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Abstract
Runtime Verification (RV) is the discipline that allows monitoring systems at runtime in order
to check the satisfaction or violation of a given correctness property. Parallel systems are more
complicated than sequential systems. Therefore, systems that run in parallel need a parallel
runtime verification framework to monitor their behaviour and guarantee correctness properties.
Parallel systems have correctness properties different from correctness properties of sequential
systems. For instance, as a correctness property of parallel systems, absence of deadlock has to
be guaranteed and mutual exclusion mechanism has to be applied in case a resource is shared be-
tween more than one system and the parallelism form is true concurrency. Therefore, sequential
runtime verification framework can not handle systems that run in parallel due to the singularity
issue of this kind of framework as they are built to handle a single system at a time, whereas for
parallel systems a framework has to handle many systems at a time. AnaTempura is a runtime
verification tool which can handle single systems at a time. To solve this problem, I evolved
AnaTempura to be able to handle parallel systems. In this thesis, I propose a Parallel Runtime
Verification Framework (PRVF) that can handle systems which use architectures of parallelism
in their design such as multi-core processor architecture. The proposed model can check system
behaviour at runtime in order to either guarantee satisfaction or detect violations of correctness
properties. My technique is based on Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) and its executable subset
Tempura to verify properties at runtime using the AnaTempura tool.
I use, as a demonstration, the case study of private L2 cache memory of multi-core proces-
sor architecture. My objectives are to i) design MSI protocol compliant with cache memory
IV
coherence and ii) fulfil main memory consistency model at runtime. I achieve this via a for-
mal Tempura specification of the cache controller which is then verified at runtime against my
objectives for memory consistency and cache coherence using AnaTempura. The presented spec-
ifications allow to extend it allow to extend it to not only capture correctness but also monitor
the performance of a cache memory controller. The case study is then evaluated via integrating
AnaTempura with MATLAB in order to check correctness properties such as memory consis-
tency and cache coherence.
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Parallel computing includes computer architecture, operating systems, programming languages,
applications, and algorithms. The design and the implementation of theses instances have to
consider parallelism in order to deliver highly efficient parallel computations. The main goals
of parallel computations are improving the speed needed to accomplish tasks and easing the
functionality of the tasks being computed. These goals are sometimes difficult to achieve due
to hardware or software issues. The key driver of hardware parallelism is the performance of
computer systems, while the key drivers of software parallelism are performance and application
functionality [211].
Parallel programming is an important factor towards effective parallel computing. The ma-
jor purpose of parallel programming is the efficient execution of codes in order to save the time
needed to execute applications. The efficient execution of codes enables parallel programming
to scale well with the problem size, which, consequently, leads to solving larger problems ef-
ficiently. This efficient performance of parallel programming is due to providing concurrency
which allows simultaneous performing of multiple tasks [210].
Parallel programming goes beyond the limits caused by sequential computing such as phys-
ical and practical factors that limit the ability of constructing faster sequential computers [210].
For instance, sequential computers speed is subjected to the speed of data which moves through
the hardware. A bandwidth of such medium restricts the transmission through a physical medium
(e.g. the speed of light or the transmission limit of copper wire). The technology of semicon-
ductors and evolutionary advancement allow a single chip to have a larger number of transistors;
however, reducing the size of such transistors to a molecular or atomic level eventually reaches a
limit. Another physical factor which limits sequential computing from being efficient is the pro-
cessor heat caused by to the amount of the consumed power; thus, dissipating processor heat by
conventional way is hard. The development of a faster processor to solve a single computational
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problem is increasingly expensive. Therefore, using large number of processors to solve such
computational problem is less expensive. The development of parallel systems architecture such
as multi-core technology overcomes these kind of problems.
Another reason for developing parallel programs is the use of several computer memory re-
sources instead of using only one computer resource which might be scarce or costly to manage
[210]. This advantage of parallel computing, in general, overcomes the limitation of the scarcity
of memory resources. The improvement in parallel systems approaches such as multi-core tech-
nology has been obtaining continuous gains.
These remarkable benefits make parallel computing the base of future computing systems.
As parallel computing systems are becoming ubiquitous in everyday life [142], careful attention
has to be paid to the satisfaction of their correctness property.
Verification techniques have to be taken into account during the development of parallel
computing systems in order to deliver remarkable benefits of parallel computing. Verification
techniques assure a correctness property of parallel computing systems with respect to their
specifications. Correctness property is a milestone in systems design and development process.
Thus, my research considers verification techniques as a mandatory approach to the correctness
of parallel computing systems. Correctness criteria is a preliminary step towards high perfor-
mance and efficient functionality. In other words, to gain performance it has to pain correctness
first.
1.2 Problem Statement and Research Motivation
In this section I will shed light on the research problems. Subsequently, the research gap is
addressed and a solution will be proposed. After that, the research motivation is highlighted.
I believe the following problems are real research problems and they should be addressed in
order to provide suitable solutions which will eventually enhance parallel computing models
algorithms and design. The problems are:
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• The correctness of parallel programs is harder to determine than for sequential programs
[142]. Fixing parallel programs bugs at the software level such as data race, atomicity
violation, deadlock are much harder than fixing sequential program ones. On the other
hand, at the hardware level a non-determinism execution is a major problem due to the out-
of-sync clocks of large systems which cause slight timing variations of a given program.
Even though the clock is synced, different interactions with operating systems or other
applications could lead to non-deterministic execution of a program each time it runs. The
non-deterministic problem makes capturing errors kind of impossible.
• Some parallel programs use synchronisation points to coordinate the work of the overall
computations and to ensure that all the parallel operations are synchronised and the data
is being used is consistent. Some parallel programs use message-passing approach to
exchange data and ensure synchronisation of data being used within the parallel operations
of such programs. The latter approach is commonly used in distributed memory machines.
However, software developers who use this approach find the correctness of such programs
difficult due to the variety of inputs that might be given to these programs. Also, the
fact that multiple software developers may share work on a given portion of a program is
another difficulty.
• Some parallel programs may use what is so-called critical section (or atomic region) to
prevent any access attempt to a shared resource at a time for more than one processor.
This mechanism is used to ensure a concurrency characteristic called atomicity. Atom-
icity violation is considered a concurrency bug. Lock-based algorithm is used to ensure
the atomic execution of the critical section (or atomic region) for concurrency sake. Un-
desired behaviour might occur due to the use of locks which is deadlock problem where
two processors are waiting for each other permanently which eventually leads to delay the
computation or halt the two processors.
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A unified generic model that can handle these concurrency issues with the consideration of
different parallel computation model aspects such as concurrency, communication and execution
is needed. Therefore, I present in this PhD thesis a unified generic model for parallel computing
models considering aspects such as concurrency, communication and execution. Such model
will benefit hardware computer systems and software performance and application functionality.
Parallel algorithms and analysis is intended to be delivered for the sake of design enhancements
and correctness verification at the same time. This model is formal method-based approach
which aims to establish an accurate and unambiguous semantics in order to deliver effective
description of every phase of parallel systems behaviour in order to fulfil correctness properties
such as safety and liveness.
Therefore, correctness of parallel computing is a mandatory need towards achieving the best
of parallelism with respect to performance and functionality. Runtime verification plays a major
role within verification techniques due to a number of reasons. Some of the most important
reasons for using runtime verification over other verification techniques are that it is a lightweight
tool, and because it guarantees the absence of states explosion caused by modelling all possible
states of system under scrutiny. My approach, runtime verification of parallel computing systems,
contributes to move forward the parallelism at hardware design level and software performance
and functionality level via the discovery of the behaviour of hardware/software during runtime.
In other words, there are states that can not be discovered but at runtime. The monitoring of
either satisfaction or violation of correctness criteria is the main task of runtime verification and
via this task hardware design and software performance evaluation can be measured accurately.
According to Muller [199] the evaluation of verification techniques focuses on the following
criteria: Soundness, Completeness, Modularity, Automation, and Efficiency. In my approach
I consider these criteria carefully as my aim is to deliver a generic model in order to verify




The major question of my research is:
• How to infer the correctness of global property from the correctness of a set of local prop-
erties for computer systems using parallel architectures?
Out of the raised major research question, a set of research questions are intended to tackle
different aspects of the encountered issues. These are:
1. How to construct a global state out of local states of parallel systems?
2. How to compose/decompose a global property out of/into a set of local properties?
3. How to handle different forms of concurrency, communication models, and execution
modes of parallel systems?
4. How to verify local/global properties at the local/global level?
1.4 Research Methodology
The research methodology I adopt follows a constructive research approach. My research con-
tributes to knowledge being developed as a new solution for the identified problem. Therefore,
I constructed new algorithms, a computational model, and an architecture framework. The con-
struction of this approach consists of the following phases:
• Background Review and Related Work:
This phase sets a comprehensive background of the involved research topics and reviews
the literature of the field of my research. The justification of my choice of the technique I
adopt to conduct this research is made. The discussion of the related work addresses the
gap and shows how our approach is going to serve the purpose of this study. My motivation





As the proposed approach is formal-method based, this phase provides an abstract formal-
isation for the proposed model. I use Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) and its executable
subset Tempura as a formal framework for specification and verification to model the be-
haviour of parallel systems using the runtime verifier, AnaTempura.
• Architecture Framework:
In this phase I describe the design and the components of the framework. I define each
component and describe their functions to be able to link the whole framework and make
it integrated. I also introduce different concurrency mechanisms, communication models,
and execution modes of parallel computing systems. In addition, this phase presents algo-
rithmic descriptions of all possible approaches that might have been encountered during
my design of the proposed framework.
• Implementation:
This phase implements the proposed framework using the programming temporal language
Tempura to model the framework components and their functions. Assertion points mech-
anism is also implemented and a set of practical improvements has been made to enable
our framework to handle receiving multiple assertion data sent from local programs si-
multaneously to compose a global property out of local properties. Java Remote Method
Invocation (RMI) framework is implemented as a demonstration of the robustness of my
proposed framework and its capability to implement various parallel systems architectures.
• Case Study:
As my approach is formal-methods based, this phase provides an abstract formalisation of
the case study which is cache controller. I use Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) as the formal
framework for the specification and verification to model the behaviour of cache controller.
The cache controller modelled using Tempura and the runtime verifier AnaTempura. A set
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of formal ITL specifications transformed into an executable code in Tempura to be checked
against a set of temporal properties.
• Evaluation:
The evaluation illustrates the effectiveness of the framework by producing a runtime verifi-
cation of the cache controller. The correctness is the success measurement of my approach.
Correctness of the framework shows consistency of the implemented system.
1.5 Success Criteria
The success criteria of my approach, in addition to answering the research questions, are reflected
in the ability of achieving the following outcomes:
1. Compositional requirements from several sources which handle local and global systems
correctness. The fulfilment of this success criteria is the answer of the question number 1.
2. Compositional collection of assertion data from several sources to handle True/Interleaving
Concurrency associated with Shared-Variable approach. The fulfilment of this success
criteria is the answer of question number 3.
3. Compositional collection of assertion data from several sources to handle Synchronous/Asyn-
chronous Communication links, which are Channels/Shunts, associated with Message-
Passing approach. The fulfilment of this success criteria is the answer of question number
3.
4. The ability to execute agents concurrently and the introduction of resource allocation
agents, and Delay and Timeout agents to model delay and timeout behaviour. The ful-
filment of this success criteria is the answer of question number 3.
5. The use of lock-based technique to enforce Mutual Exclusion to deliver synchronisation.
The fulfilment of this success criteria is the answer of questions number 1 & 3.
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6. Checking the correctness property of local systems at local/global levels. The fulfilment
of this success criteria is the answer of questions number 2 & 4.
7. The inference of the correctness of global property from the correctness of a set of local
properties of global systems. The fulfilment of this success criteria is the answer of the
raised major question.
1.6 Thesis Outline
This thesis is composed of five chapters which are organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 introduces the basic concepts of the relevant topics of verification techniques,
runtime verification, the monitor, syntax and semantics of Interval Temporal Logic (ITL)
and its executable subset Tempura as a temporal programming language used to model my
framework. Also, the justification of my choice of Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) is to
serve as a formal-method base of the proposed approach.
• Chapter 3 introduces the proposed framework and its components and a comprehensive
description of the components and their functions. Also, it introduces different concur-
rency mechanisms, communication models, and execution modes of parallel computing
systems. This chapter presents algorithmic descriptions of all possible approaches that
were encountered during the design of the proposed framework.
• Chapter 4 introduces the implementation of the proposed framework and explains in de-
tails how to implement the framework components and their communication with each
other. Also this chapter implements other parallel computing architectures.
• Chapter 5 provides the evaluation of the implemented proposed framework. Cache Con-
troller case study is modelled and implemented to evaluate my framework concerning
correctness property of cache controller. In addition to the raw data analysis, a formal
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specification in Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) of all the components of cache controller
system is given. Demonstration of the implemented case study is given in screen-shots as
the monitoring system of AnaTempura has an animation window to simulate the system
behaviour visually.
• Chapter 6 provides random and independent evaluation techniques using MATLAB. AnaTem-
pura has been linked to MATLAB in order to exchange assertion data. These assertion data
can be used within MATLAB for manipulation, analysis and making unbiased judgement
of the proposed model.
• Chapter 7 summarises the proposed approach and highlights the significance of the de-
livered contributions and draws a comparison with related work. It also discusses the
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2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I present a comprehensive background of the research topic. I present verification
techniques which are used in this field and a trade-off between these techniques. I focus mainly
on runtime verification to serve the proposed approach due to specific reasons. Interval Temporal
Logic (ITL) serves as a formal-method based framework for my approach due to various reasons.
I shed light on related work concerning memory models in addition to hardware vulnerabilities,
namely, Meltdown and Spectre.
2.2 Basic Concepts and Related Topics
In this section, a brief review of some essential technical aspects are covered such as the differ-
ence between concurrency and parallelism, parallel and concurrent models in Java programming
language, modern Central Processing Units (CPUs) and Petri Net.
2.2.1 Concurrency versus Parallelism
As in this research parallel systems are intended to be studied in order to deliver correctness prop-
erties, I have to clarify the confusion between the terminology of concurrency and parallelism.
These terminologies are often debated among computer science communities. The ambiguity in
the difference between them is confusing which might lead to misconception in views. Navarro
et al. [205] realised this misunderstanding between the two terminologies; hence, they give the
following definitions:
Definition 1 “Concurrency is a property of a program (at design level) where two or more tasks
can be in progress simultaneously.”
Definition 2 “Parallelism is a runtime property where two or more tasks are being executed
simultaneously.”
According to Navarro et al. [205] it is totally different being in progress (concurrency) from
being in execution (parallelism). Let C and P denote concurrency and parallelism respectively,
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the relationship between them can be expressed formally as: P ⊂ C, which means P is a subset
of C and subsequently C is a superset of P . In simple words, parallelism is concurrency’s
dependent while concurrency is independent of parallelism. Now the difference is even more
clearer which invites the definition of a very essential terminology in this research, which is
parallel computing:
Definition 3 “Parallel Computing is the act of solving a problem of size n by dividing its domain
into k ≥ 2 (with k ∈ N ) parts and solving them with p physical processors, simultaneously.”
where k represents the least number of processors which is 2. The problem of size n is used to
divide the tasks on the available processors in order to achieve the parallel computing consistently
and quickly.
2.2.2 Parallel-Concurrent Programming Models in Java
Java programming language has considered concurrency since the release of Java 5 by adding
the concurrent utilities or alternatively referred to as the concurrent API, where API stands for
Application Programming Interface. The concurrency utilities provide powerful features in order
to achieve concurrent programs, features and mechanisms such as semaphore, cyclic barriers,
countdown latches, thread pools, execution managers and locks.
Java continues to support concurrent programming models such as the introduction of Fork/Join
framework to Java 7 release. Fork/Join framework is an implementation of the ExecutorService
interface that helps to take advantage of multiple processors. The mechanism followed in this
Fork/Join framework breaks down the task into smaller pieces recursively and then reassembles
them once the task is done. This mechanism enhances the performance of the application via
using all available processors.
According to Schildt [234], there are two ways in which Fork/Join enhances multithreaded
programming. The first one is the creation of multiple threads, which makes it simple, and the
second one is the use of multiple processors, which makes it automatic. However, subdividing or
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partitioning the problems with Fork/Join framework must be done by the programmer. The ap-
plication of operations aggregation by Java runtime performs this task instead of the programmer
and puts together the solutions.
The use of the collections mechanism leads to a situation called non-thread-safe which makes
the implementation of parallelism difficult. Consequently, thread interference or memory con-
sistency errors are encountered as a result of the incapability of threads manipulating a collec-
tion. In order to overcome these errors, synchronisation wrappers provided by the Collection
Framework adds automatic synchronisation to collection and makes it thread-safe. Nevertheless,
synchronisation wrappers cause thread contention which does affect the parallel execution. In or-
der to implement parallelism with non-thread-safe collections, aggregate operations and parallel
streams are used. Executing streams in parallel has been introduced in Java 8. This mechanism
allows streams to be executed in serial or parallel. In case streams are executed in parallel, the
streams are partitioned by the Jave runtime. Aggregate operations iterate over and the results are
combined after processing these substreams in parallel.
The latest Java version is Java 12 which was released on 19 March 2019. Java 12 provides
concurrency and parallelism utilities such as java.util.concurrent, java.util.concurrent.atomic
and java.util.concurrent.locks. The first utility provides concurrent programming. The second
utility is a small toolkit of classes that supports lock-free and thread-safe programming on shared
memory model. Atomic package provides atomic region which prevents interference of a shared
memory being executed within this region in order to guarantee shared memory consistency.
The third utility is a set of interfaces and classes that provides a framework for the application of
locks mechanism. Locks are responsible for keeping the shared variable protected from multi-
ple modifications at a single clock in order to provide consistent parallel computation. No other
processors or threads are permitted to modify the locked shared variable until the lock is released.
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2.2.3 Modern Central Processing Units (CPUs)
According to Oak Ridge National Laboratory at the U.S. Department of Energy, June 8, 2018,
Summit is the world’s most powerful and smartest scientific supercomputer. Summit can per-
form up to 200,000 trillion calculations per second or alternatively 200 petaflops. Up until June
2019, Summit supercomputer kept being the first on the list of supercomputers ever since its
release with a total number of 2,414,592 processors [1]. IBM developed Summit or OLCF-4
supercomputer for use at Oak Ridge National Laboratory for scientific research.
National Supercomputing Center in Wuxi, China has developed a supercomputer called Sun-
way TaihuLight and it is ranked third on the list of supercomputers although it has 10,649,600
processors [1]. More numbers of processors does not always mean better performance. There-
fore, Sunway TaihuLight supercomputer has the maximum number of processors in the 500 list
available in [1].
While the maximum number of parallel processors for modern CPUs at the personal usage
level such as PCs or Laptops is 18 processors as Table 2.1 illustrates:
Table 2.1: Intel vs AMD Processors
No. Processors Release Date Generation
Intel Core i9-9980XE 18 Q4’18 9th
AMD Ryzen 7 3800X 8 Q3’19 7th
Intel Core i9-9980XE processor is a 9th generation processor and has been released in the
forth quarter of 2018 [4]. Ryzan [3] is a 7th generation processor manufactured by Advanced
Micro Devices (AMD). The maximum number of processors of AMD Ryzen 7 3800X is 8.
Ryzen 7 3800X has been released in the third quarter of 2019.
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2.2.4 Petri Net
A Petri Net is a graphical and mathematical modelling tool used to describe and study informa-
tion processing systems of various types [200, 223, 102]. In 1962, Carl Adam Petri presented
this approach as a PhD dissertation entitled ”Communication with Automata“ in the faculty of
Mathematics and Physics at the Technical University of Darmstadt in West Germany. The tool
can be used in mathematical branches such as algebraic equations and state equations. More-
over, computer science and communication systems such as logical systems can be modelled and
analysed using Perti Nets. Parallel computing has been significantly advanced by Petri’s work.
Additionally, modern studies of complex systems have been boosted by Petri Nets approach.
There are a number of different scenarios and applications where Petri Nets are particularly
useful in modelling such as state machine, formal languages, multiprocessor systems, dataflow
computation, communication protocols, synchronisation control and producers-consumers sys-






Figure 2.1: Modelling Parallelism using Petri Net [200]
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The model considers a parallel system that does a certain computation and at some point
the parallel system divides the computation into two execution paths. Each execution path is
assigned to a single thread and works independently. Once these two executions are done, at
some point they get combined together as one system as they were before the split. This parallel
behaviour model helps to enhance the process of designing algorithms and analysis for parallel
computing systems.
2.2.5 Global State Construction
Parallel and distributed systems concern the consistency of their composed global states out of
local states information as they have multiple subsystems running in parallel. This issue has
been considered in [32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 167, 274]. Automatic collections of the information
is produced from parallel systems in order to construct global state of the whole system.
Borkowski et al. [34, 35, 36, 37] proposed a methodology of organising execution control
in parallel and distributed systems which monitor system global states. Automatic collection
of information from parallel systems about their local states and subsequently global states are
constructed and composed. The global state can then be evaluated and measured in order to fulfil
a desired correctness property of parallel and distributed systems. Borkowski [32, 33] sheds light
on the importance and effectiveness of parallel and distributed systems by underlying Consistent
Global State (CGS) and Strongly Consistent Global State (SCGS) monitoring mechanisms.
Mattern et al. [167] argue that a structure of linear order of time is not always adequate for
a distributed system. Subsequently, a generalised non-standard model of time which consists of
vectors is proposed. Timestamps and simple clock update mechanism are used to represent a
global time consistently. In order to compute a consistent global snapshot of distributed systems,
a new algorithm is proposed in this in their work.
Tudruj et al. [274] propose a control infrastructure which is based on synchronisers organised
at the processors and threads levels in order to collect local states information for evaluation sake
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and produce a consistency model of global state for parallel and distributed systems.
The construction of global state of a system out of local states of subsystems which run
in parallel or in distributed model is significant and it enhances the verification process of such
systems. Correctness properties of subsystems can be fulfilled and generalised using construction
mechanism of global states. The global state’s correctness property of the parallel/distributed
systems Prop can be constructed from the set of the correctness properties of their subsystems
Propi. This assertion can be expressed formally as follows:
∧i=n
i=0 Propi ⊃ Prop
where i represents the identification number id of processors or threads assigned to execute
subsystems run in parallel or in distributed model. The local correctness property of processor
or thread i = 0 is Prop0 and i = n is Propn, while the global correctness property is Prop.
It can been seen theoretically so far that a construction of global state out of local states for
parallel and distributed systems is possible. Therefore, local states correctness properties can
infer the correctness property of global state. A practical demonstration of this assertion will be
presented later in this thesis.
2.2.6 Parallel Programming Models
The difference between parallel computing models and parallel programming models is that the
former concerns designing parallel algorithms and analysing technical aspects, for instance, com-
puting time complexity. Some commonly used parallel computing models for such purposes are
PRAM [94], (U)PMH [9], BSP [277] and LogP [67]. These prior parallel computing models will
be discussed later in this research. While parallel programming models concern the communi-
cation aspects of parallel processors and how they should be programmed. The most important
Parallel programming models are Shared Memory and Message Passing due to their wide use
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and implementation by modern Application Programming Interfaces (APIs).
2.2.6.1 Shared Memory
Reading and writing to a shared memory using this programming model is asynchronous. Shared
memory model is natively useful for multicore systems. Non-deterministic behaviour of parallel
processors have to be managed using parallel algorithms for this sake in order to maintain shared
memory consistency model. Read and write operations on the same shared memory are possible
at any time, and an explicit synchronisation and control mechanisms have to be applied such as
monitors, semaphores, atomic operations and mutual exclusion (mutex). These synchronisation
solutions and shared resources control mechanism enable processors to lock a shared memory
in order to get a consistent copy. Once the shared memory is locked, no other processors are
allowed to interfere. Constraints on shared memory can be applied in order to guarantee shared
memory consistency model [89]:
• All processors/threads must see exactly the same values for a shared memory;
• All processors/threads must see updates to the memory at the same time;
• Only one processor/thread is allowed to write to the shared memory at any given time.
2.2.6.2 Message Passing
Message passing programming model allows processors to communicate asynchronously or syn-
chronously. Processors can send and receive messages containing words of data. Messages might
arrive i) very quickly, ii) within a fixed period of time, iii) at some point of time in the future, or
iv) possibly never in case errors are encountered. There are various forms where processors can
communicate; the most common three mechanisms are:
• Point-to-Point, where the communication occurs only between two processors, the sender
and the receiver;
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• Broadcast, where the sender sends the message without a certain destination;
• Multicast, where messages can get delivered to subsystems with some restrictions.
Message Passing Interface (MPI) is the standard interface for message passing model. MPI
can be used to distribute the work and handle communication in CPU distributed applications.
2.2.6.3 Shared Memory versus Message Passing
It can be seen that the implementation of shared memory is practically less complicated, less
time consuming and can be done automatically. On the other hand, the implementation of mes-
sage passing model is more complicated, time consuming, and has to be done manually by the
programmer. Parallel programming models community believes in the fact that shared memory
model has superiority over message passing model. Therefore, I will omit the implementation of
message passing model in my proposed model for communication aspects. Alternatively, shared
memory model will be implemented only.
2.3 Verification Techniques
Verification is a process of checking whether a system under scrutiny is acting accordingly to the
contract which has been signed between that system and a set of desired properties to guarantee
the correctness criteria. Mainly, the verification process has different techniques such as theorem
proving [30], model checking [63], testing [40, 202], and runtime verification [150, 151] as
Figure 2.2 illustrates.
Theorem proving is a correctness of programs using mathematics proof to deliver correctness
of a theorem, and it is primarily applied manually. Model checking is an automatic verification,
and it checks all the possible states of finite systems which lead to states explosion. Testing can
be classified as incomplete verification techniques for checking correctness. However, runtime
verification complements between some of these verification techniques such as model check-
ing and testing. Runtime verification monitors system behaviour only at runtime which avoids
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having state explosion.
These verification techniques are subject to some factors such as the availability of formal
model for model checking and confidence strength or weakness in favour for theorem proving
over testing. In comparison, runtime verification technique is considered a lightweight verifica-
tion technique. Verification techniques such as model checking and testing can get complemented
by runtime verification. Due to the nature of such verification technique, it occurs at runtime and
only explores states which are being executed. This characteristic merits runtime verification
over model checking and testing throughout the absence of states explosion of model checking










Figure 2.2: Verification Techniques
2.4 Runtime Verification
Static verification techniques assume that designed models are completely explorable in order
to deliver correctness of these models. The assumption of the ability to access and explore such
models is not reasonable. Therefore, verification techniques must offer runtime verification tech-
niques. The states of systems under scrutiny are then generated and collected in order to do the
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analysis of their behaviour and make the judgement accordingly. Runtime verification technique
complements static verification techniques [177]. The term correctness is defined as follows
[29]:
Definition 4 “In computing systems, correctness refers to the assertion that a system satisfies its
specification.”
Runtime verification checks whether the execution of a system complies with the correctness
criteria involved within the process of system design to meet a set of desired properties such as
safety, liveness, and projected time.
Runtime verification has the ability to handle inadequacy of information being executed be-
cause it is intended to observe the executed information only and provides a property check
against the correctness specification that is already prescribed formally and internally within the
runtime verifier. A runtime verifier should not infer the execution of what is being executed so
far; in other words, it should not enforce an execution of a certain instance of a system under
scrutiny if it is not yet reached. Alternatively, it only detects the violation of the correctness crite-
ria and checks whether the prescription of the system is being respected especially for on-the-fly
applications [177].
When a variation between the required behaviour and the observed behaviour of the system
under scrutiny occurs, it is called a system failure. In case the expected behaviour and the current
behaviour of a system under scrutiny are not matched, it is called fault. When a human makes a
mistake, it is called an error. Potentially, a failure can be caused due to a fault; similarly, a fault
can be caused due to a mistake.
According to IEEE [2], verification concerns the techniques which are intended to show a
system satisfaction with its specification. Verification techniques such as theorem proving [30],
model checking [63], and testing [40, 202] are considered traditional verification techniques.
Runtime verification is introduced as a new direction within the field of verification techniques.
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Definition 5 “Runtime Verification is the discipline of computer science that deals with the
study, development, and application of those verification techniques that allow checking whether
a run of a system under scrutiny satisfies or violates a given correctness property [151].”
Runtime verification [65, 216, 103] uses a device called monitor which checks at runtime the
satisfaction or the violation of the execution of system under scrutiny against a correctness tem-
poral property. The traditional verification techniques such as theorem proving, model checking,
and testing are complemented by runtime verification.
Runtime verification does not influence or interfere with the execution of a system under
scrutiny in case a correctness property is violated; instead, it only deals with the detection of
either violation or satisfaction of correctness property.
2.4.1 Monitors
The only concern for runtime verification is whether the run of a system Sys is satisfied against
a correctness property ϕ. A monitor is intended to check whether the execution of a system Sys
satisfies a correctness property ϕ. When a correctness property ϕ is met, a truth value is dis-
patched. Formally, a set of valid executions JϕK is given by property ϕ, and runtime verification
checks whether the execution of Sys belongs to a set of valid executions JϕK [151].
Definition 6 “Monitor is a device that reads a finite trace and yields a certain verdict [151].”
A verdict being yield is a truth value which belongs to a truth domain B = Jtrue, falseK or alter-
natively it might have this form B = J0, 1K. The truth value true or 1 denotes that a correctness
property ϕ is satisfied; otherwise, a correctness property ϕ is violated [151].
2.4.2 Taxonomy
Runtime verification has brought different contributions into the verification techniques field.
Aspects of runtime verification are systematically presented as Figure 2.3 illustrates. The aspects
are Trace, Monitoring, Stage, Integration, Interference, Steering, and Application Area [151].
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Figure 2.3: Taxonomy of Runtime Verification [151]
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TRACE: Runtime verification has the ability to work on i) finite (terminated), ii) finite but
continuously expanding, or iii) on prefixes of infinite traces. In regards to finite but continuously
expanding and infinite traces, impartiality and anticipation should be taken into the monitor’s
account. Impartiality implies that judgement should not be made of a finite trace in case there is
an infinite continuation trace which might lead to a different verdict. Anticipation implies that a
judgement should be made if an infinite continuation of a finite trace has the same verdict value.
MONITORING: Runtime verification has different interests or concerns in terms of what is
being monitored. For instance, a system may get checked in terms of the input or output be-
haviour. Moreover, a system may get checked in terms of sequence of states, or in terms of
sequence of events being executed.
STAGE: Online monitoring occurs when a current execution of a system is being checked by
a monitor. Offline monitoring occurs when the execution of a system being checked is recorded.
INTEGRATION: Inline monitoring occurs when a monitoring code is interwoven with the
code of a program to check. If the monitoring code is used to externally check a program under
inspection, then the monitoring is outlined.
INTERFERENCE: Invasive monitoring interferes with the system being checked, while non-
invasive monitoring does not interfere with the system being checked.
STEERING: When a monitor only observes the program execution and reports program fail-
ures, then it is called passive monitoring. When the monitor is used to steer the program execu-
tion, it is called active monitoring.
APPLICATION AREA: Runtime verification serves different application and purposes. It
might be used to check safety or security conditions. It can also be used to collect information of
the system being executed for performance evaluation purposes.
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2.4.3 Runtime Verification versus Model Checking
Model checking determines whether all computations of a given modelM satisfies a correctness
property ϕ. Model checking can be considered an automatic verification technique which can
handle finite state systems. In automata theoretic approach [279], a transformation of correctness
property ϕ to an automaton M¬ϕ which accepts a violation of a correctness property ϕ. The
automaton M¬ϕ is run in parallel to a model M in order to check whether M is violating a
correctness property ϕ. Similarly, runtime verification has to generate the monitor as the model
checking has to generate an automaton. However, there are differences between them:
• Model checking examines all possible executions of a given model of a systemMwhether
the executions of the modelM satisfies a correctness property ϕ. However, runtime checks
only the execution of a modelM at runtime whether this runtime execution satisfies a cor-
rectness property ϕ.
• Model checking considers infinite traces, while in runtime verification only finite execu-
tions are considered.
• As a consequence of considering infinite traces by model checking, the state explosion
problem is encountered. On the other hand, a single run of a system does not cause this
problem.
2.4.4 Runtime Verification versus Testing
As stated above, runtime verification does not check the whole possible execution of a system
under scrutiny; instead, it just checks the single execution of a system. This characteristic makes
runtime verification and testing both incomplete verification techniques.
Testing receives finite input-output sequences which form what is called test suite [217].
Then the checking process takes place whether the actual output and the expected ones are met
or not. Another form of testing which is relatively closer to runtime verification is called oracle-
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based testing. The difference between this test and the former one is that the test suite is only
formed by input sequences. Then an oracle-based test has to be designed and attached to the
system being tested to make sure that the output is anticipated. Runtime verification can be seen
from this angle; however, there are differences between these verification techniques:
• In testing, more precisely oracle-based test, an oracle is defined directly rather than getting
it from a generation of high-level specification.
• In testing, in order to test a system exhaustively, input sequences have to be provided. In
contrary, this is considered internally within a domain of runtime verification.
Therefore, runtime verification can be considered a passive form of testing in addition to the
fact that runtime verification tests forever which makes it complete.
2.4.5 The Use of Runtime Verification
The model checking and theorem proving reflect the most important aspects of the implemen-
tation via a model check and analysis to make sure the implementation meets the correctness
property. However, the implementation, due to the environment surrounding the system under
scrutiny, might behave differently from what is being predicted by the model. Runtime veri-
fication is then used to overcome this obstacle via a runtime check of the actual execution of a
system under scrutiny and find out whether a correctness property is satisfied. Therefore, runtime
verification in this case can be considered as a partner to model checking and theorem proving
[151].
There are cases where some information of a system under scrutiny can only be available at
runtime and can not be explored using other verification techniques. The information of a system
is not only available at runtime. However, this information is checked out at runtime because it
is more convenient than checking it using different verification techniques, due to the nature of
the system under scrutiny [151].
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The environment influences the behaviour of a system being executing; therefore, the envi-
ronment of a system under scrutiny matters. Model checking and theorem proving make assump-
tions on the the behaviour of a system within a certain environment. However, the assumptions
made by model checking or theorem proving is inadequate. Therefore, runtime verification per-
forms a formal correctness of these assumptions [151].
For critical systems security and safety aspects, it might be beneficial to monitor a system
which has already been checked to make sure it adheres to the correctness property that is already
met. In this case, runtime verification can be considered as a partner to model checking, theorem
proving, and testing [151].
Due to the critical role of runtime verification and its partnership with other verification tech-
niques, runtime verification is worthy to be considered a major verification techniques and be a
fundamental component of the architecture of system designs.
2.4.6 Existing Runtime Verification Frameworks
Martin Leucker visited in [150] the considered existing runtime verification frameworks. Some
of these frameworks are considered major players in the field such as EAGLE, J-LO, Larva,
LogScope and LoLa.
2.4.6.1 EAGLE
EAGLE [23] is a rule-based framework intended to define and implement finite trace monitoring
logics, such as future and past time temporal logic, extended regular expressions, real-time log-
ics, interval logics, and forms of quantified temporal logics. EAGLE’s novel techniques for rule
definition, manipulation and execution are implemented as a Java library. Monitoring mechanism
follows a state-by-state basis, without storing a trace of the execution.
2.4.6.2 J-LO
J-LO [263] is a runtime verification framework for Java programs. The specification of properties
can be formally expressed in Linear-time Temporal Logic (LTL) over AspectJ pointcuts. The
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automaton-based approach where transitions can be triggered via aspects is used to check these
properties expressed in LTL at runtime. As AspectJ is working on the bytecode level, Java source
code is unnecessary.
2.4.6.3 LARVA
LARVA [66] is a runtime verification framework and is considered a lightweight approach to
guarantee properties of Java programs including real-time properties. LARVA enables properties
to be expressed in formal notations such as timed-automated, Lustre and a subset of the dura-
tion calculus. The tool has been used as a case study for industrial systems, and it has been
successfully working. At the analysis level of real-time properties, LARVA performs as well as
calculates memory and temporal overheads caused by monitoring process. The tool is also used
in order to assess the consequences caused by the process of monitoring such as slowing down a
system in order to satisfy the desired properties of a system.
2.4.6.4 LogScope
LogScope [25] is a Python framework that allows to check logs for conformance to a speci-
fication and to learn patterns from logs. LogScope architecture divides its functionality into
LogMaker tool and a core LogScope module. The latter checks logs and learns specifications.
LogScope is developed by and dedicated to NASA’s Mars Science Laboratory Mission (MSL). A
list of events is generated by LogMaker and after a communication channel is opened to MSL’s
SQL-based ground software. LogScope receives two arguments i) a log generated by LogMaker,
and ii) a specification. The specification language offers an expressive rule-based language,
which supports state machine, a higher-level pattern language, which is then translated into a
more expressive rule-based language in order to perform the monitoring process. Logging sys-
tems events can be used as a basis for automated evaluation of log files against requirements.
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2.4.6.5 LoLa
LoLa [69] is a specification language and algorithms for online and offline monitoring of syn-
chronous systems such as circuits and embedded systems. Despite the simplicity of the specifica-
tion language, it is elegantly expressive. It can be used to not only describe correctness property
but also detect failure by using assertions, so a measurement of interesting statistics can be used
for system profiling and coverage analysis. The language has been used for monitoring industrial
systems such as Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) bus protocol and memory controller.
The outcomes prove that the specification language is sufficiently expressive in such systems and
applications.
2.5 Formal Methods-Based Tools for Parallel Systems
Verification techniques for parallel systems require formal-methods based tools which use mathe-
matical concepts such as formal semantics, formal specification, and formal verification to check
the desired correctness property of such systems. The most common correctness properties of
the execution of parallel systems is concurrency errors such as data races, deadlocks, livelocks,
atomicity violation. Formal-methods based techniques are applied such as deductive verification
(theorem proving), model checking, static program analysis, and runtime verification. As I dis-
cussed in the previous sections, 2.4.3, 2.4.4, & 2.4.6, that runtime verification complements other
verification techniques such as theorem proving, model checking, and testing; thus, my interest
in this research is a runtime verification due to the discussion above and the reasons listed in the
previous sections.
The evaluation of my approach, runtime verification of parallel systems, focuses on the fol-
lowing criteria: [199]
• SOUNDNESS: A verification technique is considered sound when the check results are
valid with respect to the semantics of the programming language, or simply when none of
the errors of an execution of a system is missed.
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• COMPLETENESS: A verification technique is considered complete when it omits the pro-
duction of false positives because each detected error requires an investigation which im-
plies a human intervention.
• MODULARITY: A verification technique is considered modular when it has the ability to
deduce the correctness of the whole system from the correctness of its independent com-
ponents. Modularity allows to analyse and check parallel systems.
• AUTOMATION: A verification technique is considered automatic when it requires no hu-
man intervention. A verification technique might be considered highly automatic if it re-
quires little human intervention. Human intervention includes, for instance, providing sys-
tem specification to be checked.
• EFFICIENCY: A verification technique is considered efficient when it has the ability to
check large systems in short amount of time and space.
2.6 Temporal Logic
According to Konur [139], Temporal logics are formal frameworks which describe statements
whose truth values change over time. In comparison with classical logics, temporal logics char-
acterise the change of states over time where classical logics do not include time constraints. The
introduction of time characteristics in temporal logics makes it richer than classical logics.
Temporal logics have been widely used for more than two decades in the field of various
systems specifications, such as real-time systems and control systems (sequential or parallel
manners). Temporal logics use mathematical notation in order to deliver formal analysis and
model for systems. Temporal logics have been applied in industrial application and academic
disciplines [139].
Temporal logics are introduced in order to solve specific problems that cannot be completely
solved using different logics either due to the expressiveness or complexity issues. Expressive-
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ness and complexity are the main trade-off concerning temporal logics. The use of temporal
logics is subjected to these trade-offs; some applications prefer expressiveness over complexity,
while other applications prefer the complex over expressiveness [28].
The classification of temporal logics can be based on various dimensions such as proposi-
tional versus first-order logic, point-based versus interval-based, linear versus branching, and
discrete versus continues [28, 83, 281]. In the next section, I discuss why interval-based tem-
poral logics is more expressive than point-based temporal logics. I omit the discussion of other
dimensions which temporal logics can be based on due to the fact that I adopt Interval Temporal
Logic (ITL) [51] as a formal methods-based framework for my research; therefore, I discuss
only this dimension to justify my selection of Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) over other temporal
logics.
2.6.1 Point-Based versus Interval-Based Structure of Temporal Logics
Modelling time in temporal logics has two structures, either point-based structure or interval-
based structure. Different modal operators are used to describe different temporal relationships.
Some temporal logics use modal operators to express quantification over time. However, point-
based temporal logics tend to be difficult to express relationships between intervals [86].
Point-based temporal logics such as Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) [214], Computational Tree
Logic (CTL) [62, 84, 145] are used formulas to specify desired properties. These logics are
suitable to model computation states and their relationships. however, they are not suitable to
model a computation stretches such as actions with durations, accomplishment, and temporal
aggregations. Interval-based logics can overcome these limitations of point-based logics via the
consideration of time as intervals not points [178].
Interval Temporal Logics (ITLs) are temporal logics which are intended to reason about pe-
riods of time (intervals). The representation formalisms of time as intervals are more expressive
than formalisms as points. Interval-based logics enrich representation formalisms more than
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point-based logics. This enrichment allows interval-based logics to be used to model real-time
systems behaviour [139].
Expressiveness of interval temporal logics enables them to express a relationship between
events modelled using intervals. The syntax of interval temporal logics [237, 238, 193, 144, 169,
221, 110] is simpler and neater than point-based logics. The syntax of interval temporal logics
enables them to provide high level abstraction in order to model systems. Therefore, interval
temporal logics formulas are more comprehensive than point-based logic formulas.
Table 2.2: LTL vs CTL vs ITL
Logic Logic Order Fund. Entity Temporal Structure
LTL Propositional Point Linear
CTL Propositional Point Branching
ITL First-order Interval Linear
Table 2.2 compares point-based logics such as Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) [214] and Com-
putational Tree Logic (CTL) [62, 84, 145] with interval-based logics such as Interval Temporal
Logic (ITL) [193]. The main criteria of comparison is the representation of time in either points
or intervals form.
2.6.2 Interval Temporal Logic (ITL)
Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) is a flexible notation for both propositional and first-order reason-
ing about periods of time found in descriptions of hardware and software systems [51]. Interval
Temporal Logic (ITL) can handle sequential and parallel compositions, and it has a powerful and
extensible specification and proof techniques in order to reason about properties such as safety,
liveness and projected time [194]. ITL has the ability to express timing constraints and most im-
perative programming constructs as well can be expressed as formulas in an executable modified
version of ITL called Tempura [47]. Tempura is an executable subset of ITL, and it provides
an execution framework for ITL specifications to shift a system from abstract specification to
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concrete implementation. In addition, ITL and its mature executable subset Tempura [182] have
been extensively used to specify and model the properties of real-time systems where the prim-
itive circuits are directly represented by a set of temporal formulae. Tempura has been applied
variously to simulate hardware design and other areas where timing is crucially important.
2.6.2.1 Syntax
The key notion of ITL is an interval. An interval σ is considered to be a (in)finite sequence of
states σ0, σ1 . . ., where a state σi is a mapping from the set of variables V ar to the set of values
V al. The length |σ| of an interval σ0 . . . σn is equal to n (one less than the number of states in the
interval (this has always been a convention in ITL), for instance, a one state interval has length
zero [51]. The syntax of ITL is defined in Table 2.3, where:
z is an integer value,
a is a static integer variable (doesn’t change within an interval),
A is a state integer variable (can change within an interval),
v a static or state integer variable,
g is a integer function symbol,
q is a static Boolean variable (doesn’t change within an interval),
Q is a state Boolean variable (can change within an interval),
h is a predicate symbol.
Table 2.3: Syntax of ITL
Expressions
e ::= z | a | A | g(e1, . . . , en) | ©A | fin A
Formulae
f ::= true | q | Q | h(e1, . . . , en) | ¬f | f1 ∧ f2 | ∀v q f |
skip | f1 ; f2 | f∗
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2.6.2.2 Informal Semantics
The informal semantics of the most interesting constructs are as follows: [51]
• ©A: if interval is non-empty then the value of A in the next state of that interval else an
arbitrary value.
• fin A: if interval is finite, then the value ofA in the last state of that interval else an arbitrary
value.
• skip unit interval (length 1).
Figure 2.4: Some Sample of ITL Formulae [51]
• f1 ; f2 holds if the interval can be decomposed (“chopped”) into a prefix and suffix inter-
val, such that f1 holds over the prefix and f2 over the suffix, or if the interval is infinite and
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• f ∗ holds if the interval is decomposable into a finite number of intervals such that for each
of them f holds, or the interval is infinite and can be decomposed into an infinite number
of finite intervals for which f holds.
f f f f
Figure 2.6: Chop Star
2.6.2.3 Justification for Choosing Interval Temporal Logic (ITL)
The characteristics of Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) induced its choice. These characteristics
are presented as follows [299]:
• ITL is a flexible notation for both propositional and first-order reasoning about periods of
time found in descriptions of hardware and software systems.
• Unlike most temporal logics, ITL can handle both sequential and parallel composition
and offer powerful and extensible specification and proof techniques for reasoning about
properties involving safety, liveness and time.
• Tempura, the executable subset of ITL, provides an executable framework for developing,
analysing and experimenting with suitable ITL specifications [182].
• Modular and reusable tempura test suites can be developed.
• Several specifications can be compared over a range of test data.
• The use of specialised theorem provers and model checkers can be postponed until after a
preliminary runtime consistency check of candidate specifications and proofs.
• In contrast to model checking, execution can be used to check theorems that are not decid-
able.
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• ITL and Tempura both improve through the increased feedback between theory and prac-
tice. Particular benefits are:
– The discovery of further executable assumptions and commitments specifications
– The development of more and better compositional proof techniques
• Interval Temporal Logic serves as the single unifying logical and computational formali-
sation at all stages of analysis.
• ITL has a complete axiomatic system [197].
• In addition, Cau and Zedan [47] have provided a refinement calculus for ITL that can
“translate” an ITL formula into an executable code.
2.7 Related Work
A review of the literature has led to a drawback of Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) which is the
lack of memory model. Therefore, related suggested memory models such as Framing Variable
and Transactional Memory (TM) are investigated in this section in order to diagnose the situation
and avoid being trapped by such a limitation.
2.7.1 Memory Models for Interval Temporal Logic (ITL)
One of the most critical issues within the field of parallelism and concurrency of real-time sys-
tems is the access to the common shared resource (memory). Due to the importance of this issue,
I review some of related work approaches which have been done in order to overcome obstacles
which might be encountered in this field. More precisely, approaches such as Framing Variables,
and Transactional Memory.
2.7.1.1 Framing Variables
Framed variables remain unchanged at a state, or over an interval, when no assignment is en-
countered at that state, or over the interval. Framing Variables is defined as follows [295]:
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Definition 7 “Framing a variable x means that the variable x always keeps its old value over
an interval if no assignment to x is encountered.”
In temporal logics, no value inherited from a previous state. Alternatively, if a value is needed to
be inherited, a repeated assignment of the value should take place at every state. To inherit a value
during an interval, I use a formula for each relevant variable such as stable(x). The repeatability
of such assignments affects the efficiency of the program and makes it tedious [190, 295]. The
application of such a mechanism [196] makes the specification implicit and neat.
The study of framing variables in ITL [190] is initiated by Hale [107]. An investigation of
framing variables has also been done by Duan [295]. Projection Temporal Logic (PTL) is an
ITL extension with operators for temporal granularities and framing [78, 295]. Subsequently,
an executable subset of PTL called Framed Tempura is introduced [295]. Framed Tempura has
new operations such as projection operator prj, synchronous communication await, and framing
operator frame [295].
However, there are cases where an explicit statement has to be made upon a variable that
does not change. Whenever a memory cell has to be updated, it will be a very costly operation.
This is called the framing problem. As a solution to this problem is an increase of the speed of
the simulator. Instead of updating m memory cells m times, only one statement is needed [49].
2.7.1.2 Transactional Memory
There four attributes which define the transaction notion are Atomicity, Consistency, Isolation,
Durability or what is known for short as ACID. Transactional Memory (TM) is defined as follows
[82]:
Definition 8 “Transactional Memory (TM) is a promising lock-free technique that enables parts
of a program to execute with atomicity and isolation, without regard to other concurrently ex-
ecuting tasks. TM allows programs to read and modify disparate primary memory locations
atomically as a single operation.”
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Atomicity ensures either a commitment of the operations in a transaction completely or abortion
of all the operations and leaving no evidence behind [82].
Consistency ensures that the data in the memory is consistent with its corresponding state.
Only successful transactions commit their data and permanently store them; otherwise, the old
data is restored. Isolation ensures that an execution of a transaction does not affect other concur-
rent transactions. In other words, the result of these concurrent executions has to be equivalent
like they were executed sequentially. Durability ensures storing the modified data of a successful
transaction on a durable media such as a disk.
Transactional Memory (TM) is relatively easy to use, and it does not need locks, as it is
lock-free which avoids the occurrence of deadlocks scenario. The performance is boosted due to
the increase of parallelism level. However, its application is limited and the debugging is difficult
to place a breakpoint within the transaction.
El-kustaban [82] [80] has formalised Transactional Memory (TM) in Interval Temporal Logic
(ITL) and verified it using Tempura/AnaTempura. There are still aspects such as nested trans-
actions and mechanisms of updating the memory which should be imported to provable abstract
TM.
It is challenging to control parallel systems accessing shared resource in order to guarantee
correctness property such as consistency of shared resource. In order to avoid having access
conflicts, a synchronisation mechanism has to be applied. Techniques have been used to apply
synchronisation mechanism such as lock-based, lock-free and wait-free.
Lock-free and wait-free avoid using locks which could cause deadlock. However, they are
complex to implement. More precisely, as Transactional Memory (TM) is a lock-free tech-
nique, it avoids lock-based problems and offers high-level abstract parallel programming mod-
els. However, even though the claim made by Transactional Memory (TM) research community
that programming with Transactional Memory (TM) is easier than alternatives such as locks, but
evidence is scant [228]. A study was made [228] in which 147 undergraduate students in an op-
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erating systems course implemented the same programs using coarse-grain and fine-grain locks,
monitors, and Transactional Memory. A survey was made on the students after the assignment
and their code was examined to determine the types and frequency of the programming errors for
each synchronisation technique. The evaluation shows that students found Transactional Mem-
ory (TM) harder to use than coarse-grain locks, but slightly easier to use than fine-grained locks.
More reasons why Transactional Memory (TM) is not sufficient enough are space overhead
and latency. Transactional Memory (TM) requires significant amounts of global and per-thread
meta-data. Transactional Memory (TM) has high single-thread latency, usually two times com-
pared to lock-based technique [68]. Generally speaking, Mutual Exclusion (mutex) locks limit
concurrency but offers single-thread latency, whereas, Transactional Memory (TM) has higher
latency but scales well [68].
2.7.2 Meltdown and Spectre
Meltdown [156] and Spectre [138] are hardware vulnerabilities in modern computers leak pass-
words and sensitive data. Meltdown and Spectre take advantage of modern processors critical
vulnerabilities. As a consequent of these hardware vulnerabilities, programs get permissions to
steal data that has been processed on the computer. Although reading data of programs from
other programs is not permitted, a malicious program takes advantage of Meltdown and Spectre
to get hold of sensitive personal information stored in the memory of other running programs.
Stolen information might be passwords, personal photos, emails, bank card details, etc. Melt-
down and Spectre might hit personal computers, mobile devices, and cloud servers. Hitting cloud
providers’ infrastructure might cause a steal of data from other customers.
Meltdown breaks the most fundamental isolation between user applications and the operating
system. Consequently, programs are allowed to access the memory of other programs and the
operating system. Spectre breaks the isolation between different applications. Consequently,
error-free programs get tricked by an attacker to leak their secrets. Spectre is harder to exploit
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than Meltdown, but it is also harder to mitigate. For more information about Meltdown and
Spectre, I refer the reader to [156, 138].
These hardware vulnerabilities, Meltdown and Spectre, are my motive of choosing a case
study of cache controller of cache memory and its implication on the main memory with respect
to their correctness. The case study demonstrates a correctness of such critical systems and par-
allel architectures such as multicore architecture to deliver modular, sound, complete, automatic,
and an efficient model of the proposed computational model.
2.8 Summary
In this chapter a comprehensive background about the research topic is given. Verification tech-
niques is presented and a trade-offs between these techniques is discussed. Runtime verification
has been chosen to serve the proposed approach due to specific reasons which have been pre-
sented as well. Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) has been chosen to be a formal methods-based
framework for the approach due to various reasons. Related works concerning memory models





• To introduce the Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF) Model
• To highlight the Communication Mechanisms, Concurrency Forms, and Execution Modes
• To produce Novel Algorithms and establish a Theoretical Ground
• To describe the Components of the Model
• To demonstrate the Capabilities of the Model
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3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the computational model, namely, Parallel Runtime Verification Framework
(PRVF) is introduced. A comprehensive description of the main components of PRVF and their
functions is given. The framework has two levels which are global level and locals level; and it
has three phases which are Generation Phase, Locals Verification & Assertion Phase, and Global
Verification Phase. I describe the possible communication models and concurrency forms that
the proposed framework is intended to handle. Then a description of these levels and phases of
the proposed framework is given. Novel algorithms are invented, described, validated, and im-
plemented in order to establish a theoretical ground for Parallel Runtime Verification Framework
(PRVF) model.
3.2 Computational Model
Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF) is a generic model which is intended to handle
several parallel computing characteristics such as concurrency forms, communication models,
and execution modes. Concurrency forms might be true or interleaving. Communication models
might use shared-variable or message-passing based approach. Execution modes might follow
either synchronous or asynchronous mechanism. Therefore, I introduce a framework that can
handle both concurrency forms, true concurrency and interleaving concurrency, associated with
either shared-variable or message-passing based approach for (a)synchronous communication
links. Synchronous communication links are called Channels, while asynchronous communica-
tion links are called Shunts [47]. Later in this chapter, a comprehensive description of Channels
and Shunts constructs is given.
3.2.1 Message-Passing based Communication
Message-passing based is a model of communication between parallel systems via sending and
receiving to/from other systems. Predicates such as send and receive are used to perform com-
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munication between systems. A message being sent may either arrive or never arrive due to
system failure. In case a system fails, there shall be a timeout option to avoid waiting forever.
There are forms of message-passing communication in terms of the sender and the receiver such
as the following:
• Point-to-Point: It is where a message is sent from one sender to one receiver.
• Broadcast: It is where a sender dispatches the message without knowing information
about the receivers, such as names and addresses of the recipients.
• Multicast: It is where a sender is allowed to broadcast not only to receivers, but also to
subset of all possible receivers without knowing the names or addresses of the receivers
and their subsets.
3.2.1.1 Related Work
Cau and Zedan [47] extended Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) to include modularity, resources,
and explicit communications. This extension [47] allows synchronous, asynchronous and shared-
variable concurrency to be explicitly expressed. The developed model in [47] uses the shared-
variable approach to model message-passing in Interval Temporal Logic (ITL). The constructs
Channels and Shunts are modelled. Channels are synchronous communication links, while
Shunts are asynchronous communication links.
The proposed computational model in [47] is closely related to a wide-spectrum language
called Temporal Agent Model (TAM) [236]. Temporal Agent Model (TAM) can express both
functional and timing properties in either abstract or concrete levels. However, Cau and Zedan
[47] introduced timed-communication, timeout, and resource allocation constructs in Interval
Temporal Logic (ITL) semantics because the original TAM semantics is not accessible enough.
In addition to Channels and Shunts constructs, timing constraints, such as delay and timeout,
resource allocation, and shunts’ multiplexer called Funnel are modelled in Cau and Zedan com-
putational model [47].
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3.2.1.2 Execution Modes
To discover Channels and Shunts constructs, modes of execution, such as (a)synchronous, have
to be illustrated first. Synchronous execution enforces parallel systems to start and finish their
execution at the same clock as Figure 3.1 illustrates, while asynchronous execution allows sys-
tems run in parallel to start and finish their execution at different clocks as Figure 3.2 illustrates
where Sys1 and Sys2 represent any system running in parallel; σn represents the state number.
σ0 σ1 σ2 σ3 σ4
σ0 σ1 σ2 σ3 σ4
Sys1 Sys1 Sys1 Sys1
Sys2 Sys2 Sys2 Sys2
Figure 3.1: Synchronous Execution of Parallel Systems Sys1 and Sys2
σ0 σ1 σ2 σ3 σ4
σ0 σ1 σ2 σ3 σ4
Sys1 Sys1 Sys1 Sys1
Sys2 Sys2
Sys2 Sys2
Figure 3.2: Asynchronous Execution of Parallel Systems Sys1 and Sys2
3.2.1.3 Channel Communication
The variablesC ∈ Chan are the representation of channels whose values are triples (wtr, wtw, v)
where:
• wtr is a boolean value and its value indicates whether the system is willing to accept(read)
a message from that channel.
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• wtw is a boolean value and its value indicates whether the system is willing to send(write)
a message to that channel.
• When wtr and wtw are both true, v stands for the value currently in channel C.
To introduce a channel C, channel C ∈ P is used. To send a value of expression e over the
channel C and denotes an output which has been sent we use C!e. To receive a value over the
channel C and store it in x and denotes it as an input we use C?x:
channelC inP =̂ ∃C  P
C? =̂ Π1(C) = true
C! =̂ Π2(C) = true
C.x =̂ Π3(C) = x ∧ C? ∧ C!
C!e =̂ (¬C? ∧ C! ∧ stable(C) ; skip) ∨ empty ; C.e
C?x =̂ (¬C! ∧ C? ∧ stable(C) ; skip) ∨ empty ; C.x
The projection function Π1 gives the ”willing to read” value, while the projection function Π2
gives the ”willing to write” value. The projection function Π3 has the actual value in the channel.
The notations C!de (C?dx) formally describes that an agent is willing to perform the communi-
cation at time d where d ∈ TIME. However, in case the environment fails to react promptly,
the system will be on hold forever:
C!de =̂ C!e ∧ (finite ⊃ len = d)
C?de =̂ C!x ∧ (finite ⊃ len = d)
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3.2.1.4 Shunt Communication
The tuples (t, v) represent the values of the shunt s variables, where t is a stamp and v is the
written value. To introduce a shunt s, shunt s in P is used. To denote the written value v to
shunt s, I used write(v, s). To read the stored value in shunt s, I used read(s). To give the stamp





shunt s inP =̂ ∃s √s = 0 ∧ P
write(v, s) =̂ skip ∧ ©s = (√s+ 1, v)
read(s) =̂ Π2(s)
The projection function Π1 gives the stamp while the projection function Π2 gives the value
stored in shunt s. The notation writed(v, s) formally describes an agent that writes to shunt s the
value v at time d where d ∈ Time− {0}:
writed(v, s) =̂ len = 1− 1 ; skip ∧ ©s = (√s+ 1, v)
In case the agent writed(v, s) is required to stay stable except of the last state of the interval, the
agent pwrited(v, s) takes over as follows:
pwrited(v, s) =̂ writed(v, s) ∧ padded(s)
padded(s) =̂ (stable(s) ; skip) ∨ empty
where padded(s) is a padded expression, and it has been formally defined in Interval Temporal
Logic (ITL) as shown the above formula.
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3.2.1.5 Delay and Timeout
The notation delayd formally describes an agent that sets on hold at first for d time units, where
d ∈ TIME ∪ {∞}, and then it gets terminated without updating the global variables:
delayd =̂ len = d
The notation P Ed Q formally describes an agent behaviour such as P if P is executed within
d time units, otherwise agent Q takes over the execution:
P Ed Q =̂ if (P ⊃ finite ∧ len 6 d) then P elseQ
3.2.1.6 Resource Allocation
The v units of resource res can be requested via the agent request(v, res). The agent waits for
v units in case they are not available [47]. The agent release(v, res) is used to release v units of
the resource res:
request(v, s) =̂ if res > v then res := res− v else ©(request(v, res))
release(v, s) =̂ ©res = res+ v
3.2.1.7 The Funnel
A restricted form of multiplexing on shunts can be performed using the agent called funnel. The
syntax of the agent funnel is si  I sout describes the connection of shunts si, which is indexed
by i, to the shunts sout. When a write operation occurs in shunts sj where j ∈ I then shunts sout
must have a write operation at the same time. Shunts si and sout stay stable if no write operation
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occurs. The funnel becomes false when two different values are written to shunts si and sj at the
same time:
si  I sv =̂ (
∧
i∈I stable(si) ∧ stable(sout))∨
((
∨





∃v, t  len = t∧
((
∧




si + 1 ⊃ fin(read(si)) = v)∧
pwritet(v, sout))
According to Cau and Zedan [47], the funnel allows to execute agents concurrently to the
same shunt with making the assumption of no conflict is occurring. As an agent may perform
reading and writing to shunts, it requires at least two time units to update the stamp.
3.2.2 Shared-Variable based Communication
Shared-variable is a model of communication between parallel systems that share a variable.
All systems can read and write to the variable whenever they need to. There are constraints on
shared-variable model to ensure consistency of the value of shared variable among all systems
that share it:
• All parallel systems can read the consistent value of the shared variable at the same time
(Concurrent Read CR).
• Only one system can write to the shared variable at a time (Exclusive Write EW). Mutual
Exclusion mechanism is applied to ensure this constraint. For instance, if Sys1 needs
to write to a shared variable Data, a lock-based solution is used to enforce a Mutual
Exclusion synchronisation mechanism on a shared variable as the following:
Lock(Data); Data = x; Unlock(Data);
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Only one system, for instance Sys1, is allowed to write the value x to a shared variable
Data at a time. The above two constraints use one model of the Parallel Random Access
Machine (PRAM) models, which is a Concurrent Read Exclusive Write (CREW) [275].
3.2.3 True Concurrency
True concurrency form allows the parallel systems to be independently executed at the same time.
If parallel systems share a variable, then a synchronisation mechanism such as mutual exclusion
has to be applied to ensure a consistent value of a shared variable. Figure 3.3 illustrates this form
of concurrency where Sys1 and Sys2 represent any system running in parallel, and σn represents
the state number. A global state construction for parallel systems which run in true concurrency
is defined in Definition 9 and illustrated in Figure 3.4.
σ0 σ1 σ2 σ3 σ4
σ0 σ1 σ2 σ3 σ4
Sys1 Sys1 Sys1 Sys1
Sys2 Sys2 Sys2 Sys2
Figure 3.3: Parallel Composition of Sys1 and Sys2 (True Concurrency)
Definition 9 Global State Construction (True Concurrency): The locals state numbers i and j
of parallel systems, Sys1 and Sys2, which run by the local processors n and m respectively are
equivalent, while the global state number of the composed systems, Sys1 and Sys2, which run
by the global processor g is k; k is the sum of the locals state numbers divided by x, the number
of available processors, as follows:
σni ‖T σmj ≡ σgk=(i+j)/x
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where:
‖T is the parallel (true concurrency) operator symbol,
σni : state number i of processor n,
σmj : state number j of processor m,
g: global processor,



















σ10 ‖T σ20 ≡ σg0 σ11 ‖T σ21 ≡ σg1 σ12 ‖T σ22 ≡ σg2 σ13 ‖T σ23 ≡ σg3 σ14 ‖T σ24 ≡ σg4
Sys1 Sys1 Sys1 Sys1
Sys2 Sys2 Sys2 Sys2
Sys1 ‖T Sys2 Sys1 ‖T Sys2 Sys1 ‖T Sys2 Sys1 ‖T Sys2
Figure 3.4: Global State Construction (True Concurrency)
3.2.4 Interleaving Concurrency
Interleaving concurrency allows only one system to be executed at a time. When one system is
running, the other parallel systems are idle. Synchronisation mechanism is not required in this
form because there is no concurrent writes to a shared variable and any change gets committed
at every state, which allows the other parallel systems to see the updates in the next state. Figure
3.5 illustrates this form of concurrency where Sys1 and Sys2 represent any system running in
parallel, and σn represents the state number.
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σ0 σ1 σ2 σ3 σ4
σ0 σ1 σ2 σ3 σ4
Sys1 Sys1
Sys2 Sys2
Figure 3.5: Parallel Composition of Sys1 and Sys2 (Interleaving Concurrency)
A global state construction for parallel systems which run in interleaving concurrency is
defined in Definition 10 and illustrated in Figure 3.6.
Definition 10 Global State Construction (Interleaving Concurrency): The locals state num-
bers i and j of parallel systems, Sys1 and Sys2, which run by the local processors n and m
respectively are inequivalent, while the global state number of the composed systems, Sys1 and
Sys2, which run by the global processor g is k; k is the sum of the active processor’s local state
number and the stuttered processors state numbers as follows:
σni ‖I σmj ≡ σgk=i+j
where:
‖I : parallel (interleaving concurrency) operator symbol,
σni : state number i of processor n,
σmj : state number j of processor m,
g: global processor,
k: global state number.
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σ10 ‖I σ20 ≡ σg0 σ11 ‖I σ20 ≡ σg1 σ11 ‖I σ21 ≡ σg2 σ12 ‖I σ21 ≡ σg3 σ12 ‖I σ22 ≡ σg4
Sys1 Sys1
Sys2 Sys2
Sys1 Sys2 Sys1 Sys2
Figure 3.6: Global State Construction (Interleaving Concurrency)
3.3 Architecture Framework
As stated in section 3.1, Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF) has different levels and
phases. The levels are global and locals, while the phases are generation phase, local verification
& assertion phase, and global verification phase. The global level includes the generation phase
in the beginning and the global verification phase in the end of the architecture of the framework.
The locals level includes the locals verification & assertion phase in the middle of the architecture
of the framework. These levels and phases are illustrated in Figures 3.7 to 3.10.
3.3.1 Generation Phase
This phase lies within the global level of a framework where the global level is intended to
generate processor identification Pid, global data Data, communication model Communication,
concurrency form Concurrency, and execution mode Execution. The generation of Pids occurs
randomly via the modulo operation where a random number gets modulo over the available
number of the processors that run in parallel. Data is generated according to the nature of the
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system under scrutiny.
3.3.1.1 Communication Models
The value of Communication determines the mechanism of the communication between parallel
systems. When the value is 0, then the mechanism of the communication is shared-variable.
When the value is 1, then the mechanism of the communication is message-passing.
3.3.1.2 Concurrency Forms
The value of Concurrency is assigned to indicate the concurrency form which is either inter-
leaving or true concurrency (0 for interleaving, 1 for true concurrency). The execution value
determines the execution mode of systems running parallel in terms of communication.
3.3.1.3 Execution Modes
The execution mode is either synchronous (the value 0 is set) or asynchronous (the value 1 is
set). For synchronous execution of the communication, I used Channels, while for asynchronous
execution of the communication, I used Shunts.
These generated data then get broadcast to all local parallel systems with Pid = 0 to K – 1,
where K is the number of available processors that are intended to run systems in parallel with
all possible paths which might be encountered.
Algorithm 1 defines the mechanism that is used in PRVF model to generate Pid and Data
randomly, and set values for a communication mechanism, concurrency form, and execution
mode. The communication value determines which mechanism is being used. For instance, the
Communication’s value 0 sets the mechanism to shared-variable, while the Communication’s
value 1 sets the mechanism to message-passing. Within each communication mechanism there
are varieties of concurrency forms. When the value of Concurrency is 0, then concurrency is
interleaving. At every single cycle, one local candidate wins the assignment to be the active pro-
cessor, while the others set to be idle. When the value of Concurrency is 1, then the concurrency
is true concurrency which means that at every single cycle all locals become active. The execu-
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Algorithm 1: Generation Phase
1 Generate(Pid,Data,Concurrency,Execution);
Input : Communication, Concurrency, Execution
Output: Pid,Data
2 for i← 0 to n do
3 Pid = Random mod K; B K IS THE NUMBER OF PROCESSORS.
4 Data = Random mod N ; B N IS ANY NATURAL NUMBER.
5 Communication = Random mod 2; B COMMUNICATION IS EITHER 0 TO SET
IT TO SHARED-VARIABLE, OR 1 TO
SET IT TO MESSAGE-PASSING.
6 if Communication = 0 then
7 Concurrency = Random mod 2; B CONCURRENCY IS EITHER 0 TO SET
IT TO INTERLEAVING, OR 1 TO
SET IT TO TRUE CONCURRENCY.
8 else
9 Execution = Random mod 2; B EXECUTION IS EITHER 0 TO SET
IT TO SYNCHRONOUS, OR 1 TO SET
IT TO ASYNCHRONOUS.
10 end
11 foreach j ← 0 to K − 1 do







tion mode has two values, either 0 or 1. When the value of Execution is 0, then the execution
mode is synchronous; otherwise, it is asynchronous.
Shared-variable based communication is associated with the concurrency forms such as in-
terleaving or true concurrency. However, the association between execution modes and shared-
variable based communication is omitted. On the other hand, message-passing based communi-
cation is associated with the execution modes such as synchronous or asynchronous. However,
the association between concurrency forms and message-passing based communication is also
omitted. The reason for these two omissions is because the proposed model demonstrates all the
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possibilities of communication versus all the possibilities of concurrency of parallel systems. In
other words, the applicability of these approaches can be tailored accordingly.
3.3.2 Locals Verification & Assertion Phase
Locals Verification & Assertion phase lies within the locals level of the framework. The Locals
level is intended to synchronise the execution of parallel systems according to the data that are
sent from the global level. Shared-variable communication mechanism is determined via the
assignment of communication value. Algorithm 1 describes and models all the possibilities that
the proposed framework might encounter.
3.3.2.1 Interleaving Concurrency and Shared-Variable
I assume that the value of Communication is 0 which means that the communication mechanism
is shared-variable. When the value of Concurrency is 0, all locals receive these data and compare
the received Pid from the global level with their local Pids. If a local matches its Pid with the
received Pid from the global, it precedes; otherwise, a local sets itself to idle. Then, the received
global data gets assigned to local data DataL to be locally checked against a property of interest
Propi.
Algorithm 2: Locals Verification & Assertion Phase of Processor i (Interleaving)
1 Assert(Propi);
Input : Pid,Data, Concurrency
Output: Propi
2 if Communication = 0 ∧ Concurrency = 0 then
3 if Pid = i then
































































































Figure 3.7: Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (Shared-Variable Interleaving Concur-
rency)
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After that, the local property Propi is asserted to be sent to the global level and the global
verification phase (see Algorithm 2 & Figure 3.7).
3.3.2.2 True Concurrency and Shared-Variable
I assume that the value of Communication is 0 which means that the communication mecha-
nism is shared-variable. When the value of Concurrency is 1, the fastest local system locks the
received data Data to be able to exclusively write to it.
Once the write operation is done, Data gets unlocked and synchronised with all the locals
to enforce data consistency of shared variable Data. Then, a property Propi is checked locally
against a set of specifications within all locals system that are interested in the shared variable
Data. After that, the locals’ properties Propi and Propj are asserted to be sent to the global level
and the global verification phase. Algorithm 3 describes this model.
Algorithm 3: Locals Verification & Assertion Phase of Processor i (True Concurrency)
1 Assert(Propi);
Input : Pid,Data, Concurrency
Output: Propi
2 if Communication = 0 ∧ Concurrency = 1 then
3 Lock(Data);








Figure 3.8 illustrates the components of this model including levels and phases. The Levels
are global and locals, while the phases are generation, assertions and locals verification, and
global verification. The flowchart visually describes the flow of the data within this model.
Flowcharts components such as process and decision are primarily used to describe this version
of the model.
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Figure 3.8: Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (Shared-Variable True Concurrency)
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3.3.2.3 Synchronous Execution and Message-Passing (Channels)
The message-passing communication mechanism is encountered when the value of Communi-
cation is 1. When a communication mechanism is shared-variable, only a concurrency form
has to be set and sent to locals level. On the contrary, when a communication mechanism is
message-passing, only an execution mode has to be set and sent to locals level. Being within
message-passing communication mechanism implies that the value of Communication is 1. Fig-
ure 3.9 & Algorithm 4 illustrate this model. The first decision process is encountered within
Algorithm 4: Locals Verification & Assertion Phase of Processor i (Synchronous
Message-Passing (Channels))
1 Assert(Propi);
Input : Pid,Data, Concurrency
Output: Propi
2 if Communication = 1 ∧ Execution = 0 then





8 Print ”Local i is not willing to read through Channel C”;
9 end










locals level for the selected path is the execution mode. There are two execution modes which
are either synchronous or asynchronous. Synchronous execution of message-passing communi-
cation mechanism is modelled using a construct called Channel communication.
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Figure 3.9: Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (Synchronous Message-Passing)
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Channel construct has triple of these values wtr, wtw, and v. The first one, wtr, is a boolean
value, and its value indicates whether the system is willing to accept (read) a message from that
channel. The second one, wtw, is a boolean value, and its value indicates whether the system is
willing to send (write) a message to that channel. The third one, v, stands for the value currently
in channel C when wtr and wtw are both true.
When wtr is true, Locali reads what is being passed through the channel C at time d. When
wtw is also true, Locali writes the value v to the channel C at time d. Once the write operation
is done, the written value v is checked to determine whether it is satisfying the desired property
Propi of locali. Then, a local property Propi is asserted to be delivered to the global verification
phase.
3.3.2.4 Asynchronous Execution and Message-Passing (Shunts)
Back to the first decision process encountered within locals level for the selected path which is
an execution mode, the second execution mode is asynchronous execution of message-passing
communication mechanism which is modelled using a construct called Shunt communication.
Algorithm 5 illustrate this model.
Shunt construct has tuple of these values t, and v, where t is a stamp and v is the written
value. The construct shunt si belongs to Locali uses the write agent writed(v, si) to denote that
at time d, shunt si has the value v written to it. The read agent readd(si) denotes the value stored
in shunt si. The stamp agent
√
s denotes the stamp of the shunt si.
The funnel allows agents to write concurrently at the same time to the same shunt s. When
shunt s has different values written to it via different agents e.g. i and j at the same time d, the
funnel becomes false. When the agents i and j write the same value at the same time time d,
the write operation occurs instantly in sout. The written value is then checked against a desired
property. After that, the local Propi gets asserted to be sent to the global verification phase.
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Algorithm 5: Locals Verification & Assertion Phase of Processor i (Asynchronous
Message-Passing (Shunts))
1 Assert(Propi);
Input : Pid,Data, Concurrency
Output: Propi






8 if si = sj then










Figure 3.10 illustrates the components of this model including levels and phases. The Levels
are global and locals, while the phases are generation, assertions and locals verification, and
global verification.
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Figure 3.10: Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (Asynchronous Message-Passing)
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3.3.3 Global Verification Phase
This phase lies within a global level. At this phase locals’ properties are received from the locals
assertion phase. The global verification phase gets locals’ properties in order to compose a global
property out of the received locals’ properties as Algorithm 6 illustrates. When the concurrency
Algorithm 6: Global Verification Phase
1 Check(Pid,DataL);
Input : PropPids
Output: Set of Locals Properties
2 Receive(Propi);
3 if Concurrency = 0 then
4 Get(Propi);
5 else
6 foreach i← 0 to K − 1 do




form is interleaving concurrency, Concurrency is 0, then only one local property is gotten due to
the concurrency form. The property of the active local is received. When the concurrency form is
true concurrency, Concurrency is 1, then all locals properties are gotten due to the concurrency
form. The properties of interest of all locals are received.
Message-passing communication models can be handled according to the concurrency form
being used. I omit the concurrency forms for message-passing due to fact that my interest is to
show all the possible models without redundancy, for instance, true and interleaving concurrency
are demonstrated in association with shared-variable communication mechanism; therefore, no
need to demonstrate it in association with message-passing communication mechanism. The
same idea applies to (a)synchronous execution modes.
Locali Ed Localj =̂ if (Locali ⊃ finite ∧ len 6 d) then Locali elseLocalj
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Timeout agent deals with locals which do not behave in a time manner. For instance, Locali is
expected to do its task within d time units. Localj takes over, otherwise.
3.4 Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF) Model
Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF) model allows the collection of requirements
from several sources to handle local and global correctness properties. The model also allows
sending and receiving assertion data from several sources to handle true/interleaving concurrency
associated with shared-variable based communication approach. In addition, the model enables
the application of mutual exclusion synchronisation mechanism and the use of lock-based tech-
nique in order to guarantee synchronised and consistent shared variables.
Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF) model allows handling synchronous/asyn-
chronous communication links such as Shunts/Channels associated with message-passing based
communication approach. The model offers the ability to execute agents concurrently via the
funnel besides the introduction of resource allocation agents request and release.
Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF) model introduces Delay (Delay) and Time-
out (P Ed Q) agents which play an important role in managing such a behaviour. It also offers
checking the correctness properties of local systems at the locals and global levels. Consequently,
inference of the correctness global property can be derived from the correctness of a set of lo-
cal properties of global systems. These new capabilities are demonstrated in the next chapter,
Chapter 4.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, the computational model, namely, Parallel Runtime Verification Framework
(PRVF) is introduced. Communication mechanisms such as shared-variable and message-passing
are identified. Concurrency forms such as true concurrency and interleaving concurrency are
identified as they are intended to be used in the proposed model. Additionally, PRVF can han-
dle synchronous execution of message-passing via a construct called channel and asynchronous
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execution of message-passing via a construct called shunt. A comprehensive description of the




Design and Implementation of a Parallel Runtime
Verification Framework (PRVF)
Objectives:
• To review the current version of AnaTempura
• To describe the Development of Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF) model
• To show the Implementation of PRVF model using Java, Tempura, and AnaTempura
• To highlight the Impact of PRVF model on AnaTempura Evolution Aspects
• To demonstrate Benchmarking Applications using PRVF model
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4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the computational model, namely, Parallel Runtime Verification Framework
(PRVF) is designed and implemented. The proposed model is an extension of a runtime verifier
tool called AnaTempura. First, a description of the current model of AnaTempura is reviewed
in order to address the drawbacks of AnaTempura model. After that, the proposed model of
a Parallel AnaTempura is represented and a demonstration is given to show how it bridges the
gaps for parallel systems. Benchmarking applications such as Producer-Consumer and Dining
Philosophers Problem are implemented using the proposed model.
4.2 (Ana)Tempura
AnaTempura is a runtime verifier of systems using Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) and its exe-
cutable subset Tempura. It uses assertion points as a technique at runtime verification to check
system satisfaction or violation of a property of interest such as timing, safety, security which
are formally expressed in Interval Temporal Logic (ITL).
Figure 4.1: General System Architecture of AnaTempura [301]
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The assertion points get inserted in the source code of a system under scrutiny and subse-
quently a sequence of information such as variables’ names and their values, timestamps values
are generated. The generated data then get checked against the expected values that match a
property of interest.
A property is an expected behaviour of a system over a sequence of states (interval). The
property gets expressed in Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) and then modelled in Tempura lan-
guage to get it executed and checked against that property. AnaTempura does this membership
test as it has Tempura interpreter and the monitor [52, 54]. The main components of AnaTem-
pura are illustrated in Figure 4.1. A description of AnaTempura’s main components including
Assertion Points, The Monitor, and Tempura Interpreter is given in the next sections.
AnaTempura is a semi-automatic tool which means a human intervention is unavoidable
due to the complexity to understand systems automatically. The integration between Interval
Temporal Logic (ITL) and its executable subset Tempura allows AnaTempura to offer:
• Formal specification
• Validation and verification of a formal specification throughout simulation and runtime
checks
Figure 4.2: The Analysis Process [301]
The analysis process as illustrated in Figure 4.2 checks the system’s source code in addition
to the assertion points within it against the desired properties modelled and written in Tempura
language. The source code of a system could be written in C, C#, Java, Scala, Verilog, or Tem-
pura.
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4.2.1 Assertion Points
Assertion points is a mechanism that enables systems engineer/analyst to gather information
within a source code of these systems to analyse their behaviour over time. Assertion points
get asserted after every state which is a mapping between variables and their values. A set of
variables which is used to express the property of interest has to be determined. After that, the
assertion points get inserted directly after the value assignment to these variables. Figure 4.3
illustrates assertion points general mechanism where B1 and B2 are the assertion points to reflect
the change of code chunk of C1.
Figure 4.3: Assertion Points and Chunks [301]
Assertion points generate data which reveal information at runtime about a system under
scrutiny. This information includes States and Time Stamps:
• States information maps between the variables that express a property and their values.
This mapping technique has the format 〈Var, Val〉, for instance:
〈Pid, 1〉〈RW, 0〉〈Addr, 3〉
where three variables 〈Pid, RW, Addr〉 and their values 〈1, 0, 3〉 are inserted respectively.
The inserted variables represent a processor identification Pid, Read or Write operation
RW, Memory Address Addr. These variables are part of the cache controller case study
which is intended to be studied in Chapter 5. The above assertion point reveals that a cache
controller system creates a request to read (RW= 0 read, RW= 1 write) a memory address
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Memory[Addr] and this request is assigned to a processor which has a Pids value 1. This
generation of information can then reveal and check whether a system’s behaviour is either
satisfying or violating a certain property which has to be met.
• Time Stamps information maps between different assertion points where variables and
their values within these assertion points are changed and to record at what time a change
has occurred. A system’s clock is used to obtain time stamps. In addition to variable and
values parameters, a time stamp parameter is included to form sets of triples instead of
pairs. The triple format is 〈Var, Val, Time Stamp〉, for instance:
〈Pid, 1, 8〉〈RW, 0, 8〉〈Addr, 3, 8〉
· · · · · · · · ·Code Chunk · · · · · · · · ·
〈Pid, 1, 9〉〈RW, 0, 9〉〈Addr, 3, 9〉
where the assertion points add a time stamp value to show a change of the asserted data
between time unit 8 and 9. Time stamps could be in microseconds, seconds, minutes, hours
etc. When a memory address, Memory[3], has changed its value within these time stamps,
then a judgement in regards of a property of interest can be made.
The determination of a location and number of assertion points within a source code is still
manual and relies on systems engineer/analyst’s understanding of a system under scrutiny [300].
The mechanism of capturing and interpreting assertion points is illustrated in Figure 4.4. There
are two components which are intended to receive assertion data generated by assertion points
within a source code of a system, and then split them accordingly into three groups.
The groups as the figure illustrates are variable name, value, and time stamps. The first
component is Data Capture, and it captures the assertion data as strings and then forwards them
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Figure 4.4: Processing Assertion Points [301]
to Data Interpret component. The string has the following format:
!PROG: assert variable name: value: time stamp: !
The above clause has a set of markers. Each marker has a meaning as follows:
“!PROG” This marker indicates that assertion data are generated from a program.
“assert” indicates the data being asserted.
“:” The colon symbol separates the asserted data.
“!” The exclamation symbols terminates the assertion data clause.
Based on these markers, a Data Interpret component divides the strings into three groups
which are variable name, value, and time stamps. Then these assertion data are sent to Tem-
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pura interpreter in order to execute them and then send the corresponding output to the monitor.
Listing 4.1 illustrates how assertion points look like within a Java external program.
Listing 4.1: Generating Assertion Points within Java Program
1 class AssertionPoints {
2 public static void main(String[] args) {
3 int Pid,RW,Addr,Timestamp;
4 Pid=1;RW=0;Addr=3;Timestamp=9;
5 System.out.println("!PROG: assert Pid:"+Pid+":"+Timestamp+":!");
6 System.out.println("!PROG: assert RW:"+RW+":"+Timestamp+":!");
7 System.out.println("!PROG: assert Addr:"+Addr+":"+Timestamp+":!"); }
8 }
The assertion points in line 5, 6, and 7 within Listing 4.1 inserts three variables names and
their values in addition to the time stamp’s value. The variable set is 〈Pid, RW, Addr〉, while the
value set of these variables is 〈1, 0, 3〉 respectively to their variables names in addition to the time
stamp value which is 9. The external Java program represents a system to analyse. AnaTempura
allows systems to be plugged-in with Tempura interpreter via a monitor. To associate an external
program with a Tempura file, line 3 within Listing 4.2 has to be placed here. Figure 4.5 illustrates
a successful compilation of an external Jave program via AnaTempura which is plugged in to a
Tempura program. Once a Java external program is executed, a string of assertion data is sent to
Figure 4.5: COMPILING EXTERNAL JAVA PROGRAM
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Tempura program after they get captured and interpreted accordingly. Tempura has a mechanism
that allows the assertion data to be assigned to a list of variables within the Tempura program
intended to be checked via specific functions. These functions are listed in lines 4, 5 and 6 within
Listing 4.2. The function in line 4 is intended to pass variable names. The function in line 5 is
intended to pass values of those variables, while the functions in line 6 are intended to pass the
time stamps in seconds. These functions allow us to pass the assertion data through them and
assign the received values to internal variables to be deployed internally.
Listing 4.2: Collecting Assertion Data within Tempura Program
1 load "../library/conversion".
2 load "../library/exprog".
3 /* java AssertionPoints 0 */
4 define avar(X) = {X[0]}.
5 define aval(X) = {X[1]}.
6 define atime(X) = {strint(X[2])}.
7 set print_states = true.
8 define get_var(Variable,Value,Timestamp) = {
9 exists T : {
10 get2(T) and
11 Variable = avar(T) and
12 Value = strint(aval(T)) and
13 Timestamp = atime(T) and
14 format("Assertion data <%s, %d, %d> are received!\n",Variable,Value,Timestamp)
15 }
16 }.
17 /* run */ define Test() = {
18 exists Variable,Value,Timestamp: {
19 {get_var(Variable,Value,Timestamp) and len(0)};skip;
20 {get_var(Variable,Value,Timestamp) and len(0)};skip;




CHAPTER 4. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A PARALLEL RUNTIME
VERIFICATION FRAMEWORK (PRVF)
Once Tempura runs a test in line 17 within Listing 4.2, the monitor shows the assertion data
imported to the test. The assertion data, which has been asserted within an external Jave program,
are successfully printed out within the monitor as Figure 4.6 illustrates.
Figure 4.6: RUNNING TEMPURA PROGRAM
4.2.2 The Monitor
The monitor is a user-friendly interface which has been built to be an interactive system by
allowing system engineers/analysts to insert inputs during the runtime in order to be able to
analyse the time-critical systems. The monitor is responsible for capturing and analysing the
assertion data which is generated by assertion points. Based on a set of criteria set by system
engineers/analysts, the monitor can make a judgement on a system behaviour against properties
such as safety, liveness, and projected time. The monitor has a textual interface and graphical
interface. The Tcl/Tk [288] and Expect [155] were initially used to build the tool. Tcl/ Tk
graphical user interface no longer depend on Expect, this has been the case since the release of
version 3.3 of AnaTempura. The latest release of an up-to-date AnaTempura is version 3.4. [54].
When the run of a system initialised within the monitor, the assertion points which are placed
within a source code of a system under scrutiny send their assertion data to the monitor. The
monitor then receives these assertion data accordingly and send them to Tempura interpreter.
The Tempura interpreter then checks the executable specifications written in Tempura file against
the received assertion data and after that a judgement of pass or fail is made accordingly. The
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Tempura interpreter indicates to the failure’s location and explains why the failure occurred. This
information is displayed via the monitor.
4.2.3 Tempura Interpreter
Tempura interpreter is an interpreter of executable Interval Temporal Logic formulae. The cur-
rent Tempura interpreter is programmed in C language and denoted as C-Tempura. The C-
Tempura interpreter was originally developed by Roger Hale in 1985 at Cambridge University,
and now it is maintained by Antonio Cau and Ben Moszkowski. However, Ben Moszkowski
developed the first Tempura interpreter, and it was programmed in Prolog in December 1983.
In March 1984, Ben Moszkowski rewrote the interpreter in Lisp [54]. I refer the reader to
Moszkowski’s book [182] for more details.
4.3 Evolutionary Improvements of AnaTempura
A single vending machine can serve one person at a time. When there are ten people queuing
to be served in order to get hot beverages and while each beverage consumes 10 seconds to be
delivered, the total needed time to serve ten people is 100 seconds. But when there is another
vending machine, half of the load on the first machine is transferred to the second machine, which
means five people would be queuing at each vending machine. The existence of the other vending
machine reduces the load to the half and consequently the consumed time is as well reduced to
50 seconds to serve all the ten people. This significant reduction of the consumed time is due
to the speed increment with the assumption of having 100% parallel portion (100% = 1, 50% =
0.50) and two vending machines. Amdhal’s Law [115] is used to perform the calculation of the
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where P is a parallel portion of a system in percentage; N is the number any kind of objects that
are intended to perform parallel tasks, for instance vending machines. The application of Amd-
hal’s Law assumes that the speed is exponentially incremented in accordance with the number of
available parallel processes in execution which consequently leads to significant improvement in








The speed is doubled which means only half of the time is needed to perform the task. Instead
of consuming 100 seconds at one vending machine, only 50 seconds are needed when there are
two vending machines. Amdhal’s Law defines the incremental relationship between the number
of processors and the performance as illustrated in Figure 4.7.
Figure 4.7: AMDAHL’S LAW [115]
Dividing the ten people into two groups, and with each group consisting of five people to be
served by only one machine in interleaving concurrency form of parallelism does not change the
fact that serving them sequentially as one group of ten leads to the same result of serving them in
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interleaving concurrency form of parallelism. Therefore, practically, sequential and interleaving
concurrency mechanisms are alike in terms of performance. Performance increases significantly
by applying true concurrency form of parallelism. True concurrency form needs parallel soft-
ware/hardware components and a channel of communications in case of shared resources.
Figure 4.8: RUNTIME VERIFICATION
The current version of AnaTempura can not handle parallel systems at a time because the
current framework as illustrated in Figures 4.1 and 4.8 has single components such as The Mon-
itor (The Server) and Tempura Interpreter. The single monitor can only monitor one system
at time; also, the single Tempura Interpreter can execute only one Tempura program at a time
and this is the same for the rest of the components. Therefore, multiple components are needed
to handle parallel systems at a time. The proposed model has tackled this issue by deploying
and introducing the principles of parallelism to AnaTempura to enable it to handle all forms of
parallelism at a time and architectures such as Multi-cores/processors, Parallel Random Access
Memory (PRAM), and Remote Method Invocation (RMI).
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4.3.1 Realisation of Assertion Points Techniques
In this section, a set of realisation of assertion points techniques of the proposed model, Parallel
Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF), are introduced and explained in details.
• The variety of source of the requirements that handle local and global properties implies
the collection of assertion data from several sources, at a time, to handle concurrency. In
addition to the multiple assertion points within several sources, the assertion points clause
is extended in order to allow more variables and values to be asserted at a time. The
extended format is as follows:
〈Pidvar,Pidval,Varn,Valn, · · · ,Varm,Valm,Timestamp〉
where Pidvar could be program, process, or thread identification number, Pidval is the value
of Pidvar, Varn is the nth variable, Valn is the nth value of nth variable, and Timestamp is
a time stamp of the assertion points where time now can be in microseconds.
Listing 4.3 illustrates the extended assertion points in correspondence to the functions
introduced in Listing 4.4 to allow more variables and values to be asserted at a time and
collected at once.
Listing 4.3: Generating Assertion Points within Java Program
1 class ExtendedAssertionPoints {
2 public static void main(String[] args) {
3 int Pid,RW,Addr,Timestamp;
4 Pid=1;RW=0;Addr=3;Timestamp=9;
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Figure 4.9 illustrates the compilation of the external Java program in Listing 4.3. The
compilation occurs within AnaTempura.
Figure 4.9: GENERATING EXTENDED ASSERTION POINTS WITHIN EXTERNAL JAVA PRO-
GRAM
The new functions in lines 4 to 9 Listing 4.4 are extensions of the previous ones in Listing
4.2. The function in line 4 and 5 always reserve the parameters X[0] and X[1] to Pidvar
and Pidval respectively. The rest of the functions in line 6 and 7 have new parameters a and
b to enable their functions to assign corresponding variables to their values dynamically.
The time stamp in microseconds is introduced in line 9.
Listing 4.4: Collecting Assertion Data within Tempura Program
1 load "../library/conversion".
2 load "../library/exprog".
3 /* java ExtendedAssertionPoints 0 */
4 define apidvar(X) = {X[0]}.
5 define apidval(X) = {X[1]}.
6 define avar1(X,a) = {X[a]}.
7 define aval1(X,b) = {X[b]}.
8 define atime1(X,c) = {strint(X[c])}.
9 define atime_micro1(X,d) = {strint(X[d])}.
10 set print_states = true.
11 define get_var(Variable0,Value0,Variable1,Value1,Variable2,Value2,Timestamp) = {
12 exists T : {
13 get2(T) and
14 Variable0 = apidvar(T) and Value0 = strint(apidval(T)) and
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15 Variable1 = avar1(T,2) and Value1 = strint(aval1(T,3)) and
16 Variable2 = avar1(T,4) and Value2 = strint(aval1(T,5)) and
17 Timestamp = atime_micro1(T,6) and




22 /* run */ define Test() = {
23 exists Variable0,Value0,Variable1,Value1,Variable2,Value2,Timestamp: {
24 get_var(Variable0,Value0,Variable1,Value1,Variable2,Value2,Timestamp) and len(0)
25 }
26 }.
Figure 4.10 illustrates the collection process of a generated assertion data sent from the
external Java program. The assertion data get assigned to their functions accordingly as
described earlier in this section.
Figure 4.10: COLLECTING EXTENDED ASSERTION POINTS TEMPURA PROGRAM
• The Tempura Interpreter can now be several instances to handle concurrency. This new ca-
pability allows us to generate as many Tempura Interpreters as needed. To run the Tempura
Interpreter externally, a certain command has to be annotated within the main Tempura file
that is intended to monitor other Tempura programs. For instance, Listing 4.5 is a global
Tempura program which is intended to monitor two local Tempura programs illustrated in
Listings 4.6 and 4.7. The global program in Listing 4.5 starts another AnaTempura system
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via these commands in lines 3 and 4:
/ ∗ anatempura 0 ∗ /
/ ∗ anatempura 1 ∗ /
A description of this new capability will be given where relevant in this section. In order
to start several Tempura Interpreters instead, these commands are replaced by the new
commands at the top of the Global Tempura program in line 3 and 4:
/ ∗ prog tempura macosx 0 ∗ /
/ ∗ prog tempura macosx 1 ∗ /
These new commands start C-Tempura Interpreters as external programs within the main
monitoring system, AnaTempura, in order to monitor local programs behaviour via gener-
ating assertion points and sending the assertion data to the global Tempura program.
• The ability of the Monitor to monitor global and local properties via collecting the assertion
data that are sent from local programs. For instance, local programs in Listings 4.6 and
4.7 send their assertion data to global program in Listing 4.5. The output as illustrated
in Figure 4.11 where the monitor at the top of the figure and local0 and local1 are at the
middle and the bottom respectively.
Listing 4.5: Collecting Assertion Data within Tempura Program
1 load "conversion".
2 load "exprog".
3 /* anatempura 0 */
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4 /* anatempura 1 */
5 define apidvar(X) = {X[0]}.
6 define apidval(X) = {X[1]}.
7 define avar1(X,a) = {X[a]}.
8 define aval1(X,b) = {X[b]}.
9 define atime1(X,c) = {strint(X[c])}.
10 define atime_micro1(X,d) = {strint(X[d])}.
11 set print_states = true.
12 define get_var() = {
13 exists T : {
14 get2(T) and
15 format("Global is Receiving Assertion Data: %s=%20d from %s %d\n",
16 avar1(T,2),strint(aval1(T,3)),apidvar(T),strint(apidval(T))) and empty
17 }
18 }.
19 /* run */ define test() = {
20 exists v : {
21 {prog_send1(0,"load 'Local0'.") and
22 prog_send1(1,"load 'Local1'.")};skip;
23 {prog_send1(0,"run test_local0().") and
24 prog_send1(1,"run test_local1().")};skip;
25 for v<2 do {
26 {get_var();skip}
27 };




• The possibility to monitor a Tempura Interpreter (or another AnaTempura system) so a
hierarchy of monitors exist. A description of the process of monitoring another Tempura
Interpreter is given earlier. The process of monitoring another monitoring system AnaTem-
pura can be done via the annotation of a certain command:
/ ∗ anatempura 0 ∗ /
/ ∗ anatempura 1 ∗ /
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For instance, the global program run within Listing 4.5 has this command in lines 3 and
4. This command runs AnaTempura and this task is assigned to process 0 such as in line
3, and process 1 in line 4. The global Tempura program runs two local Tempura programs
independently in parallel to monitoring their behaviours in order to make a judgement
according to a set of properties. The functions within a global program which are intended
to load the local programs are:
prog send(Pid, “load ′Program′.”)
for instance,
prog send1(0, “load ′Local0′.”) and prog send1(1, “load ′Local1′.”)
The first parameter is a process Pid which is intended to load local program ‘local0’.
The same steps are applied to the rest of local programs when they ever exist, while the
functions which are intended to run functions within locals programs as follows:
prog send(Pid, “run Function.”)
for instance,
prog send1(0, “run test local0().”) and prog send1(1, “run test local1().”)
To run a certain function externally, the same value for the process Pid which has been
used to load this function. The difference here is the use of “run” keyword instead of
“load”.
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The Listing 4.6 illustrates local Tempura program. This program is loaded within the
global Tempura program as explained above, and the function as well is run externally
within the global Tempura program.
Listing 4.6: Generating Assertion Data within local0 Tempura Program
1 load "conversion".
2 load "exprog".
3 set print_states = false.
4 define assert() = {




9 format("Local %d is Sending %d to Global\n",Local,Data) and
10 format("!PROG: assert Local:%d:X:%d:!\n",Local, Data)
11 }
12 }.
13 /* run */ define test_local0() = {
14 skip and assert()
15 }.
The local Tempura programs in Listings 4.6 and 4.7 are alike except in variables Local and
Data. The variable Local’s value is 0 in Listing 4.6 while it is 1 in Listing 4.7. The variable
Data is generated randomly by assigning the random operator, Random, as a value to it.
Listing 4.7: Generating Assertion Data within local1 Tempura Program
1 load "conversion".
2 load "exprog".
3 set print_states = false.
4 define assert() = {
5 exists Local,Data : {
6 Local=1 and
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9 format("Local %d is Sending %d to Global\n",Local,Data) and
10 format("!PROG: assert Local:%d:X:%d:!\n",Local, Data)
11 }
12 }.
13 /* run */ define test_local1() = {
14 skip and assert()
15 }.
The monitor then displays the assertion data which are generated by local Tempura pro-
grams and collected via a global Tempura program as illustrated in Figure 4.11
Figure 4.11: GLOBAL COLLECTS ASSERTION POINTS FROM LOCALS TEMPURA PROGRAM
• The integration between AnaTempura and Java Remote Method Invocation (RMI) Frame-
work. AnaTempura allows plug-ins, as external systems, systems which use Java RMI to
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start a server implementation in order to serve clients systems run in parallel using multi-
threads programming in Java language. The compilation of Java RMI programs is unlike
other Java programs; it has different steps. The first step is to start a server and then run
the independent clients upon a running server. These steps are now embedded within the
Tempura Interpreter. In Listing 4.8 lines 3-6 are the commands which run Java RMI pro-
grams:
/*RMIREGISTRY 0*/
/*RMISERVER . RMISERVERINTF RMISERVER 1*/
/*RMICLIENT . RMISERVERINTF RMICLIENT1 2*/
/*RMICLIENT . RMISERVERINTF RMICLIENT2 3*/
The creation of RMI registry is assigned to process 0. The compilations of java programs
RmiServer, RmiClient1, RmiClient2 are assigned to processes 1, 2, 3 respectively.
Listing 4.8: Tempura RMI
1 load "conversion".
2 load "exprog".
3 /* rmiregistry 0 */
4 /* rmiserver . RmiServerIntf RmiServer 1 */
5 /* rmiclient . RmiServerIntf RmiClient1 2 */
6 /* rmiclient . RmiServerIntf RmiClient2 3 */
7 define apidvar(X) = {X[0]}.
8 define apidval(X) = {X[1]}.
9 define avar1(X,a) = {X[a]}.
10 define aval1(X,b) = {X[b]}.
11 define atime1(X,c) = {strint(X[c])}.
12 define atime_micro1(X,d) = {X[d]}.
13 set print_states = true.
14 define get_var() = {




CHAPTER 4. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A PARALLEL RUNTIME
VERIFICATION FRAMEWORK (PRVF)
18 Data=strint(aval1(T,3)) and
19 Timestamp =atime_micro1(T,4) and
20 format("Server is Receiving Assertion Data: X=%12d from Client %d at timestamp ...
%s\n",
21 Data,Client,Timestamp) and empty
22 }
23 }.
24 /* run */ define test() = {
25 exists v : {
26 for v<2 do {get_var();skip}
27 }
28 }.
Figure 4.12: IMPLEMENTATION JAVA RMI USING ANATEMPURA
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Listing 4.8 runs Jave programs associated with it in lines 4, 5, 6 as seen in Figure 4.12. The
clients Java programs have assertion points and once these programs are run via AnaTem-
pura, they send their assertion data to their corresponding Tempura programs to receive
the assertion data accordingly and then forward these assertion data as assertion points to
Tempura program in Listing 4.8. Then, the assertion data is received and displayed as
seen in Figure 4.12. The clients Java programs assert a random data, time stamp in mi-
croseconds using a format of HH-mm-ss-SSS where HH stands for Hours, mm stands for
minutes, ss stands for seconds, and SSS stands for milliseconds. The source code of these
Java programs and their relevant Tempura programs can be found in Appendix D.
• The capability to implement parallel systems designed using multi-core processor archi-
tectures. The case study, Cache Controller, is a demonstration of this capability in the next
chapter, Chapter 5.
4.4 Benchmarking Applications
In this section, some parallel/concurrent applications which can be applied using the proposed
implemented framework are explored. Producer-Consumer and Dining Philosophers Problem
are two common applications that demonstrate parallel/concurrent executions.
4.4.1 Producer-Consumer
The Producer and Consumer are two separate, concurrent programs which run in parallel and
share the same data. The access to shared data must be synchronised to deliver a consistent
model. A producer puts (produces) a stream of data into a buffer, while a consumer gets (con-
sumes) these produced data within a buffer as Figure 4.13 illustrates.
Figure 4.13: Producer-Consumer
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A buffer in this example of Producer-Consumer can hold up to four elements. When the size
of the buffer is full, it can not accept new produced elements by the producer. In such cases,
the producer waits until the buffer empties a space for a new element. The implementation of
Producer-Consumer using the proposed model in the runtime verifier AnaTempura is illustrated
in Figure 4.14.
The implementation shows the assertion data being asserted within Java external programs
that are intended to run a Producer-Consumer system in order to analyse its behaviour in order to
check desired correctness properties of such programs. As seen in Figure 4.14, the assertion data
are displayed in the monitor’s window (left side) and in the simulation window as well (right
side). Based on these data, a complete check of correctness properties can be achieved.
Figure 4.14: PRODUCER-CONSUMER EXECUTION IN TEMPURA/ANATEMPURA
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4.4.2 Dining Philosophers Problem
The Dining Philosophers Problem is a classical example of parallel/concurrent programs. Five
philosophers are sitting around a circular table. The five philosophers are either thinking or
eating spaghetti. Eating spaghetti needs two chopsticks, but unfortunately only five chopsticks
are available. Each philosopher has two chopsticks; they are to his/her immediate right and left.
When a philosopher uses two chopsticks, it means his/her immediate neighbours can not eat
because the chopsticks they need to pick up are taken and unavailable. The Dining Philosophers
Problem demonstrates how to provide a synchronisation mechanism that ensures correctness
properties in such cases. Figure 4.15 illustrates an implementation of this problem which runs in
AnaTempura.
Figure 4.15: DEMO OF DINING PHILOSOPHERS PROBLEM
Figure 4.15 illustrates that there are five parallel/concurrent programs running simultane-
ously. Each program represents a philosopher that is assigned to Pid’s (0 to 4). A philosopher’s
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actions are thinking (default initial action), eating, picking up a (left/right) chopstick, and putting
down a (left/right) chopstick. Chopsticks are numbered as well to identify them; they are num-
bered from 0 to 4 as Figure 4.15 illustrates..
Five external programs model these five philosophers and their actions. The most critical part
is the use of chopsticks because they are shared. Two neighbour philosophers are not allowed to
use the chopstick they share, e.g. Philosopher 0 and Philosopher 1 share Chopstick 0 and so on.
The proposed model handles this problem perfectly, and it allows the five parallel programs
to run and generate assertion data and displays these data in a table format within the monitor
and in graphics using the simulation window. These features allow modelling such applications
in order to validate their behaviour against correctness properties.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF) is designed and implemented.
A review of the current status of the runtime verifier AnaTempura is given, and the drawbacks in
this model with regards to handling parallel systems are addressed. Then, a mechanism of how
to handle parallel systems natively using the proposed model is illustrated. Applications such as
Producer-Consumer and Dining Philosophers Problem are implemented using this model.
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Case Study: Cache Controller
Objectives:
• To present a Case Study: the Cache Controller
• To review Cache Coherence and implement MSI Protocol
• To produce a Formal Specification in Interval Temporal Logic (ITL)
• To deliver a Runtime Verification using Tempura/AnaTempura
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5.1 Cache Memory Controller: A Case Study
In this chapter, a case study of Private L2 Cache Memory Controller that will illustrate our
compositional model is introduced. A comprehensive description of the operations and requests
of Private L2 Cache Memory, Processor, Main Memory, and MSI Protocol is given.
5.2 The Basics of Cache Memory
According to Webster’s New World Dictionary of the American Language (Third College Edition
1988) a cache is “a safe place for hiding or storing things.”; to exemplify, consider a university
library as the main memory, and the desk as the cache, the books are the things that must be
found [213]. Ever since the first appearance of the caches in research computers in 1960s and
then in computers production, they have been included in every built computer today [213].
Assigning the cache location based on the address of the word in the main memory is the
simplest method to assign a location in the cache. The process of mapping in a direct way of
each memory location to exactly one location in the cache is called direct-mapped cache. This
mapping can be easily done by applying the modulo mathematical operation which always gives
the remainder of the division operation of two operands. For instance, to find a block in direct-
mapped cache, the following equation is used:
Index = X modulo Y
(5.1)
where X is a decimal address, and Y is the number of blocks or entries in the cache, in the case
it is a power of 2. To compute the length of the index, the low order is used. In Equation 5.2, S
is a cache size in blocks and can be the exponential multiples of the base 2, such as 2, 4, 8, 16,
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Assuming that there are eight bits length for the requested address, the length of bits of
cache’s index can be found by computing the following:
log2(8) = 3 bits
This means that there are eight blocks (23) in the cache which are 000 , 001 , 010 , 011 , 100 , 101 , 110 , 111.
Suppose there are 10 as a decimal address requested by a processor, and the length of the block
address is 8 bits, the requested address has to go through the following:
1. Convert the requested address into binary: 1010 = 010102
2. Determine the length of bits used for cache index: log2(8) = 3 bits
3. Modulo used to determine the cache index that will match this address:
1010 mod 810 = 210 or in binary format 0102
Therefore, the requested address 1010 goes to index 0102 and continues the computation. But,
this index could be shared by other requested addresses such as 1810, 2610, 3410 or any decimal
number having 210, or alternatively 0102, as a resultant of the modulo operation. To solve this
conflict the tag field is introduced. Tags contain the upper portion of the address to distinguish
this requested address from other addresses which have the same index block. For instance,
consider previous example:
address 1010 : 1010 mod 810 = 210 or 0102
address 1810 : 1810 mod 810 = 210 or 0102
Both addresses have the same index. Therefore, if the two upper portions are set of the binary
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address as a tag field, then there will be different tags which are:
address 1010 (010102) has 012 as a Tag field
address 1810 (100102) has 102 as a Tag field
Alternatively, the tag field can be determined using the division operation of the requested ad-
dress over the the length of the cache index as Equation 5.3 illustrates:
Tag = Addr divS
(5.3)
where Addr is the requested address and S is the size of the cache. For instance, in case the
size of the index is 8 and to determine the tag field of addresses 10, 18, Equation 5.3 is used as
follows:
10 div 8 = 110 or 012
18 div 8 = 210 or 102
Therefore, the addresses from 0 to 7 have the tag 0, the addresses from 8 to 15 have the tag 1,
and the addresses from 16 to 23 have the tag 2 and so on.
5.2.1 Description
The multi-core processor architecture has at least two independent cores, each core has its L1
cache, and they share L2 cache as illustrated in figure 5.1. Some architectures have different
designs such as shared L2 cache; the dedicated or private L2 cache design is adopted to demon-
strate the proposed approach. The main memory is connected to the L2 cache memory using
a bus. The bus is a broadcast medium that transients the addresses and data requested by the
processors between the caches or between the cache and main memory.
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Figure 5.1: Dual Core Dual Processor System
A core or a processor requests either a read or a write operation. When a processor requests
to read an address from the cache, the cache checks its index; if it is found, then the cache fetches
the address to the processor. This case is called Read Hit. If the cache does not find the requested
address within its index, the request gets transferred to the main memory and the main memory
fetches the requested address to the processor, and it keeps this address in the cache for further
requests by the processor. This case is called Read Miss.
When the request is write, it becomes more complicated. There are two types of write oper-
ation which are are write-through and write-back. In write-through, the write operation updates
both the cache and the main memory simultaneously, so the cache and the main memory are
always consistent. In write-back when a write occurs, it updates the cache only, then writes the
modified block of the cache to the main memory when the block is replaced [213].
In case of write-through, the processor requests to write data to a block in the cache; if the
block is found, the data is then written to the block in the cache and at the same moment the main
memory gets updated. This case is called Write Hit. If the requested cache block is not found
then the request gets transferred to the main memory and performs the write operation upon the
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requested address. Then the main memory keeps a copy of this updated block in the cache for
further requests. This case is called Write Miss.
In case of write-back, a processor requests to write data to a cache block; if a cache block is
found, then the write operation occurs without updating the main memory, which means that the
cache block and the main memory are inconsistent. This case is called Write Hit. This scheme of
writing improves the performance of the processor as the processor does not need to wait until the
main memory becomes consistent with the cache. Instead, the processor continues performing
other tasks. But whenever that cache block gets replaced by another request, the modified block
gets written to the main memory. If the requested cache block is not found in the cache, then
the main memory fetches the data of the requested address to the correspondent cache block.
This case is called Write Miss[213]. Tables 5.1 to 5.7 illustrate the read-write/miss-hit of the
Table 5.1: 9-Memory Refernces to 8-Blocks Cache
State Decimal Address Binary Address Hit-Miss Assigned Cache Block
0 2210 101102 Miss (101102 mod 8) = 1102
1 2610 110102 Miss (110102 mod 8) = 0102
2 2210 101102 Hit (101102 mod 8) = 1102
3 2610 110102 Hit (110102 mod 8) = 0102
4 1610 100002 Miss (100002 mod 8) = 0002
5 310 000112 Miss (000112 mod 8) = 0112
6 1610 100002 Hit (100002 mod 8) = 0002
7 1810 100102 Miss (100102 mod 8) = 0102
8 1610 100002 Hit (100002 mod 8) = 0002
addresses requested by a processor. Table 5.1 illustrates 9 requests by a processor of addresses
Memory[22], Memory[26], Memory[16], Memory[3], and Memory[18]. Some of these ad-
dresses are requested twice which causes the occurrence of hits within the cache. For instance, at
state 0, a processor requests address Memory[22] and because this address is not present within
the cache, the request is transferred to the main memory to deliver it to the requester. The main
memory of address 22, Memory[22], gets copied into the cache accordingly, and the requested
data of this memory address is provided to the processor to continue the computation. The same
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steps are taken at state 1 of address 26. The interesting part is that when one of the previous
addresses gets requested again by a processor, it means that the requested address is already now
in the cache after the fetch operation is performed by the main memory in the previous state. The
request of the requested address gets hit as illustrated in table 5.1 at state 2 and 3 of addresses
Memory[22] and Memory[26]. The same policy is applied on the remaining requests.
Tables 5.2 to 5.7 show the described policy of read-write/miss-hit step by step. The tables
are designed according to the cache main components. The cache memory has Index, Valid,
Tag, and Data fields. The index is a unique place to store the requested addresses with their data
accordingly as illustrated in Equation 5.1. The tag determination is described in Equation 5.3.
The valid bit is an indication of whether the cache block is empty or not. For instance, it might
have 0 or N to indicate that the cache block is not valid because it is empty, whereas the values 1
or Y indicate that the cache block is valid.
Table 5.2: Empty 8-Blocks Cache









Table 5.3: Miss of Address [101102]







110 Y 102 Memory[101102]
111 N
Table 5.4: Miss of Address [110102]
Index V Tag Data
000 N
001 N




110 Y 102 Memory[101102]
111 N
Table 5.5: Miss of Address [100002]
Index V Tag Data
000 Y 102 Memory[100002]
001 N




110 Y 102 Memory[101102]
111 N
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Table 5.6: Miss of Address [000112]
Index V Tag Data
000 Y 102 Memory[100002]
001 N
010 Y 112 Memory[110102]
011 Y 002 Memory[000112]
100 N
101 N
110 Y 102 Memory[101102]
111 N
Table 5.7: Miss of Address [100102]
Index V Tag Data
000 Y 102 Memory[100002)
001 N
010 Y 102 Memory[100102]
011 Y 002 Memory[000112]
100 N
101 N
110 Y 102 Memory[101102]
111 N
5.2.2 MSI Protocol
To maintain cache coherence for multi-core architecture, the cache coherence protocols are im-
plemented. Snooping protocol is the most popular cache coherence protocol. The key to imple-
ment these protocols is the track of the states of the caches’s blocks. A cache block has different
states, when the the block is shared by more than one processor, it is called the Shared state or
is simply represented as S. The Modified state or M state is the state when the block is modified
in the cache, and this block is not consistent with the main memory. When a cache block gets
modified by a processor, any other processors with copies of this cache block has to invalidate
their copies; it is represented as I state. These three states together form a protocol called MSI
Protocol. There are other protocols with extended states such as MESI with the Exclusive state
E, and another protocol is called MOESI with another state called Owned or O [213]. How-
ever, in this research, the simplest protocol which is MSI Protocol is adopted to demonstrate the
proposed approach as these three states perfectly serve the case study.
This protocol is proposed to maintain coherence of the cache memory of one processor with
another cache memory of a different processor. The Modified state occurs when a cache block is
inconsistent with its correspondent in the main memory. The Shared state occurs when a cache
block is consistent with another processor’s same cache block or with its correspondent in the
main memory or both. The Invalid state occurs when a cache block is not present in the cache
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or updated in another cache block of another processor. Any two or more processors which have
their private cache memory must meet the criteria of MSI Protocol in Table 6.1.
Table 5.8: MSI Protocol
Modified Shared Invalid
Modified 7 7 3
Shared 7 3 3
Invalid 3 3 3
The check mark means that any two or more cache blocks of different processors can have
these states at the same time, while the cross mark means the occurrence of these states is not
allowed at the same time.
5.2.3 Formal Description of Cache Controller
The basic operations and properties of Processor, Level 2 of Cache Memory (L2 Cache), Mem-
ory, and MSI Protocol are summarised as follows:
• Operations of the processor:
1. Read from Address A (0 indicates Read operation)
2. Write Data B to Address A (1 indicates Write operation)
• Status of the processor’s request:
1. Hit
2. Miss
• Status of L2 Cache Index:
1. Valid (0 indicates Invalid, 1 indicates Valid), where Valid means that the cache block
is not empty and it has a datum in it.
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2. Dirty (0 indicates Not Dirty, 1 indicates Dirty), where Dirty means that the cache
block is not consistent with the main memory.
• MSI Status of L2 Cache Index:
1. Modified (If the index is inconsistent with its correspondent in the Main Memory.)
2. Shared (If the index is consistent with another processor’s cache block or the main
memory or both.)
3. Invalid (If the index is not present in the cache or updated in another cache.)
5.2.4 Compositional Modelling
In this section, a compositional modelling of the behaviour of the components of Cache Memory
Controller System using Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) is given as follows:
1. Processor[i] (0 6 i < nprocessors), where nprocessors = 3
2. L2CacheTag[i][j] (0 6 i < nprocessors),(0 6 j < ncachelocations), where
ncachelocations = 8
3. L2CacheState[i][j] (0 6 i < nprocessors),(0 6 j < ncachelocations)
4. Valid[i][j] (0 6 i < nprocessors),(0 6 j < ncachelocations)
5. Dirty[i][j] (0 6 i < nprocessors),(0 6 j < ncachelocations)
6. L2CacheMemory[i][j] (0 6 i < nprocessors),(0 6 j < ncachelocations)
7. MainMemory[j] (0 6 j < nmemorylocations), where nmemorylocations = 16
A formal description in Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) [54] of the Cache Controller system is
given. The possible transitions of the system are as follows:
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The Processor X request: Let Processor[X] be a state variable representing the state of
Processor X with all possible values with regards to Read-Write/Hit-Miss. The specification ex-
pressed in Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) is a formal description of Processor X Requests. The
full specification of this behaviour is written in Tempura code in Appendix B. Tempura is an
executable subset of Interval Temporal Logic (ITL). Refer to table 5.9, for more details. I refer
the reader to [182]. The following are variables declarations and their descriptions:
X =Random mod 3 : the case study has three processors
Y =(Random+ 1) mod 3
Z =(Random+ 2) mod 3
RW =Random mod 2 : if RW = 0 it is Read, if RW = 1 it is Write
Addr =Random mod 16 : Random generation of addresses between 0 and 15
Tag =Addr div 8 : Tag used to distinguish the addresses which share the cache’s index
Data =Random mod 30 : Random generation of the data between 0 and 29
Indexc =Addr mod 8 : The size of the cache is 8 blocks
Indexm =Addr mod 16 : The size of the memory is 16 blocks
Indexm′ = Addr mod 16 : where Indexm 6= Indexm′
InitialValuec =− 8 : The initial value for cache blocks is −8
InitialValuem =− 16 : The initial value for memory is −16
tagx =L2CacheTag[X][Indexc] : Tag of cache block indexc of Processor X
tagy =L2CacheTag[Y ][Indexc] : Tag of cache block indexc of Processor Y
tagz =L2CacheTag[Z][Indexc] : Tag of cache block indexc of Processor Z
ntagx =© (L2CacheTag[X][Indexc]) : Next state Tag of cache block indexc of Processor X
ntagy =© (L2CacheTag[Y ][Indexc]) : Next state Tag of cache block indexc of Processor Y
ntagz =© (L2CacheTag[Z][Indexc]) : Next state Tag of cache block indexc of Processor Z
csx =L2CacheState[X][Indexc] : State of cache block indexc of Processor X
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csy =L2CacheState[Y ][Indexc] : State of cache block indexc of Processor Y
csz =L2CacheState[Z][Indexc] : State of cache block indexc of Processor Z
ncsx =© (L2CacheState[X][Indexc]) : Next state of cache block indexc of Processor X
ncsy =© (L2CacheState[Y ][Indexc]) : Next state of cache block indexc of Processor Y
ncsz =© (L2CacheState[Z][Indexc]) : Next state of cache block indexc of Processor Z
stringx =Read Hit : The address is found in the cache and read from the cache
stringx =Read Miss : The address is not found in the cache and read from the memory
stringx =Write Hit : The address is found in the cache and the data is written to the cache
stringx =Write Miss : The address is not found in the cache and data is written to the memory
stringy =Read Hit : The address is found in and read from the cache
stringy =Read Miss : The address is not found in the cache and read from the memory
stringy =Write Hit : The address is found in the cache and the data is written to the cache
stringy =Write Miss : The address is not found in the cache and data is written to the memory
stringz =Read Hit : The address is found in the cache and read from the cache
stringz =Read Miss : The address is not found in the cache and read from the memory
stringz =Write Hit : The address is found in the cache and the data is written to the cache
stringz =Write Miss : The address is not found in the cache and data is written to the memory
The main operations in the cache controller system are read and write. A formal expression
of read and write operations in ITL is considered later in this section. The rest of the operations
can be derived and expressed in ITL by referring to Table 5.9. The read operation occurs when
the marker RW’s value is 0. There are three processors which are X, Y and Z, where they
individually check values of the relevant variables in order to deliver coherence cache states and
consistent memory. The following specifications are modelling the read operation in ITL:
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Processor Request(X,RW,Addr,Data) =̂ (1
Skip ∧2
if RW = 0 then (3
if Tag = Tagx ∧4
Statex = shared ∨5
Statex = modified then (6




if Statex = modified then (11
Dirty[X][Indxc] := 1 ∧12







if Tag = Tagy ∧20
Statey = shared ∨21
Statey = modified then (· · · )22
if Tag = Tagz ∧23
Statez = shared ∨24
Statez = modified then (· · · )25
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The case for the write operation is encountered when the marker RW’s value is 1. The
following specifications are modelling the write operation in ITL:




else if RW = 1 then (30
if Tag = Tagx then (31
stringx := Write Hit ∧32
L2Cache[X][Indxc] := Data ∧33
stable(Mem[Indxm] ∧34
stable(V alid[X][Indxc]) ∧35
if L2Cache[X][Indxc] 6= Mem[Indxm] then (36
Dirty[X][Indxc] := 1 ∧37
Statx := modified ∧ Staty := invalid ∧ Statz := invalid38
) else (39
stable(Dirty[X][Indxc]) ∧ stable(State[X][Indxc]) ∧40
stable(State[Y ][Indxc]) ∧ stable(State[Z][Indxc])41
) else (42
stringx := Write Miss ∧43
Mem[Indxm] := Data ∧44
if Dirty[X][Indxc] = 1 then (45
Mem[Indxm
′
] := L2Cache[X][Indxc] ∧46
© (L2Cache[X][Indxc] := Mem[Indxm]) ∧47
© (Dirty[X][Indxc] := 0) ∧ © (Statex := shared) ∧48
© (Statey := invalid) ∧ © (Statez := invalid) ∧49
107
CHAPTER 5. CASE STUDY: CACHE CONTROLLER
© (stable(V alid[X][Indxc]))50
) else (51
L2Cache[X][Indxc] := Mem[Indxm] ∧52
V alid[X][Indxc] := 153
))))54
if Tag = Tagy then (· · · )55
·56
·57




For a complete ITL modelling for the cache controller case study, the Tempura code is listed
in Appendix B where Table 5.9 can be used as a conversion from Tempura to ITL syntax.
Table 5.9: TEMPURA SYNTAX VERSUS ITL SYNTAX
ITL Tempura
f1 ∧ f2 f1 and f2




if b then f1 else f2 if b then f1 else f2
while b do f while b do f
Repeat b Until f Repeat b Until f
procedures define p(e1,. . ., en) = f
functions define g(e1,. . ., en) = e
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Processor X Writes to Cache: When a requested address is found in a cache, then a write
operation occurs in the cache which belongs to Processor X. VBit changes its value to 1 to
indicate that this cache block is valid. The tag of this cache block changes its value to the tag
determined by applying Equation 5.3 on Processor X and the requested address.
write to cache(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, V bit,X,M, V, tag, j) =̂ (62
skip ∧63
(∀ i < nprocessors •64
(∀ j < ncachelocations •65
if i = X ∧ j = M then(66
if V bit[i][j] = 1 then (stable(V bit[i][j])67
) else (V bit[i][j] := 1) ∧68










Processor X Writes to Memory: When Processor X requests to write to the cache block
and this cache block is already occupied by another address, the data of this address gets written
to a memory and a new requested address writes its new data to this cache block and sets Dirty
Bit to 1 to indicate that this cache block and its correspondent in the memory are inconsistent.
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write to memory(MainMemory,X,M, V, T ick) =̂ (79
skip ∧80
(∀ j < nmemorylocations • (81







Memory is unchanged: At every state, the memory either gets changed or unchanged. The
cases when a memory is unchanged, is the case where a write-back occurs.
memory unchanged(MainMemory) =̂ (89
skip ∧90





Cache is unchanged: When a read hit occurs, then a cache stays unchanged. Otherwise, a
cache gets changed.
cache unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, V bit, x) =̂ (96
skip ∧97
(∀ j < ncachelocations • (98
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Update MSI States: The states of MSI Protocol has been discussed in section 5.2.2, and the
criteria that manages these states is illustrated in table 6.1.
update msi(i, B, L2CacheState, v) =̂ (105
(∀ j < ncachelocations •106







5.3 Analysis and Discussion
In this section, data analysis of the collected data after the execution of Parallel Runtime Verifi-
cation Framework (PRVF) on the cache controller case study is given. Figure 5.2 demonstrates
the final execution of the cache controller. In this case study, an assumption has been made
in which there are three independent processors running in parallel in order to demonstrate the
































Figure 5.2: CACHE CONTROLLER
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5.3.1 Global Program : Cache Controller
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 illustrate the execution of the first state, state 0, of the cache controller. For
all states execution (state 0 to state 9) of the case study, see appendix A. Figure 5.3 is the output
of the run of a Tempura code of the cache controller at state 0, while Figure 5.4 is a graphical
simulation of the cache controller written in Tcl/Tk language [288, 179, 155] of the same state
number.
The output shows the details of the request which has been made by a random processor. The
request is either a read or write request. Every request has the ID of a requester processor X, the
read-write indicator RW (0 for read, 1 for write), the requested address in the memory Addr,
and the data Data which is written either to a cache memory or a main memory, or both.
In case the read-write indicator is 0, which means read operation, the data field is used to store
the requested value of the requested address either from the cache memory in case the request
gets hit or from the main memory in case the request gets missed.
Therefore, at every state this information has to be shown in details. This information in-
cludes State number, Processor ID, Address in the memory, Read-Write indicator, and Data.
Based on these data, expanded information is given within the table in figure 5.3. This informa-
tion is illustrated in Table 5.10.
5.3.1.1 Raw Data Description
The first column Table 5.10 is the state number, and this column has multi-row because all
the three rows have the same state number. The second column Pid is the requester processor
identification number in addition to the other idle processors IDs. The objective of displaying the
other processors’ information is to show the consistency and readability of information within
the table at every state. The third column is the operation indicator RW. The fourth and forth






























































Figure 5.4: ANATEMPURA SIMULATION AT STATE 0
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The length of the binary address is subjected to the space in the implementation within the
runtime verifier AnaTempura. As the addresses’ values are generated randomly by using the
modulo operation over 30, the highest value of the requested addresses is 29, which means that
at least 5-bits length is adequate to represent the decimal addresses between 0 and 29 in binary
format. The sixth column is the index of the cache. As explained earlier in Equation 5.2, the
length of the index can determine the size of this index. For instance, in our case the length of
the index bits is 3 which means 23 = 8 Indexes. The seventh column is the Valid bit field which
is an indicator whether the cache block in a specific index is valid or invalid. If the cache block
has a datum in it, then the value of the valid bit is 1 which means true. Otherwise, it is 0 which
means false. The eighth field is the Dirty bit which is an indicator of the consistency between a
specific cache block and its correspondent in the main memory. If they are consistent, then the
dirty bit value is 1 which means true. Otherwise it is 0 which means false. The ninth column is
the Tag field which is the upper five portions of the requested address as the lower three portions
are used for the index. Alternatively, the Tag value can be determined as a result of the division of
the requested address over the length of the cache index as explained in Equation 5.3. The tenth
column is the Hit-Miss which is the result of the requested address. When the requested address
is found within the cache, it is either Read Hit or Write Hit, depending on the second column
operation RW’s value. The eleventh column is Data where the value of the cache block for all
the processors within the cache show their values. I set all the cache blocks for all the processors
to an initial value −8 to avoid any execution error as I could not leave these cache blocks empty.
They have to have integers number as values, as the language I used, Tempura, does not support
null values. The twelfth column is the Coherence State; in other words it is the MSI Protocol
criteria. For more about the MSI Protocol, refer to section 5.2.2. The thirteenth column is the
value of the requested address within the main memory. Again, I set the integer number −16 for
all the memory addresses as initial values for the same reason I used −8 as initial value for the
cache blocks.
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Table 5.10: TEMPURA RUN OF INTERLEAVED PARALLEL LOCAL PROCESSORS 0, 1 & 2
State Pid Oper. Addr10 Addr2 Cache[Index] VBit DBit Tag Hit-Miss Data MSI Memory[Addr] = Data
0
0(0) 0 14 0001110 Cache[110] 1 0 1 Read Miss −16 Shared[0] Memory[0001110]=−16
0(1) 0 14 0001110 Cache[110] 0 0 −1 Read Miss −8 Invalid[1] Memory[0001110]=−16
0(2) 0 14 0001110 Cache[110] 0 0 −1 Read Miss −8 Invalid[2] Memory[0001110]=−16
1
2(2) 0 10 0001010 Cache[010] 1 0 1 Read Miss −16 Shared[2] Memory[0001010]=−16
2(0) 0 10 0001010 Cache[010] 0 0 −1 Read Miss −8 Invalid[0] Memory[0001010]=−16
2(1) 0 10 0001010 Cache[010] 0 0 −1 Read Miss −8 Invalid[1] Memory[0001010]=−16
2
0(0) 1 6 0000110 Cache[110] 1 1 0 Write Miss 13 Modified[0] Memory[0000110]=−16
0(1) 1 6 0000110 Cache[110] 0 0 −1 Write Miss −8 Invalid[1] Memory[0000110]=−16
0(2) 1 6 0000110 Cache[110] 0 0 −1 Write Miss −8 Invalid[2] Memory[0000110]=−16
3
2(2) 0 4 0000100 Cache[100] 1 0 0 Read Miss −16 Shared[2] Memory[0000100]=−16
2(0) 0 4 0000100 Cache[100] 0 0 −1 Read Miss −8 Invalid[0] Memory[0000100]=−16
2(1) 0 4 0000100 Cache[100] 0 0 −1 Read Miss −8 Invalid[1] Memory[0000100]=−16
4
1(1) 1 1 0000001 Cache[001] 1 1 0 Write Miss 14 Modified[1] Memory[0000001]=−16
1(2) 1 1 0000001 Cache[001] 0 0 −1 Write Miss −8 Invalid[2] Memory[0000001]=−16
1(0) 1 1 0000001 Cache[001] 0 0 −1 Write Miss −8 Invalid[0] Memory[0000001]=−16
5
0(0) 1 15 0001111 Cache[111] 1 1 1 Write Miss 19 Modified[0] Memory[0001111]=−16
0(1) 1 15 0001111 Cache[111] 0 0 −1 Write Miss −8 Invalid[1] Memory[0001111]=−16
0(2) 1 15 0001111 Cache[111] 0 0 −1 Write Miss −8 Invalid[2] Memory[0001111]=−16
6
2(2) 1 3 0000011 Cache[011] 1 1 0 Write Miss 14 Modified[2] Memory[0000011]=−16
2(0) 1 3 0000011 Cache[011] 0 0 −1 Write Miss −8 Invalid[0] Memory[0000011]=−16
2(1) 1 3 0000011 Cache[011] 0 0 −1 Write Miss −8 Invalid[1] Memory[0000011]=−16
7
0(0) 1 9 0001001 Cache[001] 1 1 1 Write Miss 3 Modified[0] Memory[0001001]=−16
0(1) 1 9 0001001 Cache[001] 0 0 0 Write Miss 14 Invalid[1] Memory[0001001]=−16
0(2) 1 9 0001001 Cache[001] 0 0 −1 Write Miss −8 Invalid[2] Memory[0001001]=−16
8
2(2) 0 4 0000100 Cache[100] 1 0 0 Read Hit −16 Shared[2] Memory[0000100]=−16
2(0) 0 4 0000100 Cache[100] 0 0 −1 Read Miss −8 Invalid[0] Memory[0000100]=−16
2(1) 0 4 0000100 Cache[100] 0 0 −1 Read Miss −8 Invalid[1] Memory[0000100]=−16
9
0(0) 0 8 0001000 Cache[000] 1 0 1 Read Miss −16 Shared[0] Memory[0001000]=−16
0(1) 0 8 0001000 Cache[000] 0 0 −1 Read Miss −8 Invalid[1] Memory[0001000]=−16
0(2) 0 8 0001000 Cache[000] 0 0 −1 Read Miss −8 Invalid[2] Memory[0001000]=−16
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5.3.1.2 External Programs : Local Processors
Figure 5.5 shows the external programs’ outputs. These external programs are the processors
which run randomly and independently. Each external program gets A Processor identification
number Pid assigned to it within the cache controller program, for instance:
Listing 5.1: Pids Assignment to Local Programs
1 {{prog_send1(0,"load 'Processor_0_5'.") and
2 prog_send1(1,"load 'Processor_1_5'.") and
3 prog_send1(2,"load 'Processor_2_5'.")};skip;
4
5 {prog_send1(0,"run L2_Processor_0().") and
6 prog_send1(1,"run L2_Processor_1().") and
7 prog_send1(2,"run L2_Processor_2().")};skip;
The lines in listing 5.1 are chunk of the global program written in Tempura language [182].
The global program loads the three local programs which respectively represent processor 0,
1, and 2. A function called Prog send1() is responsible for assigning the Pid to load a local
program as external program. For instance, line 1 assigns Pid0 to load a local program called
Processor 0 5. This local program gets loaded by Pid0 to accomplish its computation. In line
5, as Pid0 was chosen to load Processor 0 5, the same Pid0 requests to run a function within
this local program , Processor 0 5, is called L2 Processor 0(). Within this function, the main
memory address requests are created and then inserted as assertions data to the global program
to fulfil each processor request. Once the assertion data is received by the global program, the
cache controller deals with the data according to the criteria described earlier in the previous
sections to meet a set of properties of interest such as memory consistency and cache coherence.































Figure 5.5: LOCAL STATES & PROPERTIES OF PROCESSORS 0, 1, 2 AT STATE 0
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In the first line of each processor’s output window, it is noticeable that the status of the
processor is either active or idle. When it is active, it shows the request information which is
assigned to this processor. Otherwise, it shows that the processor is idle as illustrated In Figure
5.5.
5.3.1.3 Raw Data Analysis
The whole execution of a cache controller case study in Tempura/AnaTempura can be found in
Appendix A. The raw data in Table 5.10 is identically copied from the execution in Appendix A.
The number of columns in Table 5.10 is the same number in the execution plus a new column
within the table. The new column is the state number column which is an indicator of the state
number of the execution of cache controller. As Table 5.10 show,there are ten states, from 0 to
9. In each state, the data is displayed of the correspondent requested address within the cache of
the three processors including the requester processor , or what is called the active processor, and
the other idle processors. The purpose of displaying all information of processors is to increase
the readability of the run and to show the validity of the MSI (or Coherence States) results.
For instance, if the MSI column of processor X is Modified[X], then the the data stored in the
Cache and Memory columns of the requested address has to be inconsistent. The purpose of
this check is to guarantee the memory consistency property. Another purpose is to guarantee the
cache coherence property. The latter property concerns the cache coherence which is a discipline
that maintains multiple cache blocks which share the same resource. For instance, if the cache
block has data which is shared by another cache block of another processor, then the MSI (or
Coherence States) changes the states of these cache blocks to Shared.
The first 3-multiple rows in Table 5.10 is state 0 of the cache controller. In the second
column of the table, Pid, the first three rows represent the three processors identification numbers
Pids. The Pid’s value has two digits, one digit outside the parentheses, and the other inside the
parentheses. The digit outside the parentheses represents the requester Pid, while the digits
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inside the parentheses represent the idle processors. The requester Pid also includes itself as a
Pid inside the parentheses, and it always comes in the first row of each state run. For instance,
in Pid’s column, in the second row at state 0, the value 0(1) represents the requester’s Pid which
is 0 and the idle Pid which is 1 and so on. It is very important to mention that columns 6, 12 and
13 in Table 5.10 use square brackets. They are not numbered referencing styles.
STATE 0: Pid0 creates a read request of address 14 in the memory as shown in table 5.12.
The address 1410, in binary format 00011102, gets assigned to the index 610 or alternatively 1102
in binary format. Binary format is used in the case study. Therefore, Memory address 14 gets
assigned to Cache[110]. The next column, VBit, is Valid Bit, and it is set to 0 as initial values.
As the block cache[110] is empty, the previous value of it was 0. However, after the request
is missed and the data of the correspondent address is fetched from the memory, this Valid Bit
has now changed its value to 1. The initial values in the Dirty Bit column, DBit, are 0 as well,
and as the data has just recently been fetched from the memory to the cache, this DBit stays 0.
This means that the cache and the memory are consistent, while the other processors still hold
their initial values although these values might mislead the reader and give a false impression
about them. It is believed that the initial value of DBit is supposed to be -1 instead of 0 because
0 means that the cache block and the memory are consistent. However, as we can see in their
correspondent Data column, these idle processors still have the initial values of the Data column,
-8, and they obviously seem inconsistent with memory. The next column is the Tag column
where the upper portion of the binary address is assigned to be tag value. The Tag value of
address 00011102 is the four upper portions: 00012 or 110. The tag value can be determined
using Equation 5.3. The tag value is used with the VBit value as a conditional conjunction to
meet any hit requests, otherwise it is a miss regardless of the kind of operation it is. As the initial
value of Tag is -1, the idle Pids holds -1. The Hit-Miss column is a result of a request created
by an active processor of an address in the memory either to read from or write to. In this state,
state 0, the request to read address 14 is missed because the private cache memory of Pid0 has
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not got that address stored in it which leads the memory to fetch the requested data of address
14 to the cache memory as seen in Table 5.12 and to the Pid0 as seen in Table 5.12 to continue
its computation. As a result of this behaviour, the next column, Data column, has -16 after it
has been fetched from the memory. MSI column (or Coherence States) has set the state of Pid0
to Shared[0] as it is consistent with the memory while the idle processors are still invalid. The
Memory[Addr] column shows the data of the requested address created by the active processors.
STATE 1: Pid2 is a requester processor in this state. It requests to read the memory address
10, binary 10102. This address is assigned to the cache block Cache[010]. The VBit was 0,
and this request changed it to 1. The DBit stays 0 as the cache[010] and Memory[0001010] are
consistent after the requested data of address 10 is fetched from the memory. The tag field of
the Cache[010] of address 10 is 1. As the private cache block of Pid2 has not got the requested
address stored in it, the request then is Read Miss and the data of that address gets fetched from
the memory as it is unavailable in other Pid’s cache blocks. Therefore, the coherence state of
Cache[010] of Pid2 is set to shared as it is consistent with the memory. The idle processors
stay in invalid state as they still have initial values in their cache blocks, which means they are
inconsistent with the memory.
STATE 2: Pid0 requests to write data 13 to address 6. The cache block Cache[110] stores
this data instead of the memory. The point of creating a cache memory reveals in this case
where a write operation does not need to be done to the memory as writing to the cache is
faster than writing to the memory. VBit and DBit have changed their values to 1. The most
interesting change in this case is the DBit, where the new value 1 indicates that the cache block
is dirty bit because the write operation occurs locally which means the memory has not been
involved in this operation yet. Cache[110] and Memory[0000110] are inconsistent and this is
why the Coherence State of Cache[110] is set to Modified[0]. Once this cache block Cache[110],
the dirty case only, gets a future write to it by another address which shares the same cache
index 110, the old data gets replaced and moved to its correspondent memory address, while
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the new data takes over index 110. For instance, address 6 shares index 110 with addresses
14, 22, 30 or any address that has 6 as a result of modulo operation of that address over the
length of the index which is in this case eight indexes. If address 22 writes a new value to
Cache[110] of Pid0, then the old data which is 13 gets replaced and moved to Memory[0000110],
and the new data gets written to Cache[110] and sets DBit to 1 to indicate that Cache[110] and
Memory[0010110] are inconsistent. This mechanism is called Write-back. At state 0, address 14
was read and moved to Cache[110]; its value in the memory is -16 and has set DBit to 0 because
it was consistent with the memory. However, at this state, state 2, address 6 has written data
13 to Cache[110] after the replacement of the old data which is -16. The write-back operation
is not witnessed because DBit of Cache[110] was 0 before the replacement which means that
cache[110] and Memory[0001110] were consistent. Now we go back to the case study where the
value of Cache[110] is 13, while the value of its correspondent main memory Memory[0000110]
is -16, which is the initial value. The cache blocks of Pid1 and Pid2 stay invalid.
STATE 3 Pid2 requests to read address 4. The cache block, Cache[100], has not got the re-
quested address stored in it and, therefore, VBit is set to 1 after the request gets Read Missed.
The data of the correspondent address gets fetched from the memory to Cache[100] and, con-
sequently, DBit has been set to 0 due to the consistency between the cache and the memory of
the correspondent address. The Coherence State has changed the state of Pid2’s cache block
Cache[100] to Shared[2]. Address 4 has 0 as the tag value.
STATE 4: Pid1 requests to write data 14 to address 1. VBit and DBit change their values to
1 after the request gets Write Missed. Write-back operation is interesting mechanism, no write
operation occurs to the memory and, due to this, DBit’s value of cache block Cache[001] is
1. Consequently, the Coherence State changes the state of Cache[001] of Pid1 to Modified[1].
Memory[0000001] is inconsistent with Cache[001] of Pid1.
STATE 5: Pid0 requests to write data 19 to address 15. Cache block Cache[111] stores the
new data and sets VBit and DBit to 1 to indicate that the cache block is valid and dirty at the
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same time which eventually implies a write-back to the memory. As the requested address is 15,
the tag value is 1. The request gets Write missed. The Coherence State is Modified[0]. The data
of the correspondent cache block is 19, while in the memory still holds the initial value -16.
STATE 6: Pid2 requests to write data 14 to address 3. Cache block Cache[011] stores the
data of address 3 and sets VBit to 1. DBit changes its value to 1 to indicate that it is a dirty cache
block and a write-back is eventually needed. The Tag value is 0. The request gets write missed
as the cache block was invalid. The Coherence State is Modified[2] due to the inconsistency
between the cache and the memory.
STATE 7: Pid0 requests to write data 3 to address 9. Address 9 shares the same cache block
Cache[001] with address 1. As the cache block Cache[001] has been written data 14 to it via
Pid1 at state 4, Pid0 writes to its private cache block Cache[001] new data which is 3. Now there
are two caches holding different data but sharing the same cache block. The most recent request
by Pid0, at this state, sets its DBit to 1 to indicate that it contains dirty data and at the same time,
Pid0 sets DBit of the cache block cache[001], which belongs to Pid1, to 0 after the old data, data
14, gets written back to the memory. VBit is set to 1 as this cache block of the Pid0 was invalid.
As the address is 9, the tag value is 1. The request is a write miss because the VBit was invalid.
The data in the cache block Cache[001] which belonging to Pid0 is 3, while the one belongs to
Pid1 is 14. The Coherence State of Cache[001] that belongs to Pid0 is Modified[0] because it is
inconsistent with memory address 9. The Coherence State of Cache[001] that belongs to Pid1 is
set to Invalid[1].
STATE 8: Pid2 requests to read address 4 again after it requested reading the same address at
state 3. A read hit is encountered. The data is already fetched from the last read miss at state 3 to
cache block Cache[100] which is -16. VBit and DBit stabilise their values, 1 for the former and
0 for the latter. The Coherence State stays Shared[2] as the cache block Cache[100] is consistent
with the memory address Memory[0000100].
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STATE 9: Pid0 requests to read memory address 8 Memory[0001000]. The private cache
of Pid0 has not got this address stored in it, therefore, VBit sets its value to 1 and DBit sets its
value to 0 after the data of address 8 is fetched from the memory which is -16. Tag value is
1. The Coherence State changes to Shared[0] because the cache block Cache[000] of Pid0 and
Memory[0001000] are consistent; they both hold the same data. The same cache blocks of idle
processors’ caches, Pid1 and Pid2, invalidate their cache blocks Cache[000] to Invalid[1] and
Invalid[2].
To check all the above analysis, I refer the reader to Tables 5.12 and 5.12, and Figure 5.6. In
addition to these tables and this figure, Appendix A has screen-shots of the implementation of
the case study.
Table 5.11: REQUESTS OF PID0, PID1, & PID2 RESPECTIVELY.
State Oper. Addr Data
0 0 00000000000000000000000000001110 −16
1
2 1 00000000000000000000000000000110 13
3
4
5 1 00000000000000000000000000001111 19
6
7 1 00000000000000000000000000001001 3
8
9 0 00000000000000000000000000001000 −16











State Oper. Addr Data
0
1 0 00000000000000000000000000001010 −16
2
3 0 00000000000000000000000000000100 −16
4
5
6 1 00000000000000000000000000000011 14
7
8 0 00000000000000000000000000000100 −16
9
Table 5.12: L2 CACHE MEMORY OF PID0, PID1, & PID2 RESPECTIVELY.
Index V D Tag Data
000 1 0 00000000000000000000000000001 −16





110 1 1 00000000000000000000000000000 13
111 1 1 00000000000000000000000000001 19
Index V D Tag Data
000 0 −8







Index V D Tag Data
000 0 −8
001 0 −8
010 1 0 00000000000000000000000000001 −16
011 1 1 00000000000000000000000000000 14

































































































































Figure 5.6: States & Intervals (σnm, where m is state number, n is Processor id) of Cache Controller and Memory values
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5.3.1.4 Properties Check of The Cache Controller
In this section, set of properties of interest are checked against the behaviour of the Cache Con-
troller such as memory consistency and cache coherence. Memory consistency property guar-
antees that the data of a cache block and its correspondent copy within a memory address are
consistent. While the cache coherence property guarantees that the cache blocks within multi-
core processor are subjected to MSI protocol to ensure the validity of these caches and their data.
Table 5.13 illustrates the check of the correctness properties over all the states and for all cache
memories and the main memory.
Table 5.13: PROPERTIES CHECK OF CACHES OF PROCESSORS 0, 1 & 2
State Pid Invalid State Prop. Shared State Prop. Consistency Prop. MSI Protocol Global StateExpected Actual Expected Actual Expected Actual Expected Actual Expected Actual
0
0 NA NA Pass Pass Pass Pass
Pass Pass
Pass Pass
1 Pass Pass NA NA NA NA Pass Pass
2 Pass Pass NA NA NA NA Pass Pass
1
2 NA NA Pass Pass Pass Pass
Pass Pass
Pass Pass
0 Pass Pass NA NA NA NA Pass Pass
1 Pass Pass NA NA NA NA Pass Pass
2
0 NA NA NA NA Fail NA
Pass Pass
Pass Pass
1 Pass Pass NA NA NA NA Pass Pass
2 Pass Pass NA NA NA NA Pass Pass
3
2 NA NA Pass Pass Pass Pass
Pass Pass
Pass Pass
0 Pass Pass NA NA NA NA Pass Pass
1 Pass Pass NA NA NA NA Pass Pass
4
1 NA NA NA NA Fail NA
Pass Pass
Pass Pass
2 Pass Pass NA NA NA NA Pass Pass
0 Pass Pass NA NA NA NA Pass Pass
5
0 NA NA NA NA Fail NA
Pass Pass
Pass Pass
1 Pass Pass NA NA NA NA Pass Pass
2 Pass Pass NA NA NA NA Pass Pass
6
2 NA NA NA NA Fail NA
Pass Pass
Pass Pass
0 Pass Pass NA NA NA NA Pass Pass
1 Pass Pass NA NA NA NA Pass Pass
7
0 NA NA NA NA Fail NA
Pass Pass
Pass Pass
1 Pass Fail NA NA NA NA Pass Pass
2 Pass Pass NA NA NA NA Pass Pass
8
2 NA NA Pass Pass Pass Pass
Pass Pass
Pass Pass
0 Pass Pass NA NA NA NA Pass Pass
1 Pass Pass NA NA NA NA Pass Pass
9
0 NA NA Pass Pass Pass Pass
Pass Pass
Pass Pass
1 Pass Pass NA NA NA NA Pass Pass
2 Pass Pass NA NA NA NA Pass Pass
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5.4 Summary
In this chapter, a benchmark case study, Cache Controller, has been run. The results demonstrated
that the proposed model can handle parallel/distributed systems significantly. The specification
of a cache controller system is given in Interval Temporal Logic (ITL), while the runtime verifi-
cation is given in Tempura language and implemented using AnaTempura. The set of properties
of interest such as memory consistency and cache coherence are met, proved, and satisfied.
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Evaluation of Parallel Runtime Verification Frame-
work (PRVF)
Objectives:
• To introduce MATLAB
• To link AnaTempura to MATLAB
• To produce Correctness Properties of the Cache Controller System
• To evaluate Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF)
• To present Discussion and Related Work
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6.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, Chapter 5, the case study of private L2 Cache Memory was designed,
modelled, and implemented using the runtime verifier AnaTempura. The implementation has
successfully met the expected behaviour of the system and fulfilled correctness properties set
earlier. However, in this chapter I will run random and independent evaluation techniques using
MATLAB as external tools in order to exclude any bias judgement upon the proposed model,
Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF), with regards to its reliability, efficiency, per-
formance, robustness etc..
In order to be able to use MATLAB for this purpose, a set of practical steps have to be applied
to integrate AnaTempura, which is the primary tool for the implementation of the case study, with
MATLAB. The integration step plays a primary role in order to completely allow AnaTempura
to communicate natively with MATLAB. This communication between these two powerful tools
will complement the process towards comprehensive evaluation techniques.
In this chapter, MATLABI and a brief description are given. Afterwords, I will explain in
details how to integrate AnaTempura with MATLAB. An illustration of such integration using
simple Tempura, Tcl, and shell scripts will serve as a basic understanding of the whole process
of the evaluation techniques.
Once AnaTempura and MATLAB are integrated, I will import assertion data from AnaTem-
pura during the runtime verification and pass these data to MATLAB in order to conduct eval-
uation techniques. After that, MATLAB produces a comprehensive evaluation based on the
received data via the assertion data which were generated within AnaTempura. Then the evalu-
ation outcomes and judgements of both tools, AnaTempura against MATLAB, are compared. If
both evaluation outcomes and judgements are identical, the proposed model is reliable, efficient,
performing and robust. If otherwise, vice versa, and a reconsideration of the proposed model is
essential.
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6.2 MATLAB
MATLAB is the acronym for MATrix LABoratory which was developed by MathWorks to serve
as a multi-paradigm numerical computing environment and proprietary programming language.
MATLAB supports the data to be represented as matrix in order to allow matrix manipulations,
representing function and data in plots, algorithms implementation, interface creation, interacting
and interfacing with other programming languages such as Java, C, C++, C#, Fortran and Python
[164]. The advantage of supporting these common programming languages allows the users of
other programming languages via shell scripts written in C, for instance, to integrate models built
in programming languages not supported by MATLAB directly.
MATLAB has a package called Simulink which plays a primary role in graphical multi-
domain simulation and model-based design for dynamic and embedded systems. In 2018, the
number of users MATLAB exceeded three million worldwide from multiple disciplines [165].
Besides being a high-performance language, MATLAB has powerful features including mod-
elling, analysing, and prototyping technical computation. MATLAB enables the computation to
be natively expressed in mathematical notation which enhances the delivered solutions. Mainly,
MATLAB is used for the following purposes: [7]
• Mathematics and Computation
• Algorithm Development
• Modelling, Simulation, and Prototyping
• Data Analysis, Exploration, and Visualization
• Scientific and Engineering Graphics
• Application Development, including Graphical User Interface building
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6.3 Integrating MATLAB and AnaTempura
AnaTempura is a runtime verifier of systems using Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) and its exe-
cutable subset Tempura. For more information about AnaTempura refer to Section 4.2, Chapter
4 as it is completely covered in this chapter. Tempura interpreter is programmed in C language.
This makes it advantageous so an integration of MATLAB and AnaTempura can be done via
Bourne shell scripts [39]. I prefix the shell by the author’s name Stephen Bourne, in order to dis-
tinguish it from other shell languages. However, in the next sections, I use only “shell” instead of
“Bourne shell” . Shell scripts have the file extension “ .sh” in which they are computer programs
designed to be run by the Unix shell, a command-line interpreter. The various dialects of shell
scripts are considered to be scripting languages. Typical operations performed by shell scripts
include file manipulation, program execution, and printing text[135].
6.3.1 Running MATLAB
MATLAB can be run using Microsoft Disk Operating System MS-DOS or Linux/macOS Termi-
nals by typing the short command:
1 matlab
This simple command runs MATLAB in the machine either as a desktop version or internally
within the DOS or Terminal. The desktop version is the default option, alternatively, simply just
add the flag “-desktop” to the previous command as follows:
1 matlab -desktop
Otherwise, “-nodisplay -nodesktop” flags force MATLAB to run without the desktop GUI and
run it internally whether within the MS-DOS, Terminal, or within other tools such as AnaTem-
pura:
1 matlab -nodisplay -nodesktop
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Once MATLAB is run within external systems as Figure 6.1 illustrates, it offers all of its powerful
features via loading MATLAB scripts, and executing MATLAB commands natively as they were
being executed in MATLAB environment.
Figure 6.1: Running MATLAB
A matrix C of 1 row, 3 columns (1 × 3 matrix), which has these values C = [1, 2, 3] can be
created and retrieved by typing the following script:
Listing 6.1: Creating & Retrieving Matrix in MATLAB
1 M=[1,2,3];
2 M % Display M
3 A=M(:,:); % Colon mark displays all rows, columns.
4 A
5 B=M(1,2); % Display the cell at row 1, column 2.
6 B
Figure 6.2: MATLAB Script
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The percentage mark “%” is used to comment. Figure 6.2 illustrates the outputs after the execu-
tion of this short script using macOS Terminal.
MATLAB can be run as well via a shell script. For instance, the shell script in Listing 6.2
runs MATLAB first then runs a MATLAB script as Listing 6.3 illustrates:
Listing 6.2: Shell Runs MATLAB & “Arithmetic.m”
7 #!/bin/sh
8 matlab -nosplash -nodesktop -r "run('Arithmetic.m');"
The above shell script first runs MATLAB in non-desktop GUI mode, while MATLAB script
“Arithmetic.m” presents how arithmetic operations can be done in MATLAB language as fol-
lows:
Listing 6.3: MATLAB Code “Arithmetic.m”
1 X=10;Y = 2;
2 fprintf('%d * %d = %d\n',X,Y,X*Y);
3 fprintf('%d / %d = %d\n',X,Y,X/Y);
4 fprintf('%d + %d = %d\n',X,Y,X+Y);
5 fprintf('%d - %d = %d\n',X,Y,X-Y);
6 fprintf('%d mod %d = %d\n',X,Y,mod(X,Y));
Figure 6.3 illustrates the output for the execution of MATLAB script in Listing 6.3 after being
called via the shell script in Listing 6.2:
Figure 6.3: MATLAB Arithmetic Script Output
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This short tutorial of how MATLAB is run and how to run scripts written in MATLAB is for
demonstration sake. For more information and tutorials visit MATLAB website [164].
6.3.2 AnaTempura Runs MATLAB
AnaTempura can run external programs or systems by annotating the name of these programs or
systems written in different languages. This annotation then executes whatever is written inside
these programs or shell scripts. Every annotation is assigned to a unique process identification
Pid, so they do not clash or delay the execution time. For instance, the annotation within a
Tempura program in Listing 6.4, run by AnaTempura, calls Tcl, Java, C programs and shell
script as external programs:
Listing 6.4: Annotation within Tempura Program
1 Tempura code . . .
2 /* tcl Cache 0 */
3 /* java Hello 1 */
4 /* prog Fac 2 */
5 /* prog Script.sh 3 */
6 Tempura code . . .
These markers “/*” and “*/” are used respectively to open and close comments . However,
the texts between these markers are sometimes executable in case they are prefixed by keywords
such as tcl, java, prog; in these cases, they call external programs independently. Processes Pid0,
Pid1, Pid2 and Pid3 are assigned to Tcl, Java, C programs and Shell script respectively. Process
Pid3 calls the shell script to be executed. The shell script runs MATLAB as explained above,
and it also runs the MATLAB script which is already created to do some specific computations.
The execution of these various programming languages and shell scripts enriches AnaTempura
and empowers it to be used widely.
The integration procedures are going to be thoroughly explained and demonstrated in this
section. First of all, a Tempura program has to be created as Listing 6.5 illustrates:
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4 /* tcl Hello 0 */
5 /* prog Hello.sh 1 */
6 set print_states = false.




11 /* run */ define Test() = exists C: {
12 input C and output C and len(0) and Send_To_MATLAB(C)
13 }.
Annotations are made in line 4 and 5. Annotation in line 4 calls a Tcl program “Hello.tcl” as
Listing 6.6 illustrates, and the process assigned to executed it is Pid0, while the annotation in
line 5 calls the shell script “Hello.sh”, as Listing 6.7 illustrates, and the execution of the shell
script is assigned to process Pid1. The Tempura program in Listing 6.5 initialises a state variable
called “C”. The value of this state variable is entered via AnaTempura monitor at runtime, and it
has to be suffixed by a dot mark “.” in order to carry on the execution and receive the input of
“C”. Without the dot mark, AnaTempura monitor waits until doing so.
Line 12 in Listing 6.5 prompts the input to be entered and assigned to “C”, then outputs the
entered values. Afterwards, it passes the entered values to function Send To MATLAB(C).
This function is declared in line 7 of the same Listing. The function carries the input values of
“C” and a connection with an external program written in Tcl is initialised as line 8 illustrates.
The command tcl(“init”,[C]) passes the input values received via AnaTempura monitor to a
procedure init within a Tcl external program, in Listing 6.6, which has been already called via
annotation command in line 4 of the same Listing. The inputs that were entered as Figure 6.4
illustrates are “36.”, “37.” and “38.”.
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Figure 6.4: AnaTempura inputs numbers to file “input.txt”
The following Listing 6.6 is a Tcl program “Hello.tcl”; it receives the input values entered
within AnaTempura monitor. The procedure proc init {nl} in line 2 is the mediator as it was
called within the previous Listing 6.5. The command in line 3 sets a list of index 0 in order to
assign the received inputs to “C”. Lines 4 to 6 create a text file “input.txt” then write to and read
from this file.
Listing 6.6: Tcl Program “Hello.tcl”
1 namespace eval ::out {;
2 proc init {nl} {
3 set C [lindex $nl 0]
4 set fp [open "input.txt" a+]
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Once the writing process is done, the text file stores the input values entered to it via the AnaTem-
pura monitor as Figure 6.5 illustrates:
Figure 6.5: File Content for “input.txt”
At this point, the integration step is reached. The annotation in Listing 6.5, line 5 is entitled
to execute the shell script in Listing 6.7. The script runs MATLAB in a non-desktop GUI mode,
which means MATLAB will be loaded into AnaTempura monitor windows as external program
of Pid1 because this process has been assigned within the annotation in line 5. The flag “-r” in
Listing 6.7, line 2 indicates that the following text enclosed in double quotations is a MATLAB
code and has to be executed. Alternatively, a MATLAB script with the same code could be
loaded instead of writing a MATLAB code within the shell script, but this short MATLAB code
is meant to load the input text file “input.txt” which is already created by AnaTempura external
program; it then retrieves that inputs entered in the text file. Listing 6.7 illustrates shell script
“Hello.sh”:
Listing 6.7: Shell Runs MATLAB & Load Data from “input.txt”
1 #!/bin/sh
2 matlab -nosplash -nodesktop -r "load('input.txt'); C=input(:,1)"
Figure 6.6 illustrates that MATLAB has been run externally within AnaTempura, and the
inputs values entered into AnaTempura are delivered successfully to MATLAB, and they can be
manipulated, analysed, simulated, etc.
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Figure 6.6: MATLAB Reads from input file “input.txt”
The work of integrating AnaTempura with MATLAB is crucially important and original.
Such an integration bridges the gap between runtime verification tools and MATLAB which
offers a variety of toolboxes such as Model-Based Design Simulink, Fuzzy Logic, Robotics Sys-
tem, Aircraft Intuitive Design (AID), Statistics and Machine Learning and much more. MAT-
LAB is trusted by millions of engineers, scientists, companies, industrials, institutions, universi-
ties, etc.. This diversity of applications is promising in the way that AnaTempura and MATLAB
can play a great role together. The benefits are mutual for either systems, and they push each
other’s limitations.
By now, AnaTempura and MATLAB are integrated and can communicate natively. The next
section sheds light on correctness properties of interest such as Memory Consistency and Cache
Coherence State of MSI protocol. At runtime, these correctness properties have to be verified
that they are met, proved, and satisfied. In order to perform this task the integration between
AnaTempura and MATLAB have to be done to be able to compare the outcomes of AnaTempura
and MATLAB.
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6.4 Correctness Properties
According to Berkovich et al. [29], in computing systems, Correctness refers to the assertion
that a system satisfies its specification. The system I used for the case study in Chapter 5 is a
Private L2 Cache Memory of multi-core processor architecture. The proposed model, Parallel
Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF), has implemented the case study successfully. How-
ever, random and independent evaluation techniques are intended to be applied using MATLAB
in order to exclude any bias judgement upon the proposed model using only AnaTempura. MAT-
LAB is going to be used to produce another version of the judgement, and if both judgements
are identical, the proposed model is then reliable, efficient, performing and robust.
Memory Consistency and Cache Coherence State of MSI Protocol properties are the correct-
ness properties I intended to investigate. Each correctness property will be defined at first and
then expressed formally in formal-based framework, Interval Temporal Logic (ITL). After that,
AnaTempura will run the case study using the proposed model, PRVF, in order to monitor the be-
haviour of the system under scrutiny. Once AnaTempura runs the check of the system, MATLAB
will be run by AnaTempura, and they will communicate with each other and exchange assertion
data. AnaTempura makes its judgement, and simultaneously MATLAB makes its judgement too.
The judgements checks are then compared and analysed using MATLAB toolboxes.
6.4.1 Revisiting The Case Study of Cache Controller
The case study was described and implemented thoroughly in the previous chapter, Chapter 5.
In this section I will only run the case study using AnaTempura following the same steps applied
earlier in the previous chapter; however, this time MATLAB is fully integrated with AnaTempura
and will produce plotted charts representing the assertion data exchanged between AnaTempura
and MATLAB. Screen shots of the case study being run are illustrated in Figures 6.7 & 6.8.
Figure 6.7 displays the outcomes of the implementation of the case study using AnaTempura.
The outcomes are formatted in a table where they are explained and analysed in Chapter 5.
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Figure 6.7: AnaTempura Run of L2 Cache Memory of Processors 0, 1 & 2
Figures 6.8 demonstrates the outcomes generated in the table of Figure 6.7 in order to visu-
alise the outcomes and increase the understanding of the case study in addition to monitoring
purposes.
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Figure 6.8: Tcl Animation of L2 Cache Memory of Processors 0, 1 & 2
AnaTempura can now run MATLAB natively as an external programs as Figure 6.9 illus-
trates. These external windows of external programs of processors 4 & 5 are responsible for
running two shell scripts annotated within Tempura program which is written to run the case
study. The figure shows that MATLAB has been run successfully by AnaTempura in order to
monitor and analyse the behaviour of the cache memory.
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Figure 6.9: External Programs of AnaTempura for Processors 4 & 5
Figure 6.10 represents the assertion data file produced at runtime by the cache implementa-
tion and at the same time MATLAB loads this file and reads the data inside the file in order to do
the analysis step.
Figure 6.10: Dual Core Dual Processor System
All the source codes of the implementation of this case study are written in Tempura, Tcl,
shell and MATLAB languages can be found in Appendix E. With regards to the produced out-
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comes of the MATLAB scripts executed during runtime of AnaTempura, they are displayed in
the next sections, Section 6.4.2 & 6.4.3.
6.4.2 Memory Consistency Property
A memory of a particular address is consistent if it holds the same value of at least one cache
memory of the correspondent index. Otherwise, a memory is inconsistent. In the later case,
a verdict of either true or false of a marker called dirty bit within cache memory architecture
is switched accordingly. The dirty bit of the cache memory is true when cache memory and
main memory of a correspondent address are inconsistent, otherwise, it is false. The correctness
property of Memory Consistency can be formalised in Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) as follows:
`Memory[Addr] = Cache[X][Index] ∨ Cache[Y ][Index] ∨ Cache[Z][Index]
A memory of address Addr has to be equivalent with at least one of cache memory indexes,
Index of processor X, Y or Z. If the above formula is met, then a memory is consistent.
Now I will show the outcomes of the execution of MATLAB scripts that have been run within
AnaTempura. A shell script has been annotated within a Tempura program; this shell script
“CheckProperty1.sh” is responsible for running the MATLAB and then executing MATLAB
script “Property1.m”. The MATLAB script gathers and assigns the assertion data being created
during the runtime of AnaTempura, and then plots these data in graphs for each state of the
execution of the case study.
The number of states is 10, from state 0 until 9. Each single state is individually captured by
this MATLAB script and representing data of every single state of the related rows and columns
of the assertion data is in the text file as Figure 6.10 illustrates. For referencing the addresses of
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Addr: indicates the requested address
Pid: indicates the processor identification
Index: indicates the entry within the cache of Pid
Value: indicates the data integer values
Noticed that, all the cache indexes is -8, while the main memory addresses data values is -16.
Holding data -8 for the cache indexes means that cache indexes are empty and have no data yet.
In contrast, a main memory holding data -16, means that the main memory is occupied and has
data.
STATE 0: By referring to Figures 6.7 & 6.8, it can be found that the active processor is Pid1
and always comes as the first graph of the plot, at top-left corner, while Pid2, P id0 are considered
idles. In this state, the Pid1 is the processor which requests to access address 14, Addr : 14. The
requested address fetches its data to the correspondent cache index of Pid1 in case the access is
for reading RW = 0 (refer to Figure 6.7).
When the access is for writing, RW = 1, then the processor writes directly to the correspon-
dent cache index, Index[6], without updating the main memory. As the data of the main memory
of the requested address is not updated yet and is different from the data of the correspondent
cache index, the memory at state 0 is inconsistent. Once another processor requests the same ad-
dress, this particular cache of Pid1 fetches data 25 to that processor. When this particular cache
index of Pid1 is replaced by another request, the old data gets copied into the correspondent
main memory and becomes consistent. See Figure 6.11.
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Figure 6.11: Memory Consistency Check at State 0
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STATE 1: Processor Pid1 writes to index 6 the data 0, Cache[1][6] = 0. The correspondent
address of this cache index, Memory[6], is inconsistent as it has the data -16. Interestingly, at
the previous state the old data of Cache[1][6] was 25 and because it is replaced by a new data
0 in this state, the old data gets moved to its correspondent memory address Memory[14]. The
main memory of address 6 Memory[6] is inconsistent. See Figure 6.12.
Figure 6.12: Memory Consistency Check at State 1
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STATE 2: Process Pid2 requests to read address 2 and because address 2 is not available
in the cache index of all the three processors, the main memory fetches the data of address 2
to the requester processor. The main memory of address 2, Memory[2], and the cache index
of processor Pid2, index 2, Cache[2][2], have the same data, therefore, the main memory is
consistent. See Figure 6.13.
Figure 6.13: Memory Consistency Check at State 2
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STATE 3: Processor Pid2 writes a new data 0 to index 0 which is the correspondent entry of
the requested address 0. The cache index of Pid2 is index 0, Cache[2][0] = 0, while the main
memory of address 0 has different data Memory[0] = −16. Therefore, the main memory is
inconsistent because it has not been updated yet. See Figure 6.14.
Figure 6.14: Memory Consistency Check at State 3
149
CHAPTER 6. EVALUATION OF PARALLEL RUNTIME VERIFICATION
FRAMEWORK (PRVF)
STATE 4: Address 15 is requested to be read by processor Pid0. Because the cache index
of the correspondent address is empty, the main memory of the requested address 15 fetches its
data, Memory[15] = −16, to cache index 7 of Pid0 as follows Cache[0][7] = −16. The main
memory of address 15 is consistent because it has at least one cache holding the same data. See
Figure 6.15.
Figure 6.15: Memory Consistency Check at State 4
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STATE 5: Processor Pid2 requests to read address 0 which is recently modified and written
to at state 3 by the same processor, Pid2. The data written to this cache index 0 is 0, therefore,
cache index 0 of Pid2 is Cache[2][0] = 0. The main memory of the requested address 0 is still
not updated Memory[0] = −16, therefore, the main memory is inconsistent. See Figure 6.16.
Figure 6.16: Memory Consistency Check at State 5
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STATE 6: The read request is initialised by processor Pid1 to read address 4. As cache
index 4 is empty, the main memory fetches data -16 to this cache index. Cache index 4 of
processor Pid1 is Cache[1][4] = −16, and the main memory of address 4 isMemory[4] = −16.
Consequently, the main memory is consistent. See Figure 6.17.
Figure 6.17: Memory Consistency Check at State 6
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STATE 7: Processor Pid2 requests to write to address 4 a new data 23. Index 4 of Pid1 from
the previous state has got data -16 fetched by the main memory. At this state, index 4 writes
new data by Pid2. Now there are two different data Cache[1][4] = −16 and Cache[2][4] = 23.
Processor Pid2 is the most updated, while Pid1 is outdated at this state. Therefore, the main
memory of address 4 Memory[4] = −16, is outdated, and it is inconsistent. See Figure 6.18.
Figure 6.18: Memory Consistency Check at State 7
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STATE 8: Processor Pid2 requests to read address 5. Because cache index 5 of processor 2
Cache[2][5] is empty, the main memory of address 5, Memory[5] = −16, fetches its data to the
cache index, so it becomes Cache[2][5] = −16. As the cache memory of processor Pid2 and the
main memory have the same data, the main memory is consistent. See Figure 6.19.
Figure 6.19: Memory Consistency Check at State 8
154
CHAPTER 6. EVALUATION OF PARALLEL RUNTIME VERIFICATION
FRAMEWORK (PRVF)
STATE 9: Processor Pid1 requests to read address 9. Cache index 1, Cache[1][1], of this cor-
respondent address is empty, therefore, the main memory of address 9 fetches it dataMemory[9] =
−16 to this cache index, so it becomes Cache[1][1] = −16 which means that the main memory
is consistent. See Figure 6.20.
Figure 6.20: Memory Consistency Check at State 9
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6.4.3 Cache Coherence Property
The cache memory is coherent if it maintains one of the cache coherence protocols such as MSI,
MESI, MOESI and many others [213]. The MSI Protocol is chosen because it is simple, and it
serves the purpose. In section 5.2.2 I have covered the protocol and explained the meaning of the
states the protocol indicates such as Modified, Shared and Invalid. Each state is shortened to one
capital letter “M” for Modified, “S” for Shared, and “I” for Invalid. The following table, Table
??, describes the allowed and forbidden occurrences of these MSI states of the cache memory in
multi-core architecture:
Table 6.1: MSI Protocol
Modified Shared Invalid
Modified 7 7 3
Shared 7 3 3
Invalid 3 3 3
This criteria is applicable on at least two entities or more. The Modified state “M” is highly
restricted, and it does not accept any other states but Invalid “I”. The Shared state “S” is less
restricted; it accepts another cache block to be either Shared “S” or Invalid “I”. The Invalid state
“I” is tolerating, and it accepts all three states Modified “M”, Shared “S” or Invalid “I”.
Cache coherence can be achieved by maintaining MSI Protocol. This correctness property
can be expressed formally in Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) as follows:
`MSI Protocol[X,Y] = (State[X][Index] = Modified ∧ State[Y ][Index] = Invalid)∨
(State[X][Index] = Shared ∧ (State[Y ][Index] = Shared ∨ State[Y ][Index] = Invalid))∨
(State[X][Index] = Invalid ∧ (State[Y ][Index] = Modified ∨ State[Y ][Index] = Shared∨
State[Y ][Index] = Invalid))
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The formula expresses the allowed the MSI Protocol of two cache blocks for processors X
and Y . When the MSI Protocol states meet this formula, then the correctness property of the
cache coherence is satisfied.
The acronym of MSI Protocol states “M”, “S” and “I” are replaced by “1”, “2” and “3”
respectively in MATLAB graphs in order to be able to plot them as integer values of y-axis,
while x-axis represents the processors identification Pid0,1,2.
STATE 0: By referring to Figures 6.7 & 6.8, it can be seen that processor Pid1 modifies
cache block 6 by writing data 25 to it, so it becomes Modified Cache[1][6] = 25 because the
main memory is not updated yet and no other cache blocks share this new data. The same cache
blocks of processors Pid0 & Pid2 are still empty, and are, therefore, Invalid. See Figure 6.21
Figure 6.21: Cache Coherence & MSI Protocol Check at State 0
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STATE 1: Processor Pid1 writes a new data to the same cache index 6 which is written to
in the previous state. The data is 0, Cache[1][6] = 0, MSI state of this cache index is Modified
as neither the main memory nor the other cache blocks hold the new written data. The other
processors Pid0 & Pid2 are still Invalid. See Figure 6.22
Figure 6.22: Cache Coherence & MSI Protocol Check at State 1
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STATE 2: Processor Pid2 requests to read the main memory address 2. Cache index 2 of
processor 2 Cache[2][2] = −16 and the main memory of address 2 Memory[2] = −16 share
the same data. Therefore, the MSI protocol of Cache[2][2] is Shared, while the other processors
are still empty, which means that their MSI states are Invalid. See Figure 6.23
Figure 6.23: Cache Coherence & MSI Protocol Check at State 2
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STATE 3: Cache index 0 of processor 2 Cache[2][0] is Modified because a write request is
made. The data in main memory of the correspondent address is different from this cache index.
The other processors Pid0 & Pid1 are empty, therefore, their MSI state are Invalid. See Figure
6.24
Figure 6.24: Cache Coherence & MSI Protocol Check at State 3
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STATE 4: Processor Pid0 requests to read a correspondent cache index 7 of the requested
address 15, Cache[0][7]. The main memory Memory = −16 fetches its data to this cache
index. Therefore, the MSI state of this cache block is Shared as it is consistent with the main
memory data. The other processors are empty, and their MSI states are Invalid. See Figure 6.25
Figure 6.25: Cache Coherence & MSI Protocol Check at State 4
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STATE 5: Processor Pid2 requests to read address 0, because this address has recently been
in state 3 and received a write request of data 0 to it. Therefore, at this state the requested read
address returns 0, Cache[2][0] = 0. The MSI state is still Modified because the correspondent
address in the main memory holds different data. The other processors, Pid0 & Pid1, are Invalid.
Figure 6.26: Cache Coherence & MSI Protocol Check at State 5
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STATE 6: Cache block 4 of processor 1 holds data -16 after it is fetched by the main memory
of address 4 as a consequent of the read request initialised by Pid1. Therefore, Cache[1][4] =
−16 which means that the MSI state of this cache block is Shared. Because the other processors
Pid2 & Pid0 are still empty, their MSI states are Invalid. See Figure 6.27
Figure 6.27: Cache Coherence & MSI Protocol Check at State 6
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STATE 7: Processor Pid2 requests to write data 23 to cache index 4, so it becomesCache[2][4] =
23. This cache block of Pid2 was Invalid in the previous state because it was empty. At this state,
it becomes Modified as it has just received a new data while the main memory of the correspon-
dent address is still not updated. Processor Pid1 changes its cache block from being Shared at
the previous state to Invalid at this state. Processor Pid0 is still empty, therefore, it is Invalid too.
Figure 6.28: Cache Coherence & MSI Protocol Check at State 7
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STATE 8: Processor Pid2 requests to read cache index 5 and because this cache block is
empty, the main memory of address 5 fetches its data, Memory[5] = −16 to it. The cache
memory of processor 2 becomes Cache[2][5] = −16, which means it is in the Shared MSI state.
Processors Pid0 & Pid1 are still empty, which means that their MSI states are Invalid.
Figure 6.29: Cache Coherence & MSI Protocol Check at State 8
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STATE 9: Processor Pid1 requests to read cache index 1, and because this cache block is
empty, the main memory of address 9 fetches its data, Memory[9] = −16 to this cache block,
so it becomes Cache[1][1] = −16. Therefore, this cache block has Shared MSI state while the
other processors, Pid0 & Pid2, have Invalid MSI states. See Figure 6.30
Figure 6.30: Cache Coherence & MSI Protocol Check at State 9
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6.5 Discussion
The implementation of the case study of Cache Controller is deployed in order to measure
the suitability and generality of the proposed model, Parallel Runtime Verification Framework
(PRVF). As the proposed model is built and modelled using Tempura language, the subset ex-
ecution version of Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) specification notation language, AnaTempura
is used to run the case study in order to judge the model. I have illustrated the implementation
of the case study and consequently the judgement of the used model in the previous chapter,
Chapter 5.
In this chapter, I have deployed MATLAB to measure and judge the proposed model using
AnaTempura. The integration steps have been covered thoroughly and illustrated visually in
multiple figures. MATLAB gives the same judgement as the AnaTempura tool has gives of the
implementation of the case study using the proposed model PRVF.
The data analysis of ten states of two correctness properties is given in addition to twenty
figures, Figures 6.11 to 6.30. These data analysis and illustrations figures produced by MATLAB
prove that the proposed model is reliable, efficient, performing and robust.
The proposed model, PRVF, offers four mechanisms of implementation based on commu-
nication, concurrency and execution preferences. These four different mechanisms were intro-
duced in Chapter 3. Although two of these mechanisms are implemented in this PhD thesis,
which are Shared-Varibale Interleaving Concurrency and Shared-Varibale True Concurrency, the
implementation of the other mechanisms will lead to success and the same judgement of this
mechanism.
The other mechanisms are Shared-Variable True Concurrency, Message-Passing Synchronous
Execution and Message-Passing Asynchronous Execution. These mechanisms are formally ex-
pressed in algorithms and are also modelled in flowchart figures. For algorithms refer to Al-
gorithms 3, 4, 5 respectively and for the flowcharts refer to Figures 3.8, 3.9, 3.10 respectively.
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For instance, Shared-Variable True Concurrency mechanism varies from the one implemented
in this PhD thesis. It runs multiple systems simultaneously, and it has to maintain the shared
variable value and apply an explicit synchronisation and control mechanisms such as monitors
[120], semaphores [79], atomic operations and mutual exclusion (mutex) in order to provide a
consistent shared variable value. Message-Passing (A)synchronous Execution are uses Message-
Passing for communication. The only difference between these two latter mechanisms is the
execution preferences. Asynchronous Execution allows parallel systems to have different tim-
ing clocks; for instance, one system could start and finish its execution differently compared to
another parallel system running at the same time. Synchronous Execution restricts the timing
clocks for systems run in parallel and force these systems to start and finish their executions at
the same moment. In other words, Asynchronous Execution has different timing clocks, while
Synchronous Execution has identical timing clocks.
6.6 Related Work
Although the proposed model, Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF), is dedicated to
handle parallel computing systems at runtime, it is suitable to be a generic model for parallel
computing regardless of being deployed at runtime. This is due to the fact that it considers the
fundamental aspects of parallelism at software and hardware levels.
There are several models for parallel computing such as Parallel Random Access Machine
(PRAM), Parallel Memory Hierarchy (PMH), Bulk Synchronous Parallel (BSP) and LogP. Each
of these models has pros and cons, and then an explanation of the reason I favour in the proposed
model, PRVF, over the other parallel computing models follows.
In 1978, Fortune and Wyllie [94] proposed the Parallel Random Access Machine (PRAM)
as a natural evolution of the classic Random Access Machine (RAM) model. Ever since, PRAM
model is considered to be one of the most used models for parallel computing in general and for
parallel algorithms and analysis specifically.
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In the 1990s, the PRAM model was considered an unrealistic model for parallel algorithm de-
sign and analysis due to the fact that at time that simultaneous operations could not offer constant
memory access times by computers. The implementation of PRAM model was not complex as
its design algorithms were suggesting. However, the General Purpose Graphics Processing Unit
(GPGPU) computing Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) was introduced in 2006 and
consequently the model, PRAM, became relevant.
PRAM model has different four variations in order to make modelling parallel algorithms
more realistic. These variations are a 2 × 2 matrix of two sets: {Exclusive,Concurrent} and
{Read,Write}. These variations, therefore, are Exclusive Read Exclusive Write (EREW), Con-
current Read Exclusive Write (CREW), Exclusive Read Concurrent Write (ERCW) and Con-
current Read Concurrent Write (CRCW). These four variants are thoroughly explained in [205].
Concurrent writes have to meet one of the following protocols: i) Common, where all processors
write the same value, ii) Arbitrary, where only one write is successful, the others are not applied,
iii) Priority, where priority values are given to each processor (e.g., rank value), and the proces-
sor with the highest priority will be the one to write, iv) Reduction, where all writes are reduced
by an operator (add, multiply, OR, AND, XOR). PRAM uses the shared memory model.
Alpern et al. [9] proposed Parallel Memory Hierarchy (PMH) model in 1993. The model
was proposed to overcome the drawback of the PRAM model with regards to the constant time
memory operations. Central Processing Units (CPUs) have memory hierarchies of registers, L1,
L2 and L3 caches such as Intel Xeon E5 series and AMDs Opteron 6000 series. GPUs as well
have registers, L1, L2 caches and global memory as a memory hierarchy such as Nvidia GTX
680 or AMDs Radeon HD 7850. Such memory hierarchies should be considered in the process
of designing parallel algorithms.
A hierarchical tree of memory modules is used to define the PMH model. The processors are
represented using the leaves while memory modules are represented using internal nodes. The
more memory modules get closer to the processors, the faster, yet smaller, they become. On the
169
CHAPTER 6. EVALUATION OF PARALLEL RUNTIME VERIFICATION
FRAMEWORK (PRVF)
other hand, the more memory modules get far from the processors, the slower, yet larger, they
become.
Uniform Parallel Memory Hierarchy (UPMH) is a simplified version of PMH model, and it
is easier to model an algorithm than use PMH itself. UPMH model complements other models
such as PRAM and Bulk Synchronous Parallel (BSP). (U)PMH uses the shared memory model.
Leslie Valiant [277] introduced in 1990 a parallel computing model, the Bulk Synchronisa-
tion Parallel (BSP), with primary consideration of communication aspects. The model highly
considers synchronisation and communication where a number of processors with fast local
memory are connected via a network. The processors can communicate easily and send or re-
ceive messages between each other. The algorithm which is used to build BSP model is called
super-step, where it consists of three steps as a parallel block of computation: i) local computa-
tion, where p is processors perform up to L local computations, ii) global communication, where
processors can send and receive data among them, iii) barrier synchronization waits for all other
processors to reach the barrier. BSP uses the message passing model.
Culler et al [67] proposed the LogP model in 1993. LogP and BSP both consider the com-
munication aspects by focusing on modelling the cost of communication a set of distributed
processors. The cost of local operations in LogP is one unit of time, while the network con-
siders latency (L), overhead (o), gap (g), and processors (P ). The latency for communicating
a message contains a word from the source to the target processor. Overhead can be measured
by the amount of time a processor needs to send or receive. Gap can be measured by the min-
imum amount of time between successive messages in a given processor, while processors are
the number of processors.
Latency, overhead and gap are measured in cycles. LogP is synchronised by pairs of proces-
sors, while BSP uses global barriers of synchronisation. LogP considers a message overhead,
while BSP does not. Therefore, the determination of which model to use depends on the need
for local or global synchronisation and whether the communication is overhead. LogP uses the
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message passing model.
Comparing these parallel computing models to the proposed model in this PhD thesis, Par-
allel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF), shows that PRVF considers both communication
aspects such as the shared memory and message passing models unlike PRAM and PMH where
they only use shared memory model. On the other hand, BSP and LogP use the message pass-
ing model in their algorithm designing and analysis. All models take into account two forms
of concurrency, true and interleaving concurrency. In regards to (a)synchronous execution man-
ners, PRAM and (U)PMH use asynchronous execution manner, while BSP and LogP both use
(a)synchronous execution manner.
Table 6.2: Parallel Computational Models
PRAM (U)PMH BSP LogP PRVF
True Concurrency 3 3 3 3 3
Interleaving Concurrency 3 3 3 3 3
Shared Memory 3 3 7 7 3
Message Passing 7 7 3 3 3
Synchronous Execution 7 7 3 3 3
Asynchronous Execution 3 3 3 3 3
Table 6.2 illustrates a comparison between parallel computing models and the proposed
model which is Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF). The comparison shows that
PRVF fulfils all the aspects in the above table, while PRAM and (U)PMH models do not fulfil
message passing communication programming model and synchronous execution manner. On
the other hand, BSP and LogP models fulfil all aspects except the communication programming
model of the shared memory. The comparison in this table shows the comprehensiveness of Par-
allel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF) compared to the other parallel computing models.
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6.7 Summary
MATLAB has been introduced in order to be used for evaluation purposes. MATLAB and
AnaTempura have been linked and successfully communicated via exchanging assertion data.
A demonstration has been given of how AnaTempura can run MATLAB natively. Correctness
properties have been modelled formally and described in order to fulfil them. The behaviour of
the cache controller case study has been detected and checked at runtime. MATLAB has cap-
tured the behaviour of cache controller by collecting the assertion data being generated by the
model. The judgement upon the proposed model is made and a discussion and related work have
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In this PhD thesis, a formal and compositional framework for the development of monitoring
system for parallel computer systems is introduced. The proposed approach uses a single formal-
ism, namely, Interval Temporal Logic (ITL), for specifications of and reasoning about correctness
properties. This approach uses an executable subset of ITL, namely, Tempura, to monitor system
behaviour at runtime and build correctness properties in order to deliver a property check against
system behaviour via the runtime verifier AnaTempura.
The proposed approach, Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF), is intended to
monitor parallel system architectures to ensure correctness properties. I consider in this ap-
proach concurrency forms, communication models, and execution modes of parallel systems
under scrutiny. Additionally, this approach considers models for the management of resource
allocation, delay and timeout agents to increase the robustness and reliability of the proposed
framework in such cases.
The implementation of the proposed framework shows its comprehensibility and ability to
model generic parallel systems architectures. The models of concurrency, communication, exe-
cution models enable it to deal realistically with varieties of parallel system architectures such
as multi-core processor architecture, and Java Remote Method Invocation (RMI). The proposed
framework allows systems to run either true concurrency or interleaving concurrency forms.
Also, it allows systems to communicate via either shared-variable or message-passing models.
The framework takes into consideration different execution modes such as Synchronous and
Asynchronous. Assertion points mechanism allows systems to run globally or locally to ex-
change assertion data in order to check the desired properties at runtime to satisfy correctness
criteria of the whole system. It also models resource allocation to manage the process of acqui-
sition of shared resources and make them accessible systematically. Delay in the execution of a
certain global resource within a given time causes a termination of the system holding the global
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resource without updating it in order to deliver consistent resources.
A benchmark case study of cache controller was implemented to demonstrate robustness of
the proposed framework. The cache controller is composed of three cores (processors), each core
is intended to execute read/write operations to/from memory addresses which are requested to be
made upon private L2 cache memory. The design of the cache controller system considers a re-
alistic hardware design as modelled in hardware description language SystemVerilog [213]. The
coherence protocol, namely, MSI is modelled and implemented to deliver consistency property
of the cache memory and main memory. For simplification sake, I did not use a bus in the cache
controller system. Alternatively, the snoopy cache coherence protocol is implemented to ensure
that two processors that attempt to write to the same block at the same time are strictly ordered
serially and atomically. This situation is called data race where only one processor wins the
write operation. The concurrency form used for the cache controller case study is true concur-
rency which implies the application of mutual exclusion and subsequently lock-based solution
to enforce the synchronisation property of the cache memory. However, the lock-based solution
was not used because the coherence protocol MSI was used instead. In other words, such a
protocol avoids the use of locks, which leads to delay and sometimes concurrency bugs such as
deadlock and then termination of the execution. The MSI protocol has a mechanism to mark the
modified shared resource, for instance, the cache block, as dirty cache block in case it has been
modified and is inconsistent with other cache blocks or the corresponding main memory address.
This mechanism allows the processor to continue its computation and avoid waiting until the
shared resource gets unlocked which saves time and delivers consistency property.
The proposed model was randomly and independently evaluated using an external tool for
this purpose in order to make the judgement upon the model unbiased. The external tool is MAT-
LAB and for this sake, AnaTempura has been fully integrated with MATLAB. AnaTempura and
MATLAB make a strongly homogeneous pair because they complements each other. Discussion,
related work, and comparative analysis were presented in this PhD thesis.
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7.2 Comparison with Related Work
A memory model of the proposed approach using a well-defined formalism Interval Temporal
Logic (ITL) plays a major role in runtime verification of parallel programs because parallel pro-
grams need to systematically manage their access and use of shared resources in order to deliver
consistent memory model and consequently global correctness properties satisfaction. In the
related work in Chapter 2, Framing Variable and Transactional Memory (TM) approaches have
been discussed. These approaches tackle a drawback of the formalism framework of Interval
Temporal Logic (ITL) which is the absence of memory model. Interval Temporal Logic (ITL)
has two kinds of variables which are static variable and state variable. The static variable does
not change over time, whereas the state variable gets changed over time. The state variable has
the flexibility to get updated in different states or over intervals, but the problem is that the state
variable’s value does not get inherited to the next states or over intervals; it becomes undefined.
Framing Variable is initiated by Hale [107] to overcome this shortcoming of the design of
Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) formalism framework [190]. Also, Duan [295, 78] investigated
Framing Variable and subsequently Projection Temporal Logic (PTL) is introduced as an ITL
extension. Moreover, Duan introduced a new executable subset of PTL, namely, Framed Tem-
pura. Framed Tempura has new operators such as projection prj, synchronous communication
await, and framing operator frame. However, framing variable has what is called framing prob-
lem where an explicit statement has to be made if a variable does not change, bearing in mind
that the memory cell update is a very costly operation.
Alternatively, a stable operator is used to model a memory which is intended to stabilise a
list at different states or over intervals. A list construction is more powerful than a state variable
construction intended to be framed to model benchmarks memory model such as the case study,
cache controller.
On the other hand, El-kustaban [82, 80] formalised Transactional Memory (TM) in Interval
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Temporal Logic (ITL). However, there are still aspects that need to be imported to the provable
abstract TM such as nested transactions and mechanisms of updating memory. The application
of TM is limited and the debugging is difficult to place a breakpoint within the transaction.
Transactional Memory (TM) has two major drawbacks which are space overhead and latency
[68]. TM requires significant amounts of global and per-thread meta-data. Also, TM has high
single-thread latency, usually two times compared to the lock-based technique.
The proposed approach adopts the lock-based technique although it is not been demonstrated
in the case study of cache controller due to the involvement of cache coherence MSI Protocol.
MSI protocol leaves a marker on modified shared cache block to indicate its state of coherence,
to show whether it is consistent or inconsistent. Mutual Exclusion (Mutex) uses the lock-based
technique; although it limits concurrency, it offers single-thread latency. Whereas, Transactional
Memory (TM) has higher latency, it scales well [68].
7.3 Original Contribution
This PhD thesis develops a unified formal framework for the specification, verification, and
implementation of Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF) using a single well-defined
formalism, namely, Interval Temporal Logic (ITL). The proposed framework achieves:
• A general computational model for parallel computing architectures such as Multi-core,
Java RMI. The framework fits any parallel computing architectures due to its comprehen-
sibility and flexibility. It can be tailored according to the architecture design patterns.
• An executable version of the abstraction level of systems being implemented using Parallel
Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF). A high-level (abstract) specification of a case
study of cache controller is implemented using the framework PRVF in ITL. A low-level




• A formal executable specification of the cache controller system associated with the cache
coherence protocol (MSI) is delivered in addition to snoopy protocol. A formal specifi-
cation and verification of complete realistic behaviour of processor, cache memory, main
memory. A formal modelling and concrete implementation of correctness properties for
the cache controller system.
• A general computational model for handling different concurrency forms, communication
models, and execution modes of parallel computing systems. In addition to a formal model
of resource allocation, delay and timeout agents.
• A general algorithmic description of (PRVF) in terms of handling all perspectives of par-
allelism mentioned above in addition to the delivery of local/global properties verification
at local/global levels of the framework.
7.4 Success Criteria Revisited
In the introduction chapter, number of success criteria is set as a measurement for this research.
These success criteria are revised at this stage of this research to make a judgement according to
what has been met of these success criteria which are:
1. Compositional requirements from several sources to handle local and global systems
correctness:
This criterion allows to specify and reason about global systems correctness of several par-
allel programs. The development of our framework considers the composition of high-level
abstract specifications of parallel programs in order to deliver the correctness properties of
global systems. This new feature is the basis of performing further verification of low-level
concrete design and implementation of such programs (see Chapters 4, 5, 6).
2. Compositional collection of assertion data from several sources to handle True/Inter-
leaving Concurrency associated with Shared-Variable approach:
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Parallel programs run in either True/Interleaving concurrency associated with Shared-
Variable communication model which have the ability to send and receive assertion data
from several sources to verify local/global correctness properties (see Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6).
3. Compositional collection of assertion data from several sources to handle Synchronous/Asyn-
chronous Communication links Channels/Shunts associated with Message-Passing
approach:
Parallel programs running in either Synchronous/Asynchronous execution modes asso-
ciated with Message-Passing communication model have the ability to send and receive
assertion data from several sources to verify local/global correctness properties. Syn-
chronous communication links use a construct, namely, Channels, while Asynchronous
communication links use the construct, namely, Shunts (see Chapter 3).
4. The ability to execute agents concurrently and the introduction of resource allocation
agents, and Delay and Timeout agents to model delay and timeout behaviour:
The management of resource allocation, delay and timeout agents play a major role in
increasing the robustness and reliability of the framework in such cases. Agents running
in parallel need to be coordinated when they access shared resources. Moreover, timing
is modelled to increase performance of such monitoring systems and to avoid deadlock
situation in case agents do not respond timely (see Chapter 3).
5. The use of lock-based technique to enforce Mutual Exclusion to deliver synchronisa-
tion:
The Shared-Variable based approach needs the synchronisation mechanism to deliver con-
sistent and reliable resources which are shared by many parallel programs. Mutual Exclu-
sion is applied via the use of lock-based solution upon such cases. The lock-based solution
affects the performance of such programs but endorses the correctness of global properties
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of parallel programs (see Chapters 3, 4).
6. Checking correctness property of local systems at local/global levels. The inference
of the correctness of global property from the correctness of a set of local properties
of global systems:
Local systems can check their correctness properties locally at the local level (local veri-
fication & assertion phase) concurrently. The Framework allows such systems to perform
this kind of correctness properties locally. Once local verification are made, the global ver-
ification phase at the global level collects all local correctness properties to form a global
correctness property out of the local ones (see Chapters 3, 5, 6).
7.5 Limitations
The proposed computational model, Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF), has the
following limitations:
• The decomposition paradigm allows breaking down the complex large systems into small
groups accordingly in order to manage and coordinate their computation. The application
of decomposition paradigm in this approach helps to model the correctness property of
global properties. Guidelines for the mechanism of the decomposition of global properties
would be helpful to a systematic understanding of the construction of such correctness
properties.
• The proposed framework can not deal with the verification of parallel programs that run
on several hosts. Multiple hosts have different environments which might infer the cor-
rectness of such programs and consequently harden the verification task. Programs being
run in different hosts are subjected to different assumptions and commitments about the
environments of those hosts.
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• As a consequent of the previous limitation, the proposed model of the monitoring system in
this research can only deal with programs that run on the same host. The assumptions and
commitments about the environment of that host are identical; therefore, the verification
task of the delivery of correctness properties is conveniently performed.
7.6 Future Work
Bob Floyd [93] and Tony Hoare [118] introduced pre- and post-conditions, what is so called
Hoare triple or logic, to verify systems at this level of abstraction. System S satisfies a specifi-
cation formulated as predicate pair of precondition P and postcondition R. Precondition P states
the assumptions made of system S before the system gets executed, whereas, Postcondition R
states the commitment which should be met after the execution of the system.
{ P } S { R }
As a consequence of Hoare’s Logic [118], the Assumption/Commitment style is developed
to verify a set of properties of interest such as Cau and Collette in [45] , Moszkowski in [195],
and Zedan et al in [297]. Moszkowski [195] is the first to introduce Hoare’s logic to Interval
Temporal Logic (ITL). Hoare’s logic’s clause can be expressed in ITL as follows:
` ω ∧ Sys ⊃ fin ω′
where ω and ω′ are state formulas have no temporal operators, Sys is some arbitrary temporal
formula, and fin ω′ is true on an interval iff ω′ is true in the interval’s final state. Moszkowski
[195] addressed a drawback of pre- and post-condition approach which is the unsuitability for
the specification and verification of continuous and parallel systems. Moszkowski claims the
remedy of pre- and post-condition approach via the introduction of the Assumption/Commit-
ment approach. According to Moszkowski [195], the first consideration of the latter approach




` ω ∧ As ∧ Sys ⊃ Co ∧ fin ω′
where:
ω: state formula about initial state,
As: assumption about overall interval,
Sys: the system under consideration,
Co: commitment about overall interval,
ω‘: state formula about final state.
According to Zhou [299], when compositional reasoning about systems run in parallel Sys1
and Sys2, the composition can be modelled in Assumption/Commitment style as follows:
` ω1 ∧ As1 ∧ Sys1 ⊃ Co1 ∧ fin ω‘1
` ω2 ∧ As2 ∧ Sys2 ⊃ Co2 ∧ fin ω‘2
` ω ∧ As ∧ (Sys1 ‖ Sys2) ⊃ Co ∧ fin ω‘
where:
` ω ⊂ ω1 ∧ ω2
` As ∨ Co1 ⊂ As2
` As ∨ Co2 ⊂ As1
` Co1 ∨ Co2 ⊂ Co
` fin ω‘1 ∧ fin ω‘2 ⊂ fin ω‘
This kind of compositional reasoning about correctness properties enables monitoring system
at a high-level (abstraction), such as PRVF, to deal with parallel programs running on several
hosts. To transform these specifications expressed in Assumption/Commitment style into a low-
level (implementation), an executable version is needed. Transforming these specifications into
an executable version is intended in the future.
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The transformation of Assumption/Commitment from a high-level into a low-level shifts
the proposed framework towards monitoring programs running in different hosts because the
availability of modelling and execution of different environments might exist.
7.7 Future Impact
7.7.1 Academic
The development of runtime verification benchmarks that include parallel systems is a promising
research topic due to the evolutionary shift in manufacturing multi-core architectures and the
wide adoption of such architectures. Modern computers use multi-core processor architectures
at the hardware/software levels in their design. Therefore, the performance and correctness of
such applications are vital for daily life. The continuity of such research topic is commercially
profitable and academically promising.
7.7.2 Industrial
The emergence of simulation based verification and validation techniques such as virtual com-
missioning is a sudden shift solution for testing automation systems even in the absence of the
process that is subjected to control. The Distributed Control Systems (DCS) which are intended
to control industrial processes might involve thousands of instruments, actuators and controllers
running in parallel to boost performance and save time. These giant control systems are com-
plex and rely on actuators and sensors. The probability of failures is high in harsh industrial
environments due to the possibility of malfunctions and defects in actuators, sensors, or pro-
cess equipment. According to OREDA, 92% of automated control and safety malfunctions of
10 international petroleum groups encountered are due to sensor or actuator malfunctions. This
kind of defects of sensors and actuators implies the introduction of a failure-tolerant design to
overcome this vulnerability of control systems. The shut down of any process in the field due
to sensors or actuators failures might cause significant waste of materials and work hours which
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lead to profitability reduction. The lost in annual revenue in the United States caused by sensors
and actuators malfunctions alone is tens of billion dollars [230].
The development of runtime verification benchmarks that include parallel control systems
consider failure-tolerant design to avoid shutting down processes in the field due to sensors or
actuators failures which cause catastrophic loses in annual revenues of industrials. Savolainen et
al. [230] propose a runtime verification framework using plant simulation models created dur-
ing the plant design process. The verification technique used in [230] is able to cover control
software errors, sensors and actuators errors. However, I believe the development of parallel
runtime verification framework is vital due to concurrency forms, communication models , and
execution modes perspectives. Their importance to deliver correctness properties for such con-
trol systems which involve thousands of instruments, sensors, actuators which eventually run in
parallel, access shared resources, and executes differently.
Another industrial impact of the development of parallel runtime verification is the correct-
ness property of hardware and software writing of parallel processing programs. As the number
of cores is doubled every two years, programmers who are interested in increasing performance
have to be parallel programmers. Manufacturing hardware and software for multi-core processor
architectures that make the writing of correct parallel processing programs leads to efficiency in
performance and power as the number of cores per chip scales geometrically. The development
of parallel runtime verification framework for such industrial fields of multi-core systems is a
sudden shift towards correctness and performance [213].
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APPENDIX A. APPENDIX A: SIMULATIONS & ANIMATION
Figure A.1: CACHE CONTROLLER EXECU-
TION
IN TEMPURA AT STATE 0
Figure A.2: CACHE CONTROLLER SIMULA-
TION
IN ANATEMPURA AT STATE 0
Figure A.3: LOCAL STATES & PROPERTIES OF PROCESSORS 0, 1, 2 AT STATE 0
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Figure A.4: CACHE CONTROLLER EXECU-
TION
IN TEMPURA AT STATE 1
Figure A.5: CACHE CONTROLLER SIMULA-
TION
IN ANATEMPURA AT STATE 1
Figure A.6: LOCAL STATES & PROPERTIES OF PROCESSORS 0, 1, 2 AT STATE 1
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Figure A.7: CACHE CONTROLLER EXECU-
TION
IN TEMPURA AT STATE 2
Figure A.8: CACHE CONTROLLER SIMULA-
TION
IN ANATEMPURA AT STATE 2
Figure A.9: LOCAL STATES & PROPERTIES OF PROCESSORS 0, 1, 2 AT STATE 2
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Figure A.10: CACHE CONTROLLER EXECU-
TION
IN TEMPURA AT STATE 3
Figure A.11: CACHE CONTROLLER SIMULA-
TION
IN ANATEMPURA AT STATE 3
Figure A.12: LOCAL STATES & PROPERTIES OF PROCESSORS 0, 1, 2 AT STATE 3
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Figure A.13: CACHE CONTROLLER EXECU-
TION
IN TEMPURA AT STATE 4
Figure A.14: CACHE CONTROLLER SIMULA-
TION
IN ANATEMPURA AT STATE 4
Figure A.15: LOCAL STATES & PROPERTIES OF PROCESSORS 0, 1, 2 AT STATE 4
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Figure A.16: CACHE CONTROLLER EXECU-
TION
IN TEMPURA AT STATE 5
Figure A.17: CACHE CONTROLLER SIMULA-
TION
IN ANATEMPURA AT STATE 5
Figure A.18: LOCAL STATES & PROPERTIES OF PROCESSORS 0, 1, 2 AT STATE 5
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Figure A.19: CACHE CONTROLLER EXECU-
TION
IN TEMPURA AT STATE 6
Figure A.20: CACHE CONTROLLER SIMULA-
TION
IN ANATEMPURA AT STATE 6
Figure A.21: LOCAL STATES & PROPERTIES OF PROCESSORS 0, 1, 2 AT STATE 6
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Figure A.22: CACHE CONTROLLER EXECU-
TION
IN TEMPURA AT STATE 7
Figure A.23: CACHE CONTROLLER SIMULA-
TION
IN ANATEMPURA AT STATE 7
Figure A.24: LOCAL STATES & PROPERTIES OF PROCESSORS 0, 1, 2 AT STATE 7
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Figure A.25: CACHE CONTROLLER EXECU-
TION
IN TEMPURA AT STATE 8
Figure A.26: CACHE CONTROLLER SIMULA-
TION
IN ANATEMPURA AT STATE 8
Figure A.27: LOCAL STATES & PROPERTIES OF PROCESSORS 0, 1, 2 AT STATE 8
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Figure A.28: CACHE CONTROLLER EXECU-
TION
IN TEMPURA AT STATE 9
Figure A.29: CACHE CONTROLLER SIMULA-
TION
IN ANATEMPURA AT STATE 9
Figure A.30: LOCAL STATES & PROPERTIES OF PROCESSORS 0, 1, 2 AT STATE 9
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Listing B.1: Tempura Code of Cache Controller




5 * This file is part Tempura: Interval Temporal Logic interpreter.
6 *
7 * Copyright (C) 1998-2017 Nayef H. Alshammari, Antonio Cau
8 *
9 * Tempura is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
13 *
14 * Tempura is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
18 *
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License




24 define nprocessors = 3.
25 define nmemorylocations = 16.
26 define ncachelocations = 8.
27 define nlocations = 8. /* for Tag and Index */
28 define initial_value = -8.
29 define initial_value2 = -16.
30 define modified = 0.
31 define shared = 1.
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38 load "../library/tcl".
39
40 /* anatempura 0 */
41 /* anatempura 1 */
42 /* anatempura 2 */
43























67 define prog_send2(A,X) = {
68 format("!E: prog%s %s\n",ctype(A),parstr([X]))
69 }.
70
71 define prog_send_ne1(A,X) = {
72 empty and format("!E: prog%s %s\n",ctype(A),parstr([X]))
73 }.
74
75 /* 2ˆ0 to 2ˆ127 */
76 define bits=[1,2,4,8,16,32,64,128,256,512,1024,2048,
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96 define single_bit(X) = {
97 exists i: {
98 skip and for (i<32) do {





104 define msb32_2(Y,X) = {
105 (if bit(Y,X) then "1" else "0")
106 }.
107
108 define msb_16_index(X) ={
109 (if bit(3,X) then "1" else "0") +
110 (if bit(2,X) then "1" else "0") +
111 (if bit(1,X) then "1" else "0") +
112 (if bit(0,X) then "1" else "0")
113 }.
114
115 define msb_8_index(X) = {
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116 (if bit(2,X) then "1" else "0") +
117 (if bit(1,X) then "1" else "0") +
118 (if bit(0,X) then "1" else "0")
119 }.
120 define msb_14_index(X) = {
121 (if bit(13,X) then "1" else "0") +
122 (if bit(12,X) then "1" else "0") +
123 (if bit(11,X) then "1" else "0") +
124 (if bit(10,X) then "1" else "0") +
125 (if bit(9,X) then "1" else "0") +
126 (if bit(8,X) then "1" else "0") +
127 (if bit(7,X) then "1" else "0") +
128 (if bit(6,X) then "1" else "0") +
129 (if bit(5,X) then "1" else "0") +
130 (if bit(4,X) then "1" else "0") +
131 (if bit(3,X) then "1" else "0") +
132 (if bit(2,X) then "1" else "0") +
133 (if bit(1,X) then "1" else "0") +
134 (if bit(0,X) then "1" else "0")
135 }.
136 define msb_7bits_addr(X) = {
137 (if bit(6,X) then "1" else "0") +
138 (if bit(5,X) then "1" else "0") +
139 (if bit(4,X) then "1" else "0") +
140 (if bit(3,X) then "1" else "0") +
141 (if bit(2,X) then "1" else "0") +
142 (if bit(1,X) then "1" else "0") +
143 (if bit(0,X) then "1" else "0")
144 }.
145 define msb(X) = {
146 (if bit(31,X) then "1" else "0") +
147 (if bit(30,X) then "1" else "0") +
148 (if bit(29,X) then "1" else "0") +
149 (if bit(28,X) then "1" else "0") +
150 (if bit(27,X) then "1" else "0") +
151 (if bit(26,X) then "1" else "0") +
152 (if bit(25,X) then "1" else "0") +
153 (if bit(24,X) then "1" else "0") +
154 (if bit(23,X) then "1" else "0") +
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155 (if bit(22,X) then "1" else "0") +
156 (if bit(21,X) then "1" else "0") +
157 (if bit(20,X) then "1" else "0") +
158 (if bit(19,X) then "1" else "0") +
159 (if bit(18,X) then "1" else "0") +
160 (if bit(17,X) then "1" else "0") +
161 (if bit(16,X) then "1" else "0") +
162 (if bit(15,X) then "1" else "0") +
163 (if bit(14,X) then "1" else "0") +
164 (if bit(13,X) then "1" else "0") +
165 (if bit(12,X) then "1" else "0") +
166 (if bit(11,X) then "1" else "0") +
167 (if bit(10,X) then "1" else "0") +
168 (if bit(9,X) then "1" else "0") +
169 (if bit(8,X) then "1" else "0") +
170 (if bit(7,X) then "1" else "0") +
171 (if bit(6,X) then "1" else "0") +
172 (if bit(5,X) then "1" else "0") +
173 (if bit(4,X) then "1" else "0") +
174 (if bit(3,X) then "1" else "0") +
175 (if bit(2,X) then "1" else "0") +
176 (if bit(1,X) then "1" else "0") +
177 (if bit(0,X) then "1" else "0")
178 }.
179
180 define tag_field_cache(X) = {
181 (if bit(31,X) then "1" else "0") +
182 (if bit(30,X) then "1" else "0") +
183 (if bit(29,X) then "1" else "0") +
184 (if bit(28,X) then "1" else "0") +
185 (if bit(27,X) then "1" else "0") +
186 (if bit(26,X) then "1" else "0") +
187 (if bit(25,X) then "1" else "0") +
188 (if bit(24,X) then "1" else "0") +
189 (if bit(23,X) then "1" else "0") +
190 (if bit(22,X) then "1" else "0") +
191 (if bit(21,X) then "1" else "0") +
192 (if bit(20,X) then "1" else "0") +
193 (if bit(19,X) then "1" else "0") +
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194 (if bit(18,X) then "1" else "0") +
195 (if bit(17,X) then "1" else "0") +
196 (if bit(16,X) then "1" else "0") +
197 (if bit(15,X) then "1" else "0") +
198 (if bit(14,X) then "1" else "0") +
199 (if bit(13,X) then "1" else "0") +
200 (if bit(12,X) then "1" else "0") +
201 (if bit(11,X) then "1" else "0") +
202 (if bit(10,X) then "1" else "0") +
203 (if bit(9,X) then "1" else "0") +
204 (if bit(8,X) then "1" else "0") +
205 (if bit(7,X) then "1" else "0") +
206 (if bit(6,X) then "1" else "0") +
207 (if bit(5,X) then "1" else "0") +
208 (if bit(4,X) then "1" else "0") +
209 (if bit(3,X) then "1" else "0")
210 }.
211
212 define index_field_cache_8(X) = {
213 (if bit(2,X) then "1" else "0") +
214 (if bit(1,X) then "1" else "0") +
215 (if bit(0,X) then "1" else "0")
216 }.
217
218 define index_field_cache(X) = {
219 (if bit(9,X) then "1" else "0") +
220 (if bit(8,X) then "1" else "0") +
221 (if bit(7,X) then "1" else "0") +
222 (if bit(6,X) then "1" else "0") +
223 (if bit(5,X) then "1" else "0") +
224 (if bit(4,X) then "1" else "0") +
225 (if bit(3,X) then "1" else "0") +
226 (if bit(2,X) then "1" else "0") +
227 (if bit(1,X) then "1" else "0") +
228 (if bit(0,X) then "1" else "0")
229 }.
230
231 define tag_field_memory(X) = {
232 (if bit(31,X) then "1" else "0") +
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APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER
233 (if bit(30,X) then "1" else "0") +
234 (if bit(29,X) then "1" else "0") +
235 (if bit(28,X) then "1" else "0") +
236 (if bit(27,X) then "1" else "0") +
237 (if bit(26,X) then "1" else "0") +
238 (if bit(25,X) then "1" else "0") +
239 (if bit(24,X) then "1" else "0") +
240 (if bit(23,X) then "1" else "0") +
241 (if bit(22,X) then "1" else "0") +
242 (if bit(21,X) then "1" else "0") +
243 (if bit(20,X) then "1" else "0") +
244 (if bit(19,X) then "1" else "0") +
245 (if bit(18,X) then "1" else "0") +
246 (if bit(17,X) then "1" else "0") +
247 (if bit(16,X) then "1" else "0") +
248 (if bit(15,X) then "1" else "0") +
249 (if bit(14,X) then "1" else "0") +
250 (if bit(13,X) then "1" else "0") +
251 (if bit(12,X) then "1" else "0") +




256 define index_field_memory_16(X) = {
257 (if bit(3,X) then "1" else "0") +
258 (if bit(2,X) then "1" else "0") +
259 (if bit(1,X) then "1" else "0") +
260 (if bit(0,X) then "1" else "0")
261 }.
262
263 define index_field_memory(X) = {
264 (if bit(10,X) then "1" else "0") +
265 (if bit(9,X) then "1" else "0") +
266 (if bit(8,X) then "1" else "0") +
267 (if bit(7,X) then "1" else "0") +
268 (if bit(6,X) then "1" else "0") +
269 (if bit(5,X) then "1" else "0") +
270 (if bit(4,X) then "1" else "0") +
271 (if bit(3,X) then "1" else "0") +
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272 (if bit(2,X) then "1" else "0") +
273 (if bit(1,X) then "1" else "0") +
274 (if bit(0,X) then "1" else "0")
275 }.
276
277 define data_field(X) = {
278 (if bit(31,X) then "1" else "0") +
279 (if bit(30,X) then "1" else "0") +
280 (if bit(29,X) then "1" else "0") +
281 (if bit(28,X) then "1" else "0") +
282 (if bit(27,X) then "1" else "0") +
283 (if bit(26,X) then "1" else "0") +
284 (if bit(25,X) then "1" else "0") +
285 (if bit(24,X) then "1" else "0") +
286 (if bit(23,X) then "1" else "0") +
287 (if bit(22,X) then "1" else "0") +
288 (if bit(21,X) then "1" else "0") +
289 (if bit(20,X) then "1" else "0") +
290 (if bit(19,X) then "1" else "0") +
291 (if bit(18,X) then "1" else "0") +
292 (if bit(17,X) then "1" else "0") +
293 (if bit(16,X) then "1" else "0") +
294 (if bit(15,X) then "1" else "0") +
295 (if bit(14,X) then "1" else "0") +
296 (if bit(13,X) then "1" else "0") +
297 (if bit(12,X) then "1" else "0") +
298 (if bit(11,X) then "1" else "0") +
299 (if bit(10,X) then "1" else "0") +
300 (if bit(9,X) then "1" else "0") +
301 (if bit(8,X) then "1" else "0") +
302 (if bit(7,X) then "1" else "0") +
303 (if bit(6,X) then "1" else "0") +
304 (if bit(5,X) then "1" else "0") +
305 (if bit(4,X) then "1" else "0") +
306 (if bit(3,X) then "1" else "0") +
307 (if bit(2,X) then "1" else "0") +
308 (if bit(1,X) then "1" else "0") +
309 (if bit(0,X) then "1" else "0")
310 }.
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311
312 define update_msi(i,B,L2CacheState,v) =
313 {
314 (forall j<ncachelocations :
315 if j=B then { L2CacheState[i][j]:=v }




320 define cs_text(V) = {
321 if V=modified then "Modified"
322 else if V=shared then "Shared"





328 Vbit,Dbit,x,RW,ADDR,DATA,j,Tick) = {
329 exists y,z,indexc, indexm, tag, datam, csx, csy, csz, tagx, tagy, tagz, datax, datay, dataz,
330 stringx, stringy, stringz,tmpwb, vbitx,vbity,vbitz, nvbitx,nvbity,nvbitz, ncsx, ncsy, ncsz,
331 dbitx,dbity,dbitz,ndbitx,ndbity,ndbitz,ntagx,ntagy,ntagz,Sx,Sy,Sz,S,
332 cmx, cmy, cmz, ncmx, ncmy, ncmz, mm, nmm : {
333 y = (x+1) mod nprocessors and
334 z = (x+2) mod nprocessors and
335 indexc = ADDR mod ncachelocations and
336 indexm = ADDR mod nmemorylocations and
337 tag = ADDR div ncachelocations and
338 csx = L2CacheState[x][indexc] and
339 csy = L2CacheState[y][indexc] and
340 csz = L2CacheState[z][indexc] and
341 ncsx = next(L2CacheState[x][indexc]) and
342 ncsy = next(L2CacheState[y][indexc]) and
343 ncsz = next(L2CacheState[z][indexc]) and
344 tagx = L2CacheTag[x][indexc] and
345 tagy = L2CacheTag[y][indexc] and
346 tagz = L2CacheTag[z][indexc] and
347 ntagx = next(L2CacheTag[x][indexc]) and
348 ntagy = next(L2CacheTag[y][indexc]) and
349 ntagz = next(L2CacheTag[z][indexc]) and
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354 /*stringy = " " and
355 stringz = " " and*/
356 /*format("Processor %t, Cache is %t \n",x,cs_text(csx)) and
357 format("Processor %t, Cache is %t \n",z,cs_text(csz)) and
358 format("Processor %t, Cache is %t \n",y,cs_text(csy)) and*/
359 vbitx = {if csx = shared or csx = modified then 1 else 0} and
360 vbity = {if csy = shared or csy = modified then 1 else 0} and
361 vbitz = {if csz = shared or csz = modified then 1 else 0} and
362 nvbitx = {if ncsx = shared or ncsx = modified then 1 else 0} and
363 nvbity = {if ncsy = shared or ncsy = modified then 1 else 0} and
364 nvbitz = {if ncsz = shared or ncsz = modified then 1 else 0} and
365
366 dbitx = {if csx = modified then 1 else 0} and
367 dbity = {if csy = modified then 1 else 0} and
368 dbitz = {if csz = modified then 1 else 0} and
369 ndbitx = {if ncsx = modified then 1 else 0} and
370 ndbity = {if ncsy = modified then 1 else 0} and
371 ndbitz = {if ncsz = modified then 1 else 0} and
372
373
374 if RW = 0 then { /* read */
375 stringx = {if tag = tagx and (csx = shared or csx = modified) then "Read Hit" else "Read ...
Miss"} and
376 stringy = {if tag = tagy and (csy = shared or csy = modified) then "Read Hit" else "Read ...
Miss"} and
377 stringz = {if tag = tagz and (csz = shared or csz = modified) then "Read Hit" else "Read ...
Miss"} and
378 if tag = tagx then {
379 /* read hit cache x */
380 if csx = shared or csx = modified then {
381 /* normal hit */
382 /*stringx = "Read hit" and*/
383 format("State %d: Processor %t getting data from Cache[%t]\n", j, x, indexc) and
384 memory_unchanged(MainMemory) and
385 DATA = L2CacheMemory[x][indexc] and
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389 /*stringy = " " and*/




394 } else { /* cache line x invalid */
395 /*stringx = "Read miss" and*/
396 if csy = invalid and csz = invalid then {
397 format("State %d: Getting data from global memory\n", j) and




402 /*stringy = "Read miss" and*/





408 } else if csy = invalid and csz = modified then {
409 if tag = tagz then { /* read hit in cache z */
410 /*stringz = "Read hit" and*/
411 /*stringy = "Read miss" and*/
412 format("State %d: Getting data from Cache of processor %t \n", j, z) and
413 DATA = L2CacheMemory[z][indexc] and
414 write_to_memory(MainMemory,x,indexm,DATA,Tick) and







422 } else { /* read miss in cache z */
423 /*stringz = "Read miss" and*/
424 /*stringy = "Read miss" and*/
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425 format("State %d: Getting data from global memory\n", j) and
426 tmpwb = 8*tagz+indexc and
427 dataz = L2CacheMemory[z][indexc] and
428 format("State %d: Processor %t, write-back cache[%t] with tag %t and
429 data %t to memory[%t] \n", j, z, indexc, tagz, dataz, tmpwb) and
430 DATA = MainMemory[indexm] and








439 } else if csy = modified and csz = invalid then {
440 if tag = tagy then { /* read hit in cache y */
441 /*stringy = "Read hit" and*/
442 /*stringz = "Read miss" and*/
443 format("State %d: Getting data from Cache of processor %t \n", j, y) and
444 DATA = L2CacheMemory[y][indexc] and
445 write_to_memory(MainMemory,x,indexm,DATA,Tick) and







453 } else { /* read miss in cache y */
454 /*stringy = "Read miss" and*/
455 /*stringz = "Read miss" and*/
456 format("State %d: Getting data from global memory\n", j) and
457 tmpwb = 8*tagy+indexc and
458 datay = L2CacheMemory[y][indexc] and
459 format("State %d: Processor %t, write-back cache[%t] with tag %t and data %t
460 to memory[%t] \n", j, y, indexc, tagy, datay, tmpwb) and
461 DATA = MainMemory[indexm] and
462 write_to_memory(MainMemory,y, tmpwb, datay,Tick) and
463 write_to_cache(L2CacheMemory,L2CacheTag,Vbit,x,indexc,DATA,tag,j) and
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470 } else if csy = shared then {
471 if tag = tagy then { /* read hit in cache y */
472 /*stringy = "Read hit" and*/
473 /*stringz = " " and*/
474 format("State %d: Getting data from Cache of processor %t \n", j, y) and








483 } else { /* read miss in cache y */
484 /*stringy = "Read miss" and*/
485 if csz = shared then {
486 if tag = tagz then { /* read hit in cache z */
487 /*stringz = "Read hit " and*/
488 format("State %d: Getting data from Cache of processor %t \n", j, z) and








497 } else { /* read miss in cache z */
498 /*stringz = "Read miss" and*/
499 format("State %d: Getting data from global memory\n", j) and











509 } else {
510 /*stringz = "Read miss" and*/
511 format("State %d: Getting data from global memory\n", j) and










522 } else {
523 if csz = shared then {
524 if tag = tagz then { /* read hit in cache z */
525 /*stringz = "Read hit" and*/
526 /*stringy = " " and*/
527 format("State %d: Getting data from Cache of processor %t \n", j, z) and








536 } else { /* read miss in cache z */
537 /*stringz = "Read miss" and*/
538 /*stringy = "Read miss" and*/
539 format("State %d: Getting data from global memory\n", j) and
540 DATA = MainMemory[indexm] and
541 write_to_cache(L2CacheMemory,L2CacheTag,Vbit,x,indexc,DATA,tag,j) and
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549 } else {
550 /*stringz = "Read miss" and*/
551 /*stringy = "Read miss" and*/
552 format("State %d: Getting data from global memory\n", j) and











564 } else { /* read miss tag 6= tagx */
565 /*stringx = "Read miss" and*/
566 if csx = invalid then { /* cache line x is invalid */
567 if csy = invalid and csz = invalid then {
568 /*stringz = "Read miss" and*/
569 /*stringy = "Read miss" and*/
570 format("State %d: Getting data from global memory\n", j) and








579 } else if csy = invalid and csz = modified then {
580 if tag = tagz then { /* read Hit in cache z */
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581 /*stringz = "Read hit" and*/
582 /*stringy = " " and*/
583 format("State %d: Getting data from Cache of processor %t \n", j, z) and
584 DATA = L2CacheMemory[z][indexc] and
585 write_to_memory(MainMemory,x,indexm,DATA,Tick) and







593 } else { /* read miss in cache z */
594 /*stringz = "Read miss" and*/
595 /*stringy = "Read miss" and*/
596 format("State %d: Getting data from global memory\n", j) and
597 tmpwb = 8*tagz+indexc and
598 dataz = L2CacheMemory[z][indexc] and
599 format("State %d: Processor %t, write-back cache[%t] with tag %t and
600 data %t to memory[%t] \n", j, z, indexc, tagz, dataz, tmpwb) and
601 DATA = MainMemory[indexm] and








610 } else if csy = modified and csz = invalid then {
611 if tag = tagy then { /* read Hit in cache y */
612 /*stringy = "Read hit" and*/
613 /*stringz = "Read miss" and*/
614 format("State %d: Getting data from Cache of processor %t \n", j, y) and
615 DATA = L2CacheMemory[y][indexc] and










624 } else { /* read Miss in cache y */
625 /*stringy = "Read miss" and*/
626 /*stringz = "Read miss" and*/
627 format("State %d: Getting data from global memory\n", j) and
628 tmpwb = 8*tagy+indexc and
629 datay = L2CacheMemory[y][indexc] and
630 format("State %d: Processor %t, write-back cache[%t] with tag %t and
631 data %t to memory[%t] \n", j, y, indexc, tagy, datay, tmpwb) and
632 DATA = MainMemory[indexm] and








641 } else if csy = shared then {
642 if tag = tagy then { /* read hit in cache y */
643 /*stringy = " Read hit" and*/
644 /*stringz = " " and*/
645 format("State %d: Getting data from Cache of processor %t \n", j, y) and








654 } else { /* read miss in cache y */
655 /*stringy = "Read miss" and*/
656 if csz = shared then {
657 if tag = tagz then { /* read hit in cache z */
658 /*stringz = "Read hit" and*/
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659 format("State %d: Getting data from Cache of processor %t \n", j, y) and








668 } else { /* read miss in cache z */
669 /*stringz = "Read miss" and*/
670 format("State %d: Getting data from global memory\n", j) and









680 } else {
681 /*stringz = "Read miss" and*/
682 format("State %d: Getting data from global memory\n", j) and










693 } else {
694 if csz = shared then {
695 if tag = tagz then { /* read hit in cache z */
696 /*stringz = "Read hit" and*/
697 /*stringy = " " and*/
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698 format("State %d: Getting data from Cache of processor %t \n", j, z) and








707 } else { /* read miss in cache z */
708 /*stringz = "Read miss" and*/
709 /*stringy = "Read miss" and*/
710 format("State %d: Getting data from global memory\n", j) and









720 } else {
721 /*stringy = "Read miss" and*/
722 /*stringz = "Read miss" and*/
723 format("State %d: Getting data from global memory\n", j) and










734 } else if csx = shared then { /* cache line x is shared */
735 if csz = shared and tagz = tag then { /* cache line z is shared and
736 a read hit on cache line z */
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737 /*stringz = "Read hit" and*/
738 /*stringy = " " and*/
739 format("State %d: Getting data from Cache of processor %t \n", j, z) and








748 } else { /* cache line z is not shared or a read miss on cache line z */
749 /*if tagz 6= tag then { stringz = "Read miss" } else { stringz = " " } and*/
750 if csy = shared and tagy = tag then { /* cache line y is shared and
751 a read hit on cache line y */
752 /*stringy = "Read hit" and*/
753 format("State %d: Getting data from Cache of processor %t \n", j, y) and








762 } else { /* cache line y is not shared or a read miss on cache line y */
763 /*if tagy 6= tag then { stringy = "Read miss" } else { stringy = " " } and*/
764 format("State %d: Getting data from global memory\n", j) and










775 } else { /* cache line x is modified, write-back */
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776 /*stringy = " " and*/
777 /*stringz = " " and*/
778 format("State %d: Getting data from global memory\n", j) and
779 DATA = MainMemory[indexm] and
780 tmpwb = 8*tagx+indexc and
781 datax = L2CacheMemory[x][indexc] and
782 format("State %d: Processor %t, write-back cache[%t] with tag %t
783 and data %t to memory[%t] \n", j, x, indexc, tagx, datax, tmpwb) and









793 } else { /* write */
794 stringx = {if tag = tagx then "Write Hit" else "Write Miss"} and
795 stringy = {if tag = tagy then "Write Hit" else "Write Miss"} and
796 stringz = {if tag = tagz then "Write Hit" else "Write Miss"} and
797 if tag = tagx then { /* write hit cache x */
798 /*stringx = "Write hit" and */
799 if csx = modified then {
800 /*stringy = " " and*/








809 } else if csx = invalid then {
810 write_to_cache(L2CacheMemory,L2CacheTag,Vbit,x,indexc,DATA,tag,j) and
811 update_msi(x,indexc,L2CacheState,modified) and
812 if csy = modified and tagy 6= tag then {
813 /*stringy = "Write miss" and*/
814 /*stringz = " " and*/
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815 datay = L2CacheMemory[y][indexc] and
816 tmpwb = 8*tagy+indexc and
817 format("State %d: Processor %t, write-back cache[%t] with tag %t and
818 data %t to memory[%t] \n", j, y, indexc, tagy, datay, tmpwb) and
819 write_to_memory(MainMemory,y, tmpwb, datay,Tick)
820 } else {
821 stringy = " " and
822 if csz = modified and tagz 6= tag then {
823 /*stringz = "Write miss" and*/
824 dataz = L2CacheMemory[z][indexc] and
825 tmpwb = 8*tagz+indexc and
826 format("State %d: Processor %t, write-back cache[%t] with tag %t and
827 data %t to memory[%t] \n", j, z, indexc, tagz, dataz, tmpwb) and
828 write_to_memory(MainMemory,z, tmpwb, dataz,Tick)
829 } else {








838 } else {
839 /*stringy = " " and*/









849 } else { /* write miss cache x */
850 /*stringx = "write miss" and*/
851 if csx = modified then {
852 /*stringy = " " and*/
853 /*stringz = " " and*/
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854 datax = L2CacheMemory[x][indexc] and
855 tmpwb = 8*tagx+indexc and
856 format("State %d: Processor %t, write-back cache[%t] with tag %t and
857 data %t to memory[%t] \n", j, x, indexc, tagx, datax, tmpwb) and







865 } else if csx = invalid then {
866 write_to_cache(L2CacheMemory,L2CacheTag,Vbit,x,indexc,DATA,tag,j) and
867 update_msi(x,indexc,L2CacheState,modified) and
868 if csy = modified and tagy 6= tag then {
869 /*stringy = "Write miss" and*/
870 /*stringz = " " and*/
871 datay = L2CacheMemory[y][indexc] and
872 tmpwb = 8*tagy+indexc and
873 format("State %d: Processor %t, write-back cache[%t] with tag %t and
874 data %t to memory[%t] \n", j, y, indexc, tagy, datay, tmpwb) and
875 write_to_memory(MainMemory,y, tmpwb, datay,Tick)
876
877 } else {
878 /*stringy = " " and*/
879 if csz = modified and tagz 6= tag then {
880 /*stringz = "Write miss" and*/
881 dataz = L2CacheMemory[z][indexc] and
882 tmpwb = 8*tagz+indexc and
883 format("State %d: Processor %t, write-back cache[%t] with tag %t and
884 data %t to memory[%t] \n", j, z, indexc, tagz, dataz, tmpwb) and
885 write_to_memory(MainMemory,z, tmpwb, dataz,Tick)
886
887 } else {










896 } else {
897 /*stringy = " " and*/












910 if RW = 0 then {
911 format("State %d: Global is receiving from Processor %d: a read request for Address: %d with
912 Data %d, Global State: %d\n",j,x,ADDR,DATA,Tick)
913 } else {
914 format("State %d: Global is receiving from Processor %d: a write request for Address: %d with
915 Data: %d, Global State: %d\n",j,x,ADDR,DATA,Tick)
916 }
917
918 and cmx = L2CacheMemory[x][indexc]
919 and cmy = L2CacheMemory[y][indexc]
920 and cmz = L2CacheMemory[z][indexc]
921 and ncmx = next(L2CacheMemory[x][indexc])
922 and ncmy = next(L2CacheMemory[y][indexc])
923 and ncmz = next(L2CacheMemory[z][indexc])
924 and mm = MainMemory[indexm]
925 and nmm = next(MainMemory[indexm])
926 and header_out() and
927
928 format("| %2d(%1d) | %d | %4t| %7s | Cache[%3s] | %t | %t | %2t | %10s | %3t | %10s[%1d] |
929 Memory[%7s] --->%4t |\n",x,x,RW,ADDR,msb_7bits_addr(ADDR),index_field_cache_8(indexc),
930 vbitx,dbitx,tagx,stringx,cmx,cs_text(csx),x,msb_7bits_addr(indexm),mm) and
931 format("| %2d(%1d) | %d | %4t| %7s | Cache[%3s] | %t | %t | %2t | %10s | %3t | %10s[%1d] |
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932 Memory[%7s] --->%4t |\n",x,y,RW,ADDR,msb_7bits_addr(ADDR),index_field_cache_8(indexc),
933 vbity,dbity,tagy,stringy,cmy,cs_text(csy),y,msb_7bits_addr(indexm),mm) and
934 format("| %2d(%1d) | %d | %4t| %7s | Cache[%3s] | %t | %t | %2t | %10s | %3t | %10s[%1d] |




939 format("| %2d(%1d) | %d | %4t| %7s | Cache[%3s] | %t | %t | %2t | | %3t | %10s[%1d] |
940 Memory[%7s] ---> %4t |\n",x,x,RW,ADDR,msb_7bits_addr(ADDR),index_field_cache_8(indexc),
941 nvbitx,ndbitx,ntagx,ncmx,cs_text(ncsx),x,msb_7bits_addr(indexm),nmm) and
942 format("| %2d(%1d) | %d | %4t| %7s | Cache[%3s] | %t | %t | %2t | | %3t | %10s[%1d] |
943 Memory[%7s] ---> %4t |\n",x,y,RW,ADDR,msb_7bits_addr(ADDR),index_field_cache_8(indexc),
944 nvbity,ndbity,ntagy,ncmy,cs_text(ncsy),y,msb_7bits_addr(indexm),nmm) and
945 format("| %2d(%1d) | %d | %4t| %7s | Cache[%3s] | %t | %t | %2t | | %3t | %10s[%1d] |




950 DATA,Tick,nmm,ADDR,ADDR mod 16])






957 msb_7bits_addr(indexm)+"\""+","+str(mm)+","+str(nmm)+"]" and /*output(Sx) and*/
958






965 msb_7bits_addr(indexm)+"\""+","+str(mm)+","+str(nmm)+"]" and /*output(Sy) and*/
966
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971 ","+"\""+stringz+"\""+","+str(cmz)+","+str(ncmz)+","+"\""+
972 cs_text(csz)+"\""+","+"\""+cs_text(ncsz)+"\""+","+"\""+
973 msb_7bits_addr(indexm)+"\""+","+str(mm)+","+str(nmm)+"]" and /*output(Sz) and*/
974
975 prog_send2(x,Sx+".") and prog_send2(y,Sy+".") and prog_send2(z,Sz+".") and












988 define Global_State_Consistency(x,y,z,j,Tick,ncsx,ncsy,ncsz) ={
989 skip and
990 if ncsx=shared or ncsx=modified or ncsx=invalid then {
991 if j=Tick then {
992 /*PID=strint(aval1(T,0)) and
993 RW = strint(aval1(T,1)) and
994 addr=strint(aval1(T,2)) and
995 datato = strint(aval1(T,3)) and
996 Tick=strint(aval1(T,4)) and */
997 footer_property_1(ncsx) and
998 format("| Global State Check | Global = %2d | Pass |\n",j) and
999 format("| Local State Check | Active[%d] = %2d | Pass |\n",x,Tick) and
1000 format("| Local State Check | Idle[%d] = %2d | Pass |\n",y,Tick) and
1001 format("| Local State Check | Idle[%d] = %2d | Pass |\n",z,Tick)
1002 } else {
1003 footer_property_1(ncsx) and
1004 format("| Global State Check | Global = %2d | Fail |\n",j) and
1005 format("| Local State Check | Active[%d] = %2d | Fail |\n",x,Tick) and
1006 format("| Local State Check | Idle[%d] = %2d | Fail |\n",y,Tick) and
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1010 }.
1011 define Invalid_State(cmx,ncmx,cmy,ncmy,cmz,ncmz,mm,nmm,x,y,z,ncsx,ncsy,ncsz) = {
1012 skip and
1013 if ncsx=invalid then {
1014 if ncmx = -8 or (ncmx = nmm and ncsx 6= shared and (ncmx 6= ncmy or ncmx 6= ncmz)) then {
1015 format("| Invalid State Check | %10s[%1d] | Pass |\n",cs_text(ncsx),x)
1016 } else {
1017 format("| Invalid State Check | %10s[%1d] | Fail |\n",cs_text(ncsx),x)
1018 }
1019 } else {
1020 format("| Invalid State Check | %10s[%1d] | NA |\n",cs_text(ncsx),x)
1021 } and
1022 if ncsy=invalid then {
1023 if ncmy = -8 or (ncmy = nmm and ncsy 6= shared and (ncmy 6= ncmx or ncmy 6= ncmz)) then {
1024 format("| Invalid State Check | %10s[%1d] | Pass |\n",cs_text(ncsy),y)
1025 } else {
1026 format("| Invalid State Check | %10s[%1d] | Fail |\n",cs_text(ncsy),y)
1027 }
1028 } else {
1029 format("| Invalid State Check | %10s[%1d] | NA |\n", cs_text(ncsy),y)
1030 } and
1031 if ncsz=invalid then {
1032 if ncmz = -8 or (ncmz = nmm and ncsz 6= shared and (ncmz 6= ncmy or ncmz 6= ncmx)) then {
1033 format("| Invalid State Check | %10s[%1d] | Pass |\n",cs_text(ncsz),z)
1034 } else {
1035 format("| Invalid State Check | %10s[%1d] | Fail |\n",cs_text(ncsz),z)
1036 }
1037 } else {




1042 define Shared_State(cmx,ncmx,cmy,ncmy,cmz,ncmz,mm,nmm,x,y,z,ncsx,ncsy,ncsz) = {
1043 skip and
1044
1045 if ncsx=shared then {
1046 if ncmx = nmm or ncmx = ncmy and ncmx = ncmz and ncmx 6= -8 then {
1047 format("| Shared State Check | %10s[%1d] | Pass |\n",cs_text(ncsx),x)
1048 } else {
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1049 format("| Shared State Check | %10s[%1d] | Fail |\n",cs_text(ncsx),x)
1050 }
1051 } else {
1052 format("| Shared State Check | %10s[%1d] | NA |\n", cs_text(ncsx),x)
1053 } and
1054 if ncsy=shared then {
1055 if ncmy = nmm or ncmy = ncmx and ncmy = ncmz and ncmy 6= -8 then {
1056 format("| Shared State Check | %10s[%1d] | Pass |\n",cs_text(ncsy),y)
1057 } else {
1058 format("| Shared State Check | %10s[%1d] | Fail |\n",cs_text(ncsy),y)
1059 }
1060 } else {
1061 format("| Shared State Check | %10s[%1d] | NA |\n", cs_text(ncsy),y)
1062 } and
1063 if ncsz=shared then {
1064 if ncmz = nmm or ncmz = ncmx and ncmz = ncmy and ncmz 6= -8 then {
1065 format("| Shared State Check | %10s[%1d] | Pass |\n",cs_text(ncsz),z)
1066 } else {
1067 format("| Shared State Check | %10s[%1d] | Fail |\n",cs_text(ncsz),z)
1068 }
1069 } else {




1074 define Consistency_Property(ncmx,ncmy,ncmz,nmm,x,y,z,ncsx,ncsy,ncsz) = {
1075 skip and
1076 /* If the cache consistent with the main memory */
1077 if ncsx=shared then {
1078 if ncmx = nmm then {
1079 format("| Consistency Property Check | %10s[%1d] | Pass |\n",cs_text(ncsx),x)
1080 } else {
1081 format("| Consistency Property Check | %10s[%1d] | Fail |\n",cs_text(ncsx),x)
1082 }
1083 } else {
1084 format("| Consistency Property Check | %10s[%1d] | NA |\n",cs_text(ncsx),x)
1085 }
1086 and
1087 if ncsy= shared then {
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1088 if ncmy = nmm then {
1089 format("| Consistency Property Check | %10s[%1d] | Pass |\n",cs_text(ncsy),y)
1090 } else {
1091 format("| Consistency Property Check | %10s[%1d] | Fail |\n",cs_text(ncsy),y)
1092 }
1093 } else {
1094 format("| Consistency Property Check | %10s[%1d] | NA |\n",cs_text(ncsy),y)
1095 }
1096 and
1097 if ncsz=shared then {
1098 if ncmz = nmm then {
1099 format("| Consistency Property Check | %10s[%1d] | Pass |\n",cs_text(ncsz),z)
1100 } else {
1101 format("| Consistency Property Check | %10s[%1d] | Fail |\n",cs_text(ncsz),z)
1102 }
1103 } else {




1108 define header_property(ncsx) = {
1109 if ncsx = shared or ncsx = modified or ncsx = invalid then {
1110 format("-------------------------------------------------------------------\n") and





1116 define footer_property_1(ncsx) = {









1126 define MSI_Protocol(ncsx,ncsy,ncsz,x,y,z) = {
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1127 skip and
1128 /* Allowed MSI States */
1129 if (ncsx = invalid and ncsy = invalid and ncsz = invalid) or
1130 (ncsx = invalid and ncsy = invalid and ncsz = modified) or
1131 (ncsx = invalid and ncsy = invalid and ncsz = shared) or
1132 (ncsx = invalid and ncsy = modified and ncsz = invalid) or
1133 (ncsx = invalid and ncsy = shared and ncsz = invalid) or
1134 (ncsx = invalid and ncsy = shared and ncsz = shared) or
1135 (ncsx = modified and ncsy = invalid and ncsz = invalid) or
1136 (ncsx = shared and ncsy = invalid and ncsz = invalid) or
1137 (ncsx = shared and ncsy = invalid and ncsz = shared) or
1138 (ncsx = shared and ncsy = shared and ncsz = invalid) or
1139 (ncsx = shared and ncsy = shared and ncsz = shared) then {
1140 footer_property() and
1141 format("| | %10s[%1d] | |\n",cs_text(ncsx),x) and
1142 format("| MSI Protocol Check | %10s[%1d] | Pass |\n",cs_text(ncsy),y) and
1143 format("| | %10s[%1d] | |\n",cs_text(ncsz),z) /*and
1144 footer_property()*/
1145 } else {
1146 footer_property() and
1147 format("| | %10s[%1d] | |\n",cs_text(ncsx),x) and
1148 format("| MSI Protocol Check | %10s[%1d] | Fail |\n",cs_text(ncsy),y) and






1155 { exists Estring00,Estring01,Estring10,Estring11 : {
1156 skip and
1157 Estring00="Read Miss" and Estring01="Read Hit" and
1158 Estring10="Write Miss" and Estring11="Write Hit" and
1159 if ncsx=shared or ncsx=modified or ncsx=invalid then {
1160 if RW=0 then { /* RW=0 Read Check */
1161
1162 if tag 6= tagx and (csx 6= shared or csx 6= modified) and
1163 tag 6= tagy and (csy 6= shared or csy 6= modified) and
1164 tag 6= tagz and (csz 6= shared or csz 6= modified) then {
1165 if stringx=Estring00 and stringy=Estring00 and stringz=Estring00 then {
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1166 footer_property() and
1167 format("| | %12t[%d] | |\n",stringx,x) and
1168 format("| Read Miss Check | %12t[%d] | Pass |\n",stringy,y) and
1169 format("| | %12t[%d] | |\n",stringz,z) and
1170 footer_property()
1171 } else {
1172 footer_property() and
1173 format("| | %12t[%d] | |\n",stringx,x) and
1174 format("| Read Miss Check | %12t[%d] | Fail |\n",stringy,y) and
1175 format("| | %12t[%d] | |\n",stringz,z) and
1176 footer_property()
1177 }
1178 } else {
1179 if stringx=Estring01 or stringy=Estring01 or stringz=Estring01 then {
1180 footer_property() and
1181 format("| | %12t[%d] | |\n",stringx,x) and
1182 format("| Read Hit Check | %12t[%d] | Pass |\n",stringy,y) and
1183 format("| | %12t[%d] | |\n",stringz,z) and
1184 footer_property()
1185 } else {
1186 footer_property() and
1187 format("| | %12t[%d] | |\n",stringx,x) and
1188 format("| Read Hit Check | %12t[%d] | Fail |\n",stringy,y) and




1193 } else { /* RW=1 Write Check */
1194 if tag 6= tagx and tag 6= tagy and tag 6= tagz then {
1195 if stringx=Estring10 and stringy=Estring10 and stringz=Estring10 then {
1196 footer_property() and
1197 format("| | %12t[%d] | |\n",stringx,x) and
1198 format("| Write Miss Check | %12t[%d] | Pass |\n",stringy,y) and
1199 format("| | %12t[%d] | |\n",stringz,y) and
1200 footer_property()
1201 } else {
1202 footer_property() and
1203 format("| | %12t[%d] | |\n",stringx,x) and
1204 format("| Write Miss Check | %12t[%d] | Fail |\n",stringy,y) and
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1205 format("| | %12t[%d] | |\n",stringz,z) and
1206 footer_property()
1207 }
1208 } else {
1209 if stringx=Estring11 or stringy=Estring11 or stringz=Estring11 then {
1210 footer_property() and
1211 format("| | %12t[%d] | |\n",stringx,x) and
1212 format("| Write Hit Check | %12t[%d] | Pass |\n",stringy,y) and
1213 format("| | %12t[%d] | |\n",stringz,z) and
1214 footer_property()
1215 } else {
1216 footer_property() and
1217 format("| | %12t[%d] | |\n",stringx,x) and
1218 format("| Write Hit Check | %12t[%d] | Fail |\n",stringy,y) and









1228 define write_to_cache(L2CacheMemory,L2CacheTag,Vbit,X,M,V,tag,j) = {
1229 skip and
1230 format("State %d: Processor %t writing to Cache[%t] value %t and tag %t\n",j,X,M,V,tag) and
1231 (forall i<nprocessors :
1232 (forall j<ncachelocations:
1233 if i=X and j=M then {
1234 if Vbit[i][j] = 1 then {stable(Vbit[i][j])}
1235 else {Vbit[i][j] := 1} and
1236 L2CacheTag[i][j] := tag and
1237 L2CacheMemory[i][j]:=V











1247 define write_to_memory(MainMemory,X,M,V,Tick) = {
1248 skip and tcl("MM",[V,msb(M),M,M mod 8,Tick]) and
1249 format("State %d: Processor %t writing to global memory[%t] value %t\n",Tick,X,M,V) and
1250 (forall j<nmemorylocations: {
1251 if j=M then {MainMemory[j]:=V}





1257 define memory_unchanged(MainMemory) = {
1258 skip and






1265 define cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory,L2CacheTag,Vbit,x) = {
1266 skip and












1279 format("| Pid | Operation | Addr | Binary Addr | Cache[Index] | Valid Bit | Dirty Bit | ...
Tag | Hit-Miss |
1280 Data | Coherence State | Memory[..Addr..] ---> Data |\n") and
1281 format("----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
260




1285 define footer_out(ncsx) = {






1292 define get_var3(MainMemory,L2CacheMemory,L2CacheTag,L2CacheState,Vbit,Dbit,j) = {




1297 RW = strint(aval1(T,1)) and
1298 addr=strint(aval1(T,2)) and
1299 datato = strint(aval1(T,3)) and
1300 Tick=strint(aval1(T,4)) and
1301 format("\n\n") and
1302 if RW = 0 then {
1303 cpu_request(MainMemory,L2CacheMemory,L2CacheTag,L2CacheState,Vbit,Dbit,PID,RW,addr,datafrom,j,Tick)
1304






1311 forall i<32 :{tcl("ABCD",[i,msb32_2(i,addr)])} and
1312
1313
1314 if PID=0 then {
1315 tcl("CM",[0,Tick,datato,tag_field_cache(addr),index_field_cache_8(addr mod 8),
1316 addr mod 8,msb_14_index(addr mod 16),addr mod 16,RW])
1317 } else if PID=1 then {
1318 tcl("CM",[1,Tick,datato,tag_field_cache(addr),index_field_cache_8(addr mod 8),
1319 addr mod 8,msb_14_index(addr mod 16),addr mod 16,RW])
1320 } else if PID=2 then {
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1321 tcl("CM",[2,Tick,datato,tag_field_cache(addr),index_field_cache_8(addr mod 8),







1329 /* run */ define L2_Cache_P0_P1_v0() = {
1330 exists PID,B,addr,tag,index8,j,i,MainMemory, CacheMemory, L2CacheTag,
1331 L2CacheMemory, Core, Tag, Index, Timer, L2CacheState, Vbit, Dbit,Select : {
1332 list(MainMemory, nmemorylocations) and stable(struct(MainMemory)) and
1333 list(CacheMemory, ncachelocations) and stable(struct(CacheMemory)) and
1334 list(Core, nprocessors) and stable(struct(Core)) and
1335 list(L2CacheMemory,nprocessors) and stable(struct(L2CacheMemory)) and
1336 list(L2CacheTag,nprocessors) and stable(struct(L2CacheTag)) and
1337 list(L2CacheState,nprocessors) and stable(struct(L2CacheState)) and
1338 list(Vbit,nprocessors) and stable(struct(Vbit)) and
1339 list(Dbit,nprocessors) and stable(struct(Dbit)) and
1340 (forall i<nprocessors: (
1341 list(L2CacheMemory[i], ncachelocations) and stable(struct(L2CacheMemory[i])) and
1342 list(L2CacheTag[i], ncachelocations) and stable(struct(L2CacheTag[i])) and
1343 list(L2CacheState[i], ncachelocations) and stable(struct(L2CacheState[i])) and
1344 list(Vbit[i], ncachelocations) and stable(struct(Vbit[i])) and
1345 list(Dbit[i], ncachelocations) and stable(struct(Dbit[i]))
1346 )
1347 ) and
1348 list(Tag, nlocations) and stable(struct(Tag)) and
1349 list(Index, nlocations) and stable(struct(Index)) and
1350
1351
1352 {{prog_send1(0,"load 'Processor_0_5'.") and
1353 prog_send1(1,"load 'Processor_1_5'.") and
1354 prog_send1(2,"load 'Processor_2_5'.")};skip;
1355
1356 {prog_send1(0,"run L2_Processor_0().") and
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1360 { tcl("init",[2,8]) and always tclbreak() and
1361 (forall j<nmemorylocations : MainMemory[j] = initial_value2) and
1362 (forall j<ncachelocations : CacheMemory[j] = initial_value) and
1363 (forall j<nprocessors : Core[j] = initial_value) and
1364 (forall i<nprocessors :
1365 (forall j<ncachelocations : (
1366 L2CacheMemory[i][j] = initial_value and
1367 L2CacheTag[i][j] = -1 and
1368 L2CacheState[i][j] = invalid and
1369 Vbit[i][j] = 0 and




1374 (forall j<nlocations : Tag[j] = initial_value) and
1375 (forall j<nlocations : Index[j] = initial_value) and
1376
1377 Timer = 0 and
1378
1379 (forall j<ncachelocations : tcl("INDEX",[j,index_field_cache_8(j)])) and
1380
1381 for j<10 do {
1382 (forall i<nmemorylocations : tcl("IM",[MainMemory[i],msb(i),i mod 16])) and
1383
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Listing B.2: Tempura Code for Processor 0




5 * This file is part Tempura: Interval Temporal Logic interpreter.
6 *
7 * Copyright (C) 1998-2017 Nayef Alshammari, Antonio Cau
8 *
9 * Tempura is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
13 *
14 * Tempura is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
18 *
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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50 NDBITX,NTAGX,STRINGX,CMX,NCMX,CSX,NCSX,INDEXM,MM,NMM,State) = {
51
52 header_out() and
53 format("| %2d | %d | %4t| %7s | Cache[%3s] | %t | %t | %2t | %10s | %3t | %10s[%1d] | ...
Memory[%7s] ---> %4t ...
|\n",PID,RW,DADDR,BADDR,INDEXC,VBITX,DBITX,TAGX,STRINGX,CMX,CSX,PID,INDEXM,MM) and
54 format("| %2d | %d | %4t| %7s | Cache[%3s] | %t | %t | %2t | %10s | %3t | %10s[%1d] | ...













66 define Local_State_Consistency(PID,State) ={
67 if State = 0 then {
68
69 format("| Local State Check | Active[%d] = %2d | Pass |\n",PID,State)
70
71 } else{
72 if prev(State) = State-1 then {
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73
74 format("| Local State Check | Active[%d] = %2d | Pass |\n",PID,State)
75
76 } else {
77







85 define Consistency_Property(PID,NCMX,NCSX,NMM) = {
86 /* If the cache consistent with the main memory */
87 if NCSX="Shared" then {
88 if NCMX = NMM then {
89 format("| Consistency Property Check | %10s[%1d] | Pass |\n",NCSX,PID)
90 } else {format("| Consistency Property Check | %10s[%1d] | Fail |\n",NCSX,PID)
91 }
92 } else {





98 define Invalid_State(PID,NCMX,NCSX,NMM) = {
99 if NCSX="Invalid" then {
100 if NCMX = -8 or
101 NCMX = NMM and NCSX 6= "Shared" then {
102 format("| Invalid State Check | %10s[%1d] | Pass |\n",NCSX,PID)
103 } else {format("| Invalid State Check | %10s[%1d] | Fail |\n",NCSX,PID)}
104 } else {




109 define Shared_State(PID,NCMX,NCSX,NMM) = {
110 if NCSX="Shared" then {
111 if NCMX = NMM or NCMX 6= -8 then {
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112 format("| Shared State Check | %10s[%1d] | Pass |\n",NCSX,PID)
113 } else {format("| Shared State Check | %10s[%1d] | Fail |\n",NCSX,PID)}
114 } else {





120 define Check_Read_Write_Miss_Hit(RW,PID,TAG,TAGX,CSX,STRINGX) = {
121 exists Estring00,Estring01,Estring10,Estring11 : {
122 Estring00="Read Miss" and Estring01="Read Hit" and
123 Estring10="Write Miss" and Estring11="Write Hit" and
124
125 if RW=0 then { /* RW=0 Read Check */
126
127 if TAG 6= TAGX and (CSX 6= "Shared" or CSX 6= "Modified") then {
128 if STRINGX=Estring00 then {
129 format("| Read Miss Check | %10t[%d] | Pass |\n",STRINGX,PID)
130 } else {
131 format("| Read Miss Check | %10t[%d] | Fail |\n",STRINGX,PID)
132 }
133 } else {
134 if STRINGX=Estring01 then {
135 format("| Read Hit Check | %10t[%d] | Pass |\n",STRINGX,PID)
136 } else {




141 } else { /* RW=1 Write Check */
142
143 if TAG 6= TAGX then {
144 if STRINGX=Estring10 then {
145 format("| Write Miss Check | %10t[%d] | Pass |\n",STRINGX,PID)
146 } else {
147 format("| Write Miss Check | %10t[%d] | Fail |\n",STRINGX,PID)
148 }
149 } else {
150 if STRINGX=Estring11 then {
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151 format("| Write Hit Check | %10t[%d] | Pass |\n",STRINGX,PID)
152 } else {












164 format("| Pid | Operation | Addr | Binary Addr | Cache[Index] | Valid Bit | Dirty Bit |










175 define header_property() = {
176 format("-------------------------------------------------------------------\n") and








185 define assert(Pid,j,RW,addr,data,Tick) = {
186 exists Operation : {
187 if RW=0 then {Operation="Read" and
188 format("State %d: Processor %d is sending %6s request from Address: %d, and Data: %d, and ...
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Global State: %d\n",Tick,Pid,Operation,addr,data,Tick)
189 } else {Operation="Write" and
190 format("State %d: Processor %d is sending %6s request to Address: %d, and Data: %d, and ...
Global State: %d\n",Tick,Pid,Operation,addr,data,Tick)
191 } and





197 /* run */ define L2_Processor_0() = {
198 exists j,Tick,PID,RW,DADDR,BADDR,INDEXC,VBITX,DBITX,TAG,TAGX,NVBITX,
199 NDBITX,NTAGX,STRINGX,CMX,NCMX,CSX,NCSX,INDEXM,MM,NMM,Tock,State : {
200
201 for j<10 do {
202 {input Tick and skip and State=Tick[1] and
203 if Tick[0]=0 then {
204 assert(Tick[0],j,Random mod 2,Random mod 16,Random mod 30, Tick[1])
205 } else
206 format("State %d: Processor 0 is idle\n",Tick[1])
207 };
208
209 { empty and
210 input Tock and output(Tock) and
211 PID=Tock[0] and RW=Tock[1] and DADDR=Tock[2] and BADDR=Tock[3] and INDEXC=Tock[4] and
212 VBITX=Tock[5] and
213 NVBITX=Tock[6] and DBITX=Tock[7] and NDBITX=Tock[8] and TAG=Tock[9] and TAGX=Tock[10] and
214 NTAGX=Tock[11] and
215 STRINGX=Tock[12] and CMX=Tock[13] and NCMX=Tock[14] and CSX=Tock[15] and NCSX=Tock[16] and
216 INDEXM=Tock[17] and
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Listing B.3: Tempura Code for Processor 1




5 * This file is part Tempura: Interval Temporal Logic interpreter.
6 *
7 * Copyright (C) 1998-2017 Nayef Alshammari, Antonio Cau
8 *
9 * Tempura is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
13 *
14 * Tempura is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
18 *
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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50 NDBITX,NTAGX,STRINGX,CMX,NCMX,CSX,NCSX,INDEXM,MM,NMM,State) = {
51
52 header_out() and
53 format("| %2d | %d | %4t| %7s | Cache[%3s] | %t | %t | %2t | %10s | %3t | %10s[%1d] | ...
Memory[%7s] ---> %4t ...
|\n",PID,RW,DADDR,BADDR,INDEXC,VBITX,DBITX,TAGX,STRINGX,CMX,CSX,PID,INDEXM,MM) and
54 format("| %2d | %d | %4t| %7s | Cache[%3s] | %t | %t | %2t | %10s | %3t | %10s[%1d] | ...













66 define Local_State_Consistency(PID,State) ={
67 if State = 0 then {
68
69 format("| Local State Check | Active[%d] = %2d | Pass |\n",PID,State)
70
71 } else{
72 if prev(State) = State-1 then {
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73
74 format("| Local State Check | Active[%d] = %2d | Pass |\n",PID,State)
75
76 } else {
77





83 define Consistency_Property(PID,NCMX,NCSX,NMM) = {
84 /* If the cache consistent with the main memory */
85 if NCSX="Shared" then {
86 if NCMX = NMM then {
87 format("| Consistency Property Check | %10s[%1d] | Pass |\n",NCSX,PID)
88 } else {format("| Consistency Property Check | %10s[%1d] | Fail |\n",NCSX,PID)
89 }
90 } else {





96 define Invalid_State(PID,NCMX,NCSX,NMM) = {
97 if NCSX="Invalid" then {
98 if NCMX = -8 or
99 NCMX = NMM and NCSX 6= "Shared" then {
100 format("| Invalid State Check | %10s[%1d] | Pass |\n",NCSX,PID)
101 } else {format("| Invalid State Check | %10s[%1d] | Fail |\n",NCSX,PID)}
102 } else {




107 define Shared_State(PID,NCMX,NCSX,NMM) = {
108 if NCSX="Shared" then {
109 if NCMX = NMM or NCMX 6= -8 then {
110 format("| Shared State Check | %10s[%1d] | Pass |\n",NCSX,PID)
111 } else {format("| Shared State Check | %10s[%1d] | Fail |\n",NCSX,PID)}
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112 } else {





118 define Check_Read_Write_Miss_Hit(RW,PID,TAG,TAGX,CSX,STRINGX) = {
119 exists Estring00,Estring01,Estring10,Estring11 : {
120 Estring00="Read Miss" and Estring01="Read Hit" and
121 Estring10="Write Miss" and Estring11="Write Hit" and
122
123 if RW=0 then { /* RW=0 Read Check */
124
125 if TAG 6= TAGX and (CSX 6= "Shared" or CSX 6= "Modified") then {
126 if STRINGX=Estring00 then {
127 format("| Read Miss Check | %10t[%d] | Pass |\n",STRINGX,PID)
128 } else {
129 format("| Read Miss Check | %10t[%d] | Fail |\n",STRINGX,PID)
130 }
131 } else {
132 if STRINGX=Estring01 then {
133 format("| Read Hit Check | %10t[%d] | Pass |\n",STRINGX,PID)
134 } else {




139 } else { /* RW=1 Write Check */
140
141 if TAG 6= TAGX then {
142 if STRINGX=Estring10 then {
143 format("| Write Miss Check | %10t[%d] | Pass |\n",STRINGX,PID)
144 } else {
145 format("| Write Miss Check | %10t[%d] | Fail |\n",STRINGX,PID)
146 }
147 } else {
148 if STRINGX=Estring11 then {
149 format("| Write Hit Check | %10t[%d] | Pass |\n",STRINGX,PID)
150 } else {
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162 format("| Pid | Operation | Addr | Binary Addr | Cache[Index] | Valid Bit | Dirty Bit |










173 define header_property() = {
174 format("-------------------------------------------------------------------\n") and








183 define assert(Pid,j,RW,addr,data,Tick) = {
184 exists Operation : {
185 if RW=0 then {Operation="Read" and
186 format("State %d: Processor %d is sending %6s request from Address: %d, and Data: %d, and ...
Global State: %d\n",Tick,Pid,Operation,addr,data,Tick)
187 } else {Operation="Write" and
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188 format("State %d: Processor %d is sending %6s request to Address: %d, and Data: %d, and ...
Global State: %d\n",Tick,Pid,Operation,addr,data,Tick)
189 } and





195 /* run */ define L2_Processor_1() = {
196 exists j,Tick,PID,RW,DADDR,BADDR,INDEXC,VBITX,DBITX,TAG,TAGX,NVBITX,
197 NDBITX,NTAGX,STRINGX,CMX,NCMX,CSX,NCSX,INDEXM,MM,NMM,Tock,State : {
198
199 for j<10 do {
200 {input Tick and skip and State=Tick[1] and
201 if Tick[0]=1 then {
202 assert(Tick[0],j,Random mod 2,Random mod 16,Random mod 30, Tick[1])
203 } else
204 format("State %d: Processor 1 is idle\n",Tick[1])
205 };
206
207 { empty and
208 input Tock and output(Tock) and
209 PID=Tock[0] and RW=Tock[1] and DADDR=Tock[2] and BADDR=Tock[3] and INDEXC=Tock[4] and
210 VBITX=Tock[5] and
211 NVBITX=Tock[6] and DBITX=Tock[7] and NDBITX=Tock[8] and TAG=Tock[9] and TAGX=Tock[10] and
212 NTAGX=Tock[11] and
213 STRINGX=Tock[12] and CMX=Tock[13] and NCMX=Tock[14] and CSX=Tock[15] and NCSX=Tock[16] and
214 INDEXM=Tock[17] and
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Listing B.4: Tempura Code for Processor 2




5 * This file is part Tempura: Interval Temporal Logic interpreter.
6 *
7 * Copyright (C) 1998-2017 Nayef Alshammari, Antonio Cau
8 *
9 * Tempura is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
13 *
14 * Tempura is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
18 *
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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50 NDBITX,NTAGX,STRINGX,CMX,NCMX,CSX,NCSX,INDEXM,MM,NMM,State) = {
51
52 header_out() and
53 format("| %2d | %d | %4t| %7s | Cache[%3s] | %t | %t | %2t | %10s | %3t | %10s[%1d] | ...
Memory[%7s] ---> %4t ...
|\n",PID,RW,DADDR,BADDR,INDEXC,VBITX,DBITX,TAGX,STRINGX,CMX,CSX,PID,INDEXM,MM) and
54 format("| %2d | %d | %4t| %7s | Cache[%3s] | %t | %t | %2t | %10s | %3t | %10s[%1d] | ...













66 define Local_State_Consistency(PID,State) ={
67 if State = 0 then {
68
69 format("| Local State Check | Active[%d] = %2d | Pass |\n",PID,State)
70
71 } else {
72 if prev(State) = State-1 then {
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73
74 format("| Local State Check | Active[%d] = %2d | Pass |\n",PID,State)
75
76 } else {
77






84 define Consistency_Property(PID,NCMX,NCSX,NMM) = {
85 /* If the cache consistent with the main memory */
86 if NCSX="Shared" then {
87 if NCMX = NMM then {
88 format("| Consistency Property Check | %10s[%1d] | Pass |\n",NCSX,PID)
89 } else {format("| Consistency Property Check | %10s[%1d] | Fail |\n",NCSX,PID)
90 }
91 } else {





97 define Invalid_State(PID,NCMX,NCSX,NMM) = {
98 if NCSX="Invalid" then {
99 if NCMX = -8 or
100 NCMX = NMM and NCSX 6= "Shared" then {
101 format("| Invalid State Check | %10s[%1d] | Pass |\n",NCSX,PID)
102 } else {format("| Invalid State Check | %10s[%1d] | Fail |\n",NCSX,PID)}
103 } else {




108 define Shared_State(PID,NCMX,NCSX,NMM) = {
109 if NCSX="Shared" then {
110 if NCMX = NMM or NCMX 6= -8 then {
111 format("| Shared State Check | %10s[%1d] | Pass |\n",NCSX,PID)
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112 } else {format("| Shared State Check | %10s[%1d] | Fail |\n",NCSX,PID)}
113 } else {





119 define Check_Read_Write_Miss_Hit(RW,PID,TAG,TAGX,CSX,STRINGX) = {
120 exists Estring00,Estring01,Estring10,Estring11 : {
121 Estring00="Read Miss" and Estring01="Read Hit" and
122 Estring10="Write Miss" and Estring11="Write Hit" and
123
124 if RW=0 then { /* RW=0 Read Check */
125
126 if TAG 6= TAGX and (CSX 6= "Shared" or CSX 6= "Modified") then {
127 if STRINGX=Estring00 then {
128 format("| Read Miss Check | %10t[%d] | Pass |\n",STRINGX,PID)
129 } else {
130 format("| Read Miss Check | %10t[%d] | Fail |\n",STRINGX,PID)
131 }
132 } else {
133 if STRINGX=Estring01 then {
134 format("| Read Hit Check | %10t[%d] | Pass |\n",STRINGX,PID)
135 } else {




140 } else { /* RW=1 Write Check */
141
142 if TAG 6= TAGX then {
143 if STRINGX=Estring10 then {
144 format("| Write Miss Check | %10t[%d] | Pass |\n",STRINGX,PID)
145 } else {
146 format("| Write Miss Check | %10t[%d] | Fail |\n",STRINGX,PID)
147 }
148 } else {
149 if STRINGX=Estring11 then {
150 format("| Write Hit Check | %10t[%d] | Pass |\n",STRINGX,PID)
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151 } else {












163 format("| Pid | Operation | Addr | Binary Addr | Cache[Index] | Valid Bit | Dirty Bit |










174 define header_property() = {
175 format("-------------------------------------------------------------------\n") and








184 define assert(Pid,j,RW,addr,data,Tick) = {
185 exists Operation : {
186 if RW=0 then {Operation="Read" and
187 format("State %d: Processor %d is sending %6s request from Address: %d, and Data: %d, and ...
Global State: %d\n",Tick,Pid,Operation,addr,data,Tick)
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188 } else {Operation="Write" and
189 format("State %d: Processor %d is sending %6s request to Address: %d, and Data: %d, and ...
Global State: %d\n",Tick,Pid,Operation,addr,data,Tick)
190 } and





196 /* run */ define L2_Processor_2() = {
197 exists j,Tick,PID,RW,DADDR,BADDR,INDEXC,VBITX,DBITX,TAG,TAGX,NVBITX,
198 NDBITX,NTAGX,STRINGX,CMX,NCMX,CSX,NCSX,INDEXM,MM,NMM,Tock,State : {
199
200 for j<10 do {
201 {input Tick and skip and State=Tick[1] and
202 if Tick[0]=2 then {
203 assert(Tick[0],j,Random mod 2,Random mod 16,Random mod 30, Tick[1])
204 } else
205 format("State %d: Processor 2 is idle\n",Tick[1])
206 };
207
208 { empty and
209 input Tock and output(Tock) and
210 PID=Tock[0] and RW=Tock[1] and DADDR=Tock[2] and BADDR=Tock[3] and INDEXC=Tock[4] and
211 VBITX=Tock[5] and
212 NVBITX=Tock[6] and DBITX=Tock[7] and NDBITX=Tock[8] and TAG=Tock[9] and TAGX=Tock[10] and
213 NTAGX=Tock[11] and
214 STRINGX=Tock[12] and CMX=Tock[13] and NCMX=Tock[14] and CSX=Tock[15] and NCSX=Tock[16] and
215 INDEXM=Tock[17] and
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1 # L2_Cache_MSI_v3.tcl --
2 #
3 #
4 # Copyright (C) 1998-2017 Nayef H. Alshammari, Antonio Cau
5 #
6 # This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
7 # it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
8 # the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
9 # (at your option) any later version.
10 #
11 # This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
12 # but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
13 # MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
14 # GNU General Public License for more details.
15 #
16 # You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License




21 package provide L2CacheContollerMSI 1.0
22
23 namespace eval ::out {;








32 wm geometry .top23 1700x800+1+20
33 $canv delete all
34 $canv config -scrollregion "10 10 1700 1000"




39 $canv create rect \
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40 10 10 \
41 425 455 \
42 -fill black -outline black -width 2 -tags rect0
43
44 #State
45 $canv create text 30 20\
46 -anchor c -fill red -text State
47
48 $canv create text 72 20\
49 -anchor c -fill red -text Oper.
50
51 $canv create text 240 20\
52 -anchor c -fill red -text Address
53
54 $canv create text 405 20\
55 -anchor c -fill red -text Data
56
57 #State
58 for {set i 0} {$i<10} {incr i} {
59 $canv create rect \
60 10 [expr 30+15*$i]\
61 50 [expr 45+15*$i]\
62 -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
63 $canv create text 30 [expr 37+15*$i]\
64 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text "" -tags StateP0($i)
65 }
66 #READ
67 for {set i 0} {$i<10} {incr i} {
68 $canv create rect \
69 50 [expr 30+15*$i]\
70 95 [expr 45+15*$i]\
71 -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
72 $canv create text 72 [expr 37+15*$i]\




77 for {set i 0} {$i<10} {incr i} {
78 $canv create rect \
284
APPENDIX C. APPENDIX C: TCL/TK CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER
79 95 [expr 30+15*$i]\
80 385 [expr 45+15*$i]\
81 -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
82 $canv create text 240 [expr 37+15*$i]\




87 for {set i 0} {$i<10} {incr i} {
88 $canv create rect \
89 385 [expr 30+15*$i]\
90 425 [expr 45+15*$i]\
91 -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
92 $canv create text 405 [expr 37+15*$i]\




97 $canv create rect \
98 430 10 \
99 845 455 \
100 -fill black -outline black -width 2 -tags rect1
101
102 #State
103 $canv create text 452 20\
104 -anchor c -fill red -text State
105
106 $canv create text 495 20\
107 -anchor c -fill red -text Oper.
108
109 $canv create text 655 20\
110 -anchor c -fill red -text Address
111
112 $canv create text 820 20\
113 -anchor c -fill red -text Data
114
115 #State
116 for {set i 0} {$i<10} {incr i} {
117 $canv create rect \
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118 430 [expr 30+15*$i]\
119 470 [expr 45+15*$i]\
120 -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
121 $canv create text 447 [expr 37+15*$i]\
122 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text "" -tags StateP1($i)
123 }
124 #READ
125 for {set i 0} {$i<10} {incr i} {
126 $canv create rect \
127 470 [expr 30+15*$i]\
128 515 [expr 45+15*$i]\
129 -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
130 $canv create text 495 [expr 37+15*$i]\




135 for {set i 0} {$i<10} {incr i} {
136 $canv create rect \
137 515 [expr 30+15*$i]\
138 805 [expr 45+15*$i]\
139 -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
140 $canv create text 660 [expr 37+15*$i]\




145 for {set i 0} {$i<10} {incr i} {
146 $canv create rect \
147 805 [expr 30+15*$i]\
148 845 [expr 45+15*$i]\
149 -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
150 $canv create text 825 [expr 37+15*$i]\




155 $canv create rect \
156 850 10 \
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157 1270 455 \
158 -fill black -outline black -width 2 -tags rect2
159
160 #State
161 $canv create text 870 20\
162 -anchor c -fill red -text State
163
164 $canv create text 912 20\
165 -anchor c -fill red -text Oper.
166
167 $canv create text 1080 20\
168 -anchor c -fill red -text Address
169
170 $canv create text 1247 20\
171 -anchor c -fill red -text Data
172
173 #State P2
174 for {set i 0} {$i<10} {incr i} {
175 $canv create rect \
176 850 [expr 30+15*$i]\
177 890 [expr 45+15*$i]\
178 -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
179 $canv create text 870 [expr 37+15*$i]\
180 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text "" -tags StateP2($i)
181 }
182 #OPERATION P2
183 for {set i 0} {$i<10} {incr i} {
184 $canv create rect \
185 890 [expr 30+15*$i]\
186 935 [expr 45+15*$i]\
187 -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
188 $canv create text 912 [expr 37+15*$i]\




193 for {set i 0} {$i<10} {incr i} {
194 $canv create rect \
195 935 [expr 30+15*$i]\
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196 1225 [expr 45+15*$i]\
197 -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
198 $canv create text 1080 [expr 37+15*$i]\




203 for {set i 0} {$i<10} {incr i} {
204 $canv create rect \
205 1225 [expr 30+15*$i]\
206 1270 [expr 45+15*$i]\
207 -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
208 $canv create text 1247 [expr 37+15*$i]\








217 for {set i 0} {$i<32} {incr i} {
218 $canv create text [expr 373+20*$i] 200\
219 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text [expr 31-$i] -tags cpuaddrtext($i)
220
221 if {$i<29} {$canv create text [expr 363+20*$i] 200\
222 -anchor c -fill red -text "|" -tags cpuaddrtext1($i)
223 } else {$canv create text [expr 363+20*$i] 200\
224 -anchor c -fill blue -text "|" -tags cpuaddrtext1($i)}
225 }
226 $canv create text 1003 200\
227 -anchor c -fill blue -text "|"
228
229 for {set i 0} {$i<32} {incr i} {
230 $canv create rect \
231 [expr 363+20*$i] 210\
232 [expr 383+20*$i] 230\
233 -width 1 -fill black
234 $canv create text [expr 373+20*$i] 220\
288
APPENDIX C. APPENDIX C: TCL/TK CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER
235 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text "" -tags cpuaddrtext2($i)
236 }
237 for {set i 0} {$i<32} {incr i} {
238 $canv create text [expr 363+20*$i] 220\




243 $canv create rect \
244 363 210 \
245 942 230 \
246 -outline red -width 2
247 #Index Bits
248 $canv create rect \
249 944 210 \
250 1003 230 \
251 -outline blue -width 2
252
253
254 #Tag line & Arrows P0
255 $canv create line \
256 370 230 \
257 370 250 \
258 -fill black -width 2 -tags lineP000
259 $canv create line \
260 260 250 \
261 370 250 \
262 -fill black -width 2 -tags lineP001
263
264 $canv create line 260 250 260 290 -arrow last -fill black -width 2 -tags ar(P000)
265
266 #Index line & Arrows P0
267 $canv create line \
268 964 230 \
269 964 240 \
270 -fill black -width 2 -tags lineP010
271 $canv create line \
272 30 240 \
273 964 240 \
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274 -fill black -width 2 -tags lineP011
275






282 # Cache P0
283 $canv create text 30 300\
284 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text Index
285
286 $canv create text 70 300\
287 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text Valid
288
289 $canv create text 110 300\
290 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text Dirty
291
292 $canv create text 260 300\
293 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text Tag
294
295 $canv create text 405 300\







303 for {set i 0} {$i<8} {incr i} {
304 $canv create rect \
305 10 [expr 310+15*$i]\
306 50 [expr 325+15*$i]\
307 -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
308 $canv create text 30 [expr 318+15*$i]\
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313 for {set i 0} {$i<8} {incr i} {
314 $canv create rect \
315 50 [expr 310+15*$i]\
316 90 [expr 325+15*$i]\
317 -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
318 $canv create text 70 [expr 318+15*$i]\




323 for {set i 0} {$i<8} {incr i} {
324 $canv create rect \
325 90 [expr 310+15*$i]\
326 130 [expr 325+15*$i]\
327 -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
328 $canv create text 110 [expr 318+15*$i]\
329 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text "" -tags DBIT0($i)
330 }
331
332 #Tag 1 18 bits
333 for {set i 0} {$i<8} {incr i} {
334 $canv create rect \
335 130 [expr 310+15*$i]\
336 390 [expr 325+15*$i]\
337 -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
338 $canv create text 260 [expr 318+15*$i]\
339 -anchor c -text "" -tags Tag18bitstext0($i)
340 }
341 #Data 1 32 bits
342 for {set i 0} {$i<8} {incr i} {
343 $canv create rect \
344 390 [expr 310+15*$i]\
345 425 [expr 325+15*$i]\
346 -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
347 $canv create text 405 [expr 317+15*$i]\
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352 #L2 Cache text
353 $canv create text 240 440\
354 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text Private_L2_Cache_Memory_(Processor(0))
355
356 #Tag line & Arrows P1
357 #$canv create line \
358 560 280 \
359 560 305 \
360 -fill blue -width 2 -tags lineP100
361 #$canv create line \
362 560 305 \
363 685 305 \
364 -fill blue -width 2 -tags lineP101
365
366 $canv create line 685 230 685 290 -arrow last -fill black -width 2 -tags ar(P100)
367
368 #Index line & Arrows P1
369 $canv create line \
370 974 230 \
371 974 245 \
372 -fill black -width 2 -tags lineP110
373 $canv create line \
374 455 245 \
375 974 245 \
376 -fill black -width 2 -tags lineP111
377
378 $canv create line 455 245 455 290 -arrow last -fill black -width 2 -tags ar(P101)
379
380 # Cache P1
381 $canv create text 455 300\
382 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text Index
383
384 $canv create text 495 300\
385 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text Valid
386
387 $canv create text 535 300\
388 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text Dirty
389
390 $canv create text 685 300\
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391 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text Tag
392
393 $canv create text 825 300\







401 for {set i 0} {$i<8} {incr i} {
402 $canv create rect \
403 430 [expr 310+15*$i]\
404 480 [expr 325+15*$i]\
405 -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
406 $canv create text 455 [expr 318+15*$i]\




411 for {set i 0} {$i<8} {incr i} {
412 $canv create rect \
413 480 [expr 310+15*$i]\
414 510 [expr 325+15*$i]\
415 -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
416 $canv create text 495 [expr 318+15*$i]\




421 for {set i 0} {$i<8} {incr i} {
422 $canv create rect \
423 510 [expr 310+15*$i]\
424 550 [expr 325+15*$i]\
425 -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
426 $canv create text 530 [expr 318+15*$i]\
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430 #Tag 1 18 bits
431 for {set i 0} {$i<8} {incr i} {
432 $canv create rect \
433 550 [expr 310+15*$i]\
434 810 [expr 325+15*$i]\
435 -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
436 $canv create text 680 [expr 318+15*$i]\
437 -anchor c -text "" -tags Tag18bitstext1($i)
438 }
439 #Data 1 32 bits
440 for {set i 0} {$i<8} {incr i} {
441 $canv create rect \
442 810 [expr 310+15*$i]\
443 845 [expr 325+15*$i]\
444 -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
445 $canv create text 825 [expr 317+15*$i]\




450 #L2 Cache text
451 $canv create text 665 440\
452 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text Private_L2_Cache_Memory_(Processor(1))
453
454 #Tag line & Arrows P2
455 $canv create line \
456 780 230 \
457 780 255 \
458 -fill black -width 2 -tags lineP200
459 $canv create line \
460 780 255 \
461 1105 255 \
462 -fill black -width 2 -tags lineP201
463
464 $canv create line 1105 255 1105 290 -arrow last -fill black -width 2 -tags ar(P200)
465
466 #Index line & Arrows P2
467 $canv create line \
468 984 230 \
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469 984 265 \
470 -fill black -width 2 -tags lineP210
471 $canv create line \
472 875 265 \
473 984 265 \
474 -fill black -width 2 -tags lineP211
475
476 $canv create line 875 265 875 290 -arrow last -fill black -width 2 -tags ar(P201)
477
478 # Cache P2
479 $canv create text 875 300\
480 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text Index
481
482 $canv create text 915 300\
483 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text Valid
484
485 $canv create text 955 300\
486 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text Dirty
487
488 $canv create text 1105 300\
489 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text Tag
490
491 $canv create text 1250 300\







499 for {set i 0} {$i<8} {incr i} {
500 $canv create rect \
501 850 [expr 310+15*$i]\
502 900 [expr 325+15*$i]\
503 -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
504 $canv create text 875 [expr 318+15*$i]\
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508 #Valid bit
509 for {set i 0} {$i<8} {incr i} {
510 $canv create rect \
511 900 [expr 310+15*$i]\
512 930 [expr 325+15*$i]\
513 -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
514 $canv create text 915 [expr 318+15*$i]\




519 for {set i 0} {$i<8} {incr i} {
520 $canv create rect \
521 930 [expr 310+15*$i]\
522 970 [expr 325+15*$i]\
523 -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
524 $canv create text 950 [expr 318+15*$i]\
525 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text "" -tags DBIT2($i)
526 }
527
528 #Tag 1 18 bits
529 for {set i 0} {$i<8} {incr i} {
530 $canv create rect \
531 970 [expr 310+15*$i]\
532 1235 [expr 325+15*$i]\
533 -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
534 $canv create text 1103 [expr 318+15*$i]\
535 -anchor c -text "" -tags Tag18bitstext2($i)
536 }
537 #Data 1 32 bits
538 for {set i 0} {$i<8} {incr i} {
539 $canv create rect \
540 1235 [expr 310+15*$i]\
541 1270 [expr 325+15*$i]\
542 -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
543 $canv create text 1250 [expr 317+15*$i]\
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547
548 #L2 Cache text
549 $canv create text 1085 440\




554 $canv create text 900 470\
555 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text Address
556 $canv create text 1075 470\
557 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text Data
558
559 #Index
560 for {set i 0} {$i<16} {incr i} {
561 $canv create rect \
562 750 [expr 480+15*$i]\
563 1050 [expr 495+15*$i]\
564 -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
565 $canv create text 900 [expr 488+15*$i]\




570 for {set i 0} {$i<16} {incr i} {
571 $canv create rect \
572 1050 [expr 480+15*$i]\
573 1100 [expr 495+15*$i]\
574 -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
575 $canv create text 1075 [expr 488+15*$i]\
576 -anchor c -fill red -text "" -tags DataMM($i)
577 $canv create text 1125 [expr 488+15*$i]\
578 -anchor c -fill red -text "" -tags DataMM2($i)
579 }
580
581 #Text Main Memory
582 $canv create text 950 730\
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586 #Timer
587 #$canv create text 80 30\
588 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text Global_State -tags tmr
589
590 #Bullets Timeline
591 $canv create text 30 480 -text {State} -anchor c -fill #00FF00
592 $canv create text 40 520 -text {Address} -anchor c -fill #00FF00
593 $canv create text 30 565 -text {P0} -anchor c -fill #00FF00
594 $canv create text 30 605 -text {P1} -anchor c -fill #00FF00
595 $canv create text 30 645 -text {P2} -anchor c -fill #00FF00





601 #$canv create oval 80 80 87 87 -fill white
602
603 #$canv create arc 70 64 180 182 -outline #00FF00 -width 2 -style arc -start 45
604
605 #$canv create oval 160 80 167 87 -fill white
606
607 #$canv create arc 150 64 260 182 -outline #00FF00 -width 2 -style arc -start 45
608




613 #$canv create arc 80 80 160 160 -outline white -width 2 -extent 180 -style arc
614
615 #P0
616 #$canv create oval 80 565 87 572 -fill white
617
618 #$canv create arc 70 549 163 667 -outline #00FF00 -width 2 -style arc -start 45
619
620 #$canv create oval 145 565 152 572 -fill white
621
622 #$canv create arc 135 549 228 667 -outline #00FF00 -width 2 -style arc -start 45
623
624 #$canv create oval 210 565 217 572 -fill white
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625
626 #P1
627 #$canv create oval 80 605 87 612 -fill white
628
629 #$canv create arc 70 589 163 707 -outline #00FF00 -width 2 -style arc -start 45
630
631 #$canv create oval 145 605 152 612 -fill white
632
633 #$canv create arc 135 589 228 707 -outline #00FF00 -width 2 -style arc -start 45
634




639 #$canv create oval 80 640 87 647 -fill white
640
641 #$canv create arc 70 624 163 742 -outline #00FF00 -width 2 -style arc -start 45
642
643 #$canv create oval 145 640 152 647 -fill white
644
645 #$canv create arc 135 624 228 742 -outline #00FF00 -width 2 -style arc -start 45
646




651 #$canv create oval 80 680 87 687 -fill white
652
653 #$canv create arc 70 664 163 782 -outline #00FF00 -width 2 -style arc -start 45
654
655 #$canv create oval 145 680 152 687 -fill white
656
657 #$canv create arc 135 664 228 782 -outline #00FF00 -width 2 -style arc -start 45
658




663 proc tmr {nl} {
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667 set State [lindex $nl 0]
668
669 #$canv itemconfigure tmr -fill #00FF00 -text Global_State:$State
670
671 if {$State<9} {
672 $canv create text\
673 [expr 83+65*$State] 480\
674 -fill #00FF00 -text $State
675 $canv create text\
676 [expr 83+65*[expr $State+1]] 480\
677 -fill #00FF00 -text [expr $State+1]
678 } else {
679 $canv create text\
680 [expr 83+65*$State] 480\
681 -fill #00FF00 -text $State
682 }
683 }
684 proc INDEX {nl} {
685 variable canv;
686
687 set IndexDecimal [lindex $nl 0]
688 set IndexBinary [lindex $nl 1]
689
690
691 $canv itemconfigure Index0($IndexDecimal) -fill #00FF00 -text $IndexBinary
692 $canv itemconfigure Index1($IndexDecimal) -fill #00FF00 -text $IndexBinary
693 $canv itemconfigure Index2($IndexDecimal) -fill #00FF00 -text $IndexBinary
694
695 }




700 set Pid [lindex $nl 0]
701 set Index [lindex $nl 1]
702 set Data [lindex $nl 2]
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703 set Tag [lindex $nl 3]
704 set Index3 [lindex $nl 4]
705 set Index4 [lindex $nl 5]
706 set Index5 [lindex $nl 6]
707 set Index6 [lindex $nl 7]
708 set RW [lindex $nl 8]
709
710
711 if {$Pid==0} {
712
713 $canv itemconfigure lineP100 -fill black
714 $canv itemconfigure lineP101 -fill black
715 $canv itemconfigure ar(P100) -fill black
716 $canv itemconfigure lineP110 -fill black
717 $canv itemconfigure lineP111 -fill black
718 $canv itemconfigure ar(P101) -fill black
719
720 $canv itemconfigure lineP200 -fill black
721 $canv itemconfigure lineP201 -fill black
722 $canv itemconfigure ar(P200) -fill black
723 $canv itemconfigure lineP210 -fill black
724 $canv itemconfigure lineP211 -fill black
725 $canv itemconfigure ar(P201) -fill black
726
727 $canv itemconfigure lineP000 -fill red
728 $canv itemconfigure lineP001 -fill red
729 $canv itemconfigure ar(P000) -fill red
730 $canv itemconfigure lineP010 -fill blue
731 $canv itemconfigure lineP011 -fill blue
732 $canv itemconfigure ar(P001) -fill blue
733
734 $canv itemconfigure Index0($Index4) -fill white -text $Index3
735 if {$RW == 1} {
736 $canv itemconfigure DataCM0($Index4) -fill white -text $Data
737 }
738 $canv itemconfigure Tag18bitstext0($Index4) -fill white -text $Tag
739
740 } elseif {$Pid==1} {
741
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742 $canv itemconfigure lineP000 -fill black
743 $canv itemconfigure lineP001 -fill black
744 $canv itemconfigure ar(P000) -fill black
745 $canv itemconfigure lineP010 -fill black
746 $canv itemconfigure lineP011 -fill black
747 $canv itemconfigure ar(P001) -fill black
748
749 $canv itemconfigure lineP200 -fill black
750 $canv itemconfigure lineP201 -fill black
751 $canv itemconfigure ar(P200) -fill black
752 $canv itemconfigure lineP210 -fill black
753 $canv itemconfigure lineP211 -fill black
754 $canv itemconfigure ar(P201) -fill black
755
756 $canv itemconfigure lineP100 -fill red
757 $canv itemconfigure lineP101 -fill red
758 $canv itemconfigure ar(P100) -fill red
759 $canv itemconfigure lineP110 -fill blue
760 $canv itemconfigure lineP111 -fill blue
761 $canv itemconfigure ar(P101) -fill blue
762
763 $canv itemconfigure Index1($Index4) -fill white -text $Index3
764 if {$RW == 1} {
765 $canv itemconfigure DataCM1($Index4) -fill white -text $Data
766 }
767 $canv itemconfigure Tag18bitstext1($Index4) -fill white -text $Tag
768
769 } elseif {$Pid==2} {
770
771 $canv itemconfigure lineP000 -fill black
772 $canv itemconfigure lineP001 -fill black
773 $canv itemconfigure ar(P000) -fill black
774 $canv itemconfigure lineP010 -fill black
775 $canv itemconfigure lineP011 -fill black
776 $canv itemconfigure ar(P001) -fill black
777
778 $canv itemconfigure lineP100 -fill black
779 $canv itemconfigure lineP101 -fill black
780 $canv itemconfigure ar(P100) -fill black
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781 $canv itemconfigure lineP110 -fill black
782 $canv itemconfigure lineP111 -fill black
783 $canv itemconfigure ar(P101) -fill black
784
785 $canv itemconfigure lineP200 -fill red
786 $canv itemconfigure lineP201 -fill red
787 $canv itemconfigure ar(P200) -fill red
788 $canv itemconfigure lineP210 -fill blue
789 $canv itemconfigure lineP211 -fill blue
790 $canv itemconfigure ar(P201) -fill blue
791
792 $canv itemconfigure Index2($Index4) -fill white -text $Index3
793 if {$RW == 1} {
794 $canv itemconfigure DataCM2($Index4) -fill white -text $Data
795 }










806 set Data [lindex $nl 0]
807 set Addr [lindex $nl 1]





813 $canv itemconfigure DataMM($IndexM) -fill #00FF00 -text $Data
814 $canv itemconfigure IndexMM($IndexM) -fill #00FF00 -text $Addr
815 #$canv itemconfigure DataCM($IndexM) -fill red -text $Data
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825 set Data [lindex $nl 0]
826 set Addr [lindex $nl 1]
827 set IndexM [lindex $nl 2]
828 set IndexC [lindex $nl 3]




833 $canv itemconfigure DataMM2($IndexM) -fill white -text ""
834 $canv itemconfigure DataMM2($IndexM) -fill white -text $Data
835 $canv itemconfigure IndexMM($IndexM) -fill white -text $Addr
836 #$canv itemconfigure DataCM($IndexM) -fill red -text $Data
837 #$canv itemconfigure data0($Tick) -fill red -text $Data
838
839 #$canv create oval\
840 [expr 80+65*$Tick] 680\
841 [expr 87+65*$Tick] 687\
842 -fill #00FF00
843 $canv create text\
844 [expr 83+65*$IndexC] 717\








853 set Loc [lindex $nl 0]
854 set Bits [lindex $nl 1]
855
856
857 $canv itemconfigure cpuaddrtext2([expr (($Loc*31+31)/($Loc+1))-$Loc]) -fill white -text $Bits
858
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859 }




864 set Pid [lindex $nl 0]
865 set Index [lindex $nl 1]
866 set Addr [lindex $nl 2]
867 set RW [lindex $nl 3]
868 set Data [lindex $nl 4]
869 set State [lindex $nl 5]
870
871 if {$Pid == 0} {
872 #$canv itemconfigure rect1 -outline black
873 #$canv itemconfigure rect2 -outline black
874 #$canv itemconfigure rect0 -outline white
875 $canv itemconfigure StateP0($State) -fill #00FF00 -text $State
876 $canv itemconfigure StateP0($State) -fill #00FF00 -text $State
877
878 $canv itemconfigure StateP0($State) -fill #00FF00 -text $State
879
880 if {$RW==0} {
881 $canv itemconfigure operationP0($Index) -fill #00FF00 -text $RW
882 } elseif {$RW==1} {
883 $canv itemconfigure operationP0($Index) -fill #00FF00 -text $RW
884 $canv itemconfigure DataCPU0($Index) -fill white -text $Data
885 }
886




891 } elseif {$Pid == 1} {
892 #$canv itemconfigure rect0 -outline black
893 #$canv itemconfigure rect2 -outline black
894 #$canv itemconfigure rect1 -outline white
895 $canv itemconfigure StateP1($State) -fill #00FF00 -text $State
896
897 if {$RW==0} {
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898 $canv itemconfigure operationP1($Index) -fill #00FF00 -text $RW
899 } elseif {$RW==1} {
900 $canv itemconfigure operationP1($Index) -fill #00FF00 -text $RW
901 $canv itemconfigure DataCPU1($Index) -fill white -text $Data
902 }
903
904 $canv itemconfigure cpuaddrtextP1($Index) -fill white -text $Addr
905
906 } elseif {$Pid == 2} {
907 #$canv itemconfigure rect0 -outline black
908 #$canv itemconfigure rect1 -outline black
909 #$canv itemconfigure rect2 -outline white
910 $canv itemconfigure StateP2($State) -fill #00FF00 -text $State
911
912 if {$RW==0} {
913 $canv itemconfigure operationP2($Index) -fill #00FF00 -text $RW
914 } elseif {$RW==1} {
915 $canv itemconfigure operationP2($Index) -fill #00FF00 -text $RW
916 $canv itemconfigure DataCPU2($Index) -fill white -text $Data
917 }
918





924 proc HM {nl} {
925 variable canv;
926
927 set PIDx [lindex $nl 0]
928 set PIDy [lindex $nl 1]
929 set PIDz [lindex $nl 2]
930 set stringx [lindex $nl 3]
931 set stringy [lindex $nl 4]
932 set stringz [lindex $nl 5]
933 set Index [lindex $nl 6]
934 set State [lindex $nl 7]
935 set VBITx [lindex $nl 8]
936 #set VBITy [lindex $nl 9]
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937 #set VBITz [lindex $nl 10]
938 set DBITx [lindex $nl 9]
939 set DBITy [lindex $nl 10]
940 set DBITz [lindex $nl 11]
941 set Data [lindex $nl 12]
942 set Tick [lindex $nl 13]
943 set Memory [lindex $nl 14]
944 set Addr [lindex $nl 15]
945 set IndexM [lindex $nl 16]
946
947
948 #$canv itemconfigure VBIT($Index) -fill #00FF00 -text $VBIT
949 #$canv itemconfigure DBIT($Index) -fill #00FF00 -text $DBIT
950
951 #$canv itemconfigure DataMM($IndexM) -fill white -text $Memory
952 #$canv itemconfigure IndexMM($IndexM) -fill white -text $Addr
953
954 if {$PIDx==0} {
955 $canv itemconfigure VBIT0($Index) -fill white -text $VBITx
956 $canv itemconfigure DBIT0($Index) -fill white -text $DBITx
957 if {$PIDy==1 && $PIDz==2} {
958 #$canv itemconfigure VBIT1($Index) -fill white -text $VBITy
959 $canv itemconfigure DBIT1($Index) -fill white -text $DBITy
960 #$canv itemconfigure VBIT2($Index) -fill white -text $VBITz
961 $canv itemconfigure DBIT2($Index) -fill white -text $DBITz
962 } elseif {$PIDy==2 && $PIDz==1} {
963 #$canv itemconfigure VBIT2($Index) -fill white -text $VBITy
964 $canv itemconfigure DBIT2($Index) -fill white -text $DBITy
965 #$canv itemconfigure VBIT1($Index) -fill white -text $VBITz
966 $canv itemconfigure DBIT1($Index) -fill white -text $DBITz
967 }
968 if {$stringx=="Write Miss"} {
969 $canv itemconfigure DataCM0($Index) -fill white -text $Data
970 } elseif {$stringx=="Write Hit"} {
971 $canv itemconfigure DataCM0($Index) -fill white -text $Data
972 } elseif {$stringx=="Read Miss"} {
973 $canv itemconfigure DataCM0($Index) -fill white -text $Data
974 $canv itemconfigure DataCPU0($Tick) -fill white -text $Data
975 } elseif {$stringx=="Read Hit"} {
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976 $canv itemconfigure DataCM0($Index) -fill white -text $Data
977 $canv itemconfigure DataCPU0($Tick) -fill white -text $Data
978 }
979 } elseif {$PIDx==1} {
980 $canv itemconfigure VBIT1($Index) -fill white -text $VBITx
981 $canv itemconfigure DBIT1($Index) -fill white -text $DBITx
982 if {$PIDy==0 && $PIDz==2} {
983 #$canv itemconfigure VBIT0($Index) -fill white -text $VBITy
984 $canv itemconfigure DBIT0($Index) -fill white -text $DBITy
985 #$canv itemconfigure VBIT2($Index) -fill white -text $VBITz
986 $canv itemconfigure DBIT2($Index) -fill white -text $DBITz
987 } elseif {$PIDy==2 && $PIDz==0} {
988 #$canv itemconfigure VBIT2($Index) -fill white -text $VBITy
989 $canv itemconfigure DBIT2($Index) -fill white -text $DBITy
990 #$canv itemconfigure VBIT0($Index) -fill white -text $VBITz
991 $canv itemconfigure DBIT0($Index) -fill white -text $DBITz
992 }
993 if {$stringx=="Write Miss"} {
994 $canv itemconfigure DataCM1($Index) -fill white -text $Data
995 } elseif {$stringx=="Write Hit"} {
996 $canv itemconfigure DataCM1($Index) -fill white -text $Data
997 } elseif {$stringx=="Read Miss"} {
998 $canv itemconfigure DataCM1($Index) -fill white -text $Data
999 $canv itemconfigure DataCPU1($Tick) -fill white -text $Data
1000 } elseif {$stringx=="Read Hit"} {
1001 $canv itemconfigure DataCM1($Index) -fill white -text $Data
1002 $canv itemconfigure DataCPU1($Tick) -fill white -text $Data
1003 }
1004 } elseif {$PIDx==2} {
1005 $canv itemconfigure VBIT2($Index) -fill white -text $VBITx
1006 $canv itemconfigure DBIT2($Index) -fill white -text $DBITx
1007 if {$PIDy==0 && $PIDz==1} {
1008 #$canv itemconfigure VBIT0($Index) -fill white -text $VBITy
1009 $canv itemconfigure DBIT0($Index) -fill white -text $DBITy
1010 #$canv itemconfigure VBIT1($Index) -fill white -text $VBITz
1011 $canv itemconfigure DBIT1($Index) -fill white -text $DBITz
1012 } elseif {$PIDy==1 && $PIDz==0} {
1013 #$canv itemconfigure VBIT1($Index) -fill white -text $VBITy
1014 $canv itemconfigure DBIT1($Index) -fill white -text $DBITy
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1015 #$canv itemconfigure VBIT0($Index) -fill white -text $VBITz
1016 $canv itemconfigure DBIT0($Index) -fill white -text $DBITz
1017 }
1018 if {$stringx=="Write Miss"} {
1019 $canv itemconfigure DataCM2($Index) -fill white -text $Data
1020 } elseif {$stringx=="Write Hit"} {
1021 $canv itemconfigure DataCM2($Index) -fill white -text $Data
1022 } elseif {$stringx=="Read Miss"} {
1023 $canv itemconfigure DataCM2($Index) -fill white -text $Data
1024 $canv itemconfigure DataCPU2($Tick) -fill white -text $Data
1025 } elseif {$stringx=="Read Hit"} {
1026 $canv itemconfigure DataCM2($Index) -fill white -text $Data




1031 #Processors' addresses values bullets
1032 if {$State==0} {
1033 if {$PIDx==0} {
1034 $canv create oval\
1035 [expr 80+65*$State] 565\
1036 [expr 87+65*$State] 572\
1037 -fill white
1038 $canv create oval\
1039 [expr 80+65*[expr $State+1]] 565\
1040 [expr 87+65*[expr $State+1]] 572\
1041 -fill white
1042 $canv create text\
1043 [expr 83+65*$State] 582\
1044 -fill white -text $Data
1045 $canv create arc [expr 80+65*$State-10] [expr 565-16]\
1046 [expr 87+65*$State+76] [expr 572+95]\
1047 -outline white -width 2 -style arc -start 45
1048
1049 $canv create oval\
1050 [expr 80+65*$State] 605\
1051 [expr 87+65*$State] 612\
1052 -fill #00FF00
1053 $canv create oval\
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1054 [expr 80+65*[expr $State+1]] 605\
1055 [expr 87+65*[expr $State+1]] 612\
1056 -fill #00FF00
1057 $canv create text\
1058 [expr 83+65*$State] 622\
1059 -fill #00FF00 -text ""
1060 $canv create oval\
1061 [expr 80+65*$State] 640\
1062 [expr 87+65*$State] 647\
1063 -fill #00FF00
1064 $canv create oval\
1065 [expr 80+65*[expr $State+1]] 640\
1066 [expr 87+65*[expr $State+1]] 647\
1067 -fill #00FF00
1068 $canv create text\
1069 [expr 83+65*$State] 657\
1070 -fill #00FF00 -text ""
1071 } elseif {$PIDx==1} {
1072 $canv create oval\
1073 [expr 80+65*$State] 565\
1074 [expr 87+65*$State] 572\
1075 -fill #00FF00
1076 $canv create oval\
1077 [expr 80+65*[expr $State+1]] 565\
1078 [expr 87+65*[expr $State+1]] 572\
1079 -fill #00FF00
1080 $canv create text\
1081 [expr 83+65*$State] 582\
1082 -fill #00FF00 -text ""
1083 $canv create oval\
1084 [expr 80+65*$State] 605\
1085 [expr 87+65*$State] 612\
1086 -fill white
1087
1088 $canv create oval\
1089 [expr 80+65*[expr $State+1]] 605\
1090 [expr 87+65*[expr $State+1]] 612\
1091 -fill white
1092 $canv create text\
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1093 [expr 83+65*$State] 622\
1094 -fill white -text $Data
1095 $canv create arc [expr 80+65*$State-10] [expr 605-16]\
1096 [expr 87+65*$State+76] [expr 612+95]\
1097 -outline white -width 2 -style arc -start 45
1098 $canv create oval\
1099 [expr 80+65*$State] 640\
1100 [expr 87+65*$State] 647\
1101 -fill #00FF00
1102 $canv create oval\
1103 [expr 80+65*[expr $State+1]] 640\
1104 [expr 87+65*[expr $State+1]] 647\
1105 -fill #00FF00
1106 $canv create text\
1107 [expr 83+65*$State] 657\
1108 -fill #00FF00 -text ""
1109
1110 } elseif {$PIDx==2} {
1111 $canv create oval\
1112 [expr 80+65*$State] 565\
1113 [expr 87+65*$State] 572\
1114 -fill #00FF00
1115 $canv create oval\
1116 [expr 80+65*[expr $State+1]] 565\
1117 [expr 87+65*[expr $State+1]] 572\
1118 -fill #00FF00
1119 $canv create text\
1120 [expr 83+65*$State] 582\
1121 -fill #00FF00 -text ""
1122 $canv create oval\
1123 [expr 80+65*$State] 605\
1124 [expr 87+65*$State] 612\
1125 -fill #00FF00
1126 $canv create oval\
1127 [expr 80+65*[expr $State+1]] 605\
1128 [expr 87+65*[expr $State+1]] 612\
1129 -fill #00FF00
1130 $canv create text\
1131 [expr 83+65*$State] 622\
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1132 -fill #00FF00 -text ""
1133 $canv create oval\
1134 [expr 80+65*$State] 640\
1135 [expr 87+65*$State] 647\
1136 -fill white
1137 $canv create oval\
1138 [expr 80+65*[expr $State+1]] 640\
1139 [expr 87+65*[expr $State+1]] 647\
1140 -fill white
1141 $canv create text\
1142 [expr 83+65*$State] 657\
1143 -fill white -text $Data
1144 $canv create arc [expr 80+65*$State-10] [expr 640-16]\
1145 [expr 87+65*$State+76] [expr 647+95]\
1146 -outline white -width 2 -style arc -start 45
1147 }
1148
1149 } elseif {$State==9} {
1150 if {$PIDx==0} {
1151 $canv create oval\
1152 [expr 80+65*$State] 565\
1153 [expr 87+65*$State] 572\
1154 -fill white
1155 $canv create text\
1156 [expr 83+65*$State] 582\
1157 -fill white -text $Data
1158
1159 } elseif {$PIDx==1} {
1160 $canv create oval\
1161 [expr 80+65*$State] 605\
1162 [expr 87+65*$State] 612\
1163 -fill white
1164 $canv create text\
1165 [expr 83+65*$State] 622\
1166 -fill white -text $Data
1167
1168
1169 } elseif {$PIDx==2} {
1170 $canv create oval\
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1171 [expr 80+65*$State] 640\
1172 [expr 87+65*$State] 647\
1173 -fill white
1174 $canv create text\
1175 [expr 83+65*$State] 657\
1176 -fill white -text $Data
1177 }
1178 } else {
1179 if {$PIDx==0} {
1180 $canv create oval\
1181 [expr 80+65*$State] 565\
1182 [expr 87+65*$State] 572\
1183 -fill white
1184 $canv create oval\
1185 [expr 80+65*[expr $State+1]] 565\
1186 [expr 87+65*[expr $State+1]] 572\
1187 -fill white
1188 $canv create text\
1189 [expr 83+65*$State] 582\
1190 -fill white -text $Data
1191 $canv create arc [expr 80+65*$State-10] [expr 565-16]\
1192 [expr 87+65*$State+76] [expr 572+95]\
1193 -outline white -width 2 -style arc -start 45
1194 $canv create oval\
1195 [expr 80+65*[expr $State+1]] 605\
1196 [expr 87+65*[expr $State+1]] 612\
1197 -fill #00FF00
1198 $canv create text\
1199 [expr 83+65*$State] 622\
1200 -fill #00FF00 -text ""
1201 $canv create oval\
1202 [expr 80+65*[expr $State+1]] 640\
1203 [expr 87+65*[expr $State+1]] 647\
1204 -fill #00FF00
1205 $canv create text\
1206 [expr 83+65*$State] 657\
1207 -fill #00FF00 -text ""
1208 } elseif {$PIDx==1} {
1209 $canv create oval\
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1210 [expr 80+65*[expr $State+1]] 565\
1211 [expr 87+65*[expr $State+1]] 572\
1212 -fill #00FF00
1213 $canv create text\
1214 [expr 83+65*$State] 582\
1215 -fill #00FF00 -text ""
1216 $canv create oval\
1217 [expr 80+65*$State] 605\
1218 [expr 87+65*$State] 612\
1219 -fill white
1220
1221 $canv create oval\
1222 [expr 80+65*[expr $State+1]] 605\
1223 [expr 87+65*[expr $State+1]] 612\
1224 -fill white
1225 $canv create text\
1226 [expr 83+65*$State] 622\
1227 -fill white -text $Data
1228 $canv create arc [expr 80+65*$State-10] [expr 605-16]\
1229 [expr 87+65*$State+76] [expr 612+95]\
1230 -outline white -width 2 -style arc -start 45
1231 $canv create oval\
1232 [expr 80+65*[expr $State+1]] 640\
1233 [expr 87+65*[expr $State+1]] 647\
1234 -fill #00FF00
1235 $canv create text\
1236 [expr 83+65*$State] 657\
1237 -fill #00FF00 -text ""
1238
1239 } elseif {$PIDx==2} {
1240 $canv create oval\
1241 [expr 80+65*[expr $State+1]] 565\
1242 [expr 87+65*[expr $State+1]] 572\
1243 -fill #00FF00
1244 $canv create text\
1245 [expr 83+65*$State] 582\
1246 -fill #00FF00 -text ""
1247 $canv create oval\
1248 [expr 80+65*[expr $State+1]] 605\
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1249 [expr 87+65*[expr $State+1]] 612\
1250 -fill #00FF00
1251 $canv create text\
1252 [expr 83+65*$State] 622\
1253 -fill #00FF00 -text ""
1254 $canv create oval\
1255 [expr 80+65*$State] 640\
1256 [expr 87+65*$State] 647\
1257 -fill white
1258 $canv create oval\
1259 [expr 80+65*[expr $State+1]] 640\
1260 [expr 87+65*[expr $State+1]] 647\
1261 -fill white
1262 $canv create text\
1263 [expr 83+65*$State] 657\
1264 -fill white -text $Data
1265 $canv create arc [expr 80+65*$State-10] [expr 640-16]\
1266 [expr 87+65*$State+76] [expr 647+95]\




1271 #Memory's address values bullets
1272 if {$State<9} {
1273 $canv create oval\
1274 [expr 80+65*$State] 680\
1275 [expr 87+65*$State] 687\
1276 -fill white
1277
1278 $canv create oval\
1279 [expr 80+65*[expr $State+1]] 680\
1280 [expr 87+65*[expr $State+1]] 687\
1281 -fill white
1282
1283 $canv create text\
1284 [expr 83+65*$State] 697\
1285 -fill white -text $Memory
1286
1287 $canv create arc [expr 80+65*$State-10] [expr 680-16]\
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1288 [expr 87+65*$State+76] [expr 687+95]\
1289 -outline white -width 2 -style arc -start 45
1290
1291 } else {
1292 $canv create oval\
1293 [expr 80+65*$State] 680\




1298 $canv create text\
1299 [expr 83+65*$State] 697\





1305 $canv create text\
1306 [expr 83+65*$State] 520\
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Listing D.1: RMI Tempura Program
1 /* -*- Mode: C -*-
2 * This file is part Tempura: Interval Temporal Logic interpreter.
3 *
4 * Copyright (C) 1998-2016 Nayef H.Alshammari, Antonio Cau
5 *
6 * Tempura is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
7 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
8 * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
9 * (at your option) any later version.
10 *
11 * Tempura is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
12 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
13 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
14 * GNU General Public License for more details.
15 *
16 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License





22 /* rmiregistry 0 */
23 /* rmiserver . RmiServerIntf RmiServer 1 */
24 /* rmiclient . RmiServerIntf RmiClient1 2 */
25 /* rmiclient . RmiServerIntf RmiClient2 3 */
26 define apidvar(X) = {X[0]}.
27 define apidval(X) = {X[1]}.
28 define avar1(X,a) = {X[a]}.
29 define aval1(X,b) = {X[b]}.
30 define atime1(X,c) = {strint(X[c])}.
31 define atime_micro1(X,d) = {X[d]}.
32 set print_states = true.
33 define get_var() = {
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38 Timestamp =atime_micro1(T,4) and
39 format("Server is Receiving Assertion Data: X=%12d from Client %d at timestamp %s\n",
40 Data,Client,Timestamp) and empty
41 }
42 }.
43 /* run */ define test() = {
44 exists v : {
45 for v<2 do {get_var();skip}
46 }
47 }.
Listing D.2: Client 1 Tempura Program
1 /* -*- Mode: C -*-
2 * This file is part Tempura: Interval Temporal Logic interpreter.
3 *
4 * Copyright (C) 1998-2016 Nayef H.Alshammari, Antonio Cau
5 *
6 * Tempura is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
7 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
8 * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
9 * (at your option) any later version.
10 *
11 * Tempura is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
12 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
13 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
14 * GNU General Public License for more details.
15 *
16 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License





22 /* rmiclient . RmiServerIntf RmiClient1 2 */
23 define apidvar(X) = {X[0]}.
24 define apidval(X) = {X[1]}.
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25 define avar1(X,a) = {X[a]}.
26 define aval1(X,b) = {X[b]}.
27 define atime1(X,c) = {strint(X[c])}.
28 define atime_micro1(X,d) = {strint(X[d])}.
29 set print_states = false.
30 define assert(Client,Data,Timestamp) = {
31 exists Client,Data,Timestamp : {
32 format("\n") and
33 format("Client %d is Sending %d to Interface\n",Client) and
34 format("!PROG: assert Client:%d:X:%d:%s:!\n",Client,Data,Timestamp)
35 }
36 }.
37 define get_var() = {
38 exists T : {
39 get2(T) and
40 Client =strint(apidval(T)) and
41 Data =strint(aval1(T,3)) and
42 Timestamp =atime_micro1(T,4) and
43 format("Client %d is Receiving Assertion Data: Client=%d from %d from External Java ...
Program at
44 Timestamp=%s\n",Client,Client,Data,Timestamp) and assert(Client,Data,Timestamp) and empty
45 }
46 }.
47 /* run */ define test_client1() = {skip and get_var()}.
Listing D.3: Client 2 Tempura Program
1 /* -*- Mode: C -*-
2 * This file is part Tempura: Interval Temporal Logic interpreter.
3 *
4 * Copyright (C) 1998-2016 Nayef H.Alshammari, Antonio Cau
5 *
6 * Tempura is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
7 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
8 * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
9 * (at your option) any later version.
10 *
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11 * Tempura is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
12 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
13 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
14 * GNU General Public License for more details.
15 *
16 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License





22 /* rmiclient . RmiServerIntf RmiClient2 3 */
23 define apidvar(X) = {X[0]}.
24 define apidval(X) = {X[1]}.
25 define avar1(X,a) = {X[a]}.
26 define aval1(X,b) = {X[b]}.
27 define atime1(X,c) = {strint(X[c])}.
28 define atime_micro1(X,d) = {strint(X[d])}.
29 set print_states = false.
30 define assert(Client,Data,Timestamp) = {
31 exists Client,Data,Timestamp : {
32 format("\n") and
33 format("Client %d is Sending %d to Interface\n",Client) and
34 format("!PROG: assert Client:%d:X:%d:%s:!\n",Client,Data,Timestamp)
35 }
36 }.
37 define get_var() = {
38 exists T : {
39 get2(T) and
40 Client =strint(apidval(T)) and
41 Data =strint(aval1(T,3)) and
42 Timestamp =atime_micro1(T,4) and
43 format("Client %d is Receiving Assertion Data: Client=%d from %d from External Java ...
Program at
44 Timestamp=%s\n",Client,Client,Data,Timestamp) and assert(Client,Data,Timestamp) and empty
45 }
46 }.
47 /* run */ define test_client2() = {skip and get_var()}.
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7 public class RmiClient1 {
8 private RmiClient1() {}
9 public static void main(String args[]) {
10 String host = (args.length < 1) ? null : args[0];
11 try {
12 Registry registry = LocateRegistry.getRegistry(host);
13 RmiServerIntf stub = (RmiServerIntf) registry.lookup("RmiServerIntf");
14 for(int i = 0; i < 1; i++){
15 Thread.sleep (1000);
16 String Time = MicroTimestamp.INSTANCE.get();
17 int id=1;
18 Random rand = new Random();
19 int X = rand.nextInt();
20 System.out.println("!PROG: assert Client:"+id+":Data:"+X+":"+Time+":!");
21 System.out.println("External Java Program is sending Assertion Data to
22 Tempura Client="+id+" Data="+X+" Timestamp="+Time);
23 }
24 } catch(Exception e) {




29 public enum MicroTimestamp {
30 INSTANCE ;
31 private long startDate ;
32 private long startNanoseconds ;
33 private SimpleDateFormat dateFormat ;
34 private MicroTimestamp() {
35 this.startDate = System.currentTimeMillis() ;
36 this.startNanoseconds = System.nanoTime() ;
37 this.dateFormat = new SimpleDateFormat("HH-mm-ss-SSS") ;
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38 }
39 public String get() {
40 long microSeconds = (System.nanoTime() - this.startNanoseconds) / 1000 ;
41 long date = this.startDate + (microSeconds/1000) ;












7 public class RmiClient2 {
8 private RmiClient2() {}
9 public static void main(String args[]) {
10 String host = (args.length < 1) ? null : args[0];
11 try {
12 Registry registry = LocateRegistry.getRegistry(host);
13 RmiServerIntf stub = (RmiServerIntf) registry.lookup("RmiServerIntf");
14 for(int i = 0; i < 1; i++){
15 Thread.sleep (1000);
16 String Time = MicroTimestamp.INSTANCE.get();
17 int id=2;
18 Random rand = new Random();
19 int X = rand.nextInt();
20 System.out.println("!PROG: assert Client:"+id+":Data:"+X+":"+Time+":!");
21 System.out.println("External Java Program is sending Assertion Data to
22 Tempura Client="+id+" Data="+X+" Timestamp="+Time);
23 }
24 } catch(Exception e) {
25 System.err.println("Client exception: " + e.toString());
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29 public enum MicroTimestamp {
30 INSTANCE ;
31 private long startDate ;
32 private long startNanoseconds ;
33 private SimpleDateFormat dateFormat ;
34 private MicroTimestamp() {
35 this.startDate = System.currentTimeMillis() ;
36 this.startNanoseconds = System.nanoTime() ;
37 this.dateFormat = new SimpleDateFormat("HH-mm-ss-SSS") ;
38 }
39 public String get() {
40 long microSeconds = (System.nanoTime() - this.startNanoseconds) / 1000 ;
41 long date = this.startDate + (microSeconds/1000) ;













8 public class RmiServer implements RmiServerIntf {
9 static Integer x = 0;
10 public RmiServer() {}
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14 public static void main(String args[]) {
15 try {
16 RmiServer obj = new RmiServer();
17 RmiServerIntf stub = (RmiServerIntf) UnicastRemoteObject.exportObject(obj, 0);
18 Registry registry = LocateRegistry.getRegistry();
19 registry.rebind("RmiServerIntf",stub);
20 System.err.println("Server ready");
21 } catch (Exception e) {





Listing D.7: Server Interface Java Program
1 import java.rmi.Remote;
2 import java.rmi.RemoteException;
3 public interface RmiServerIntf extends Remote {
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Listing E.1: MATLAB Code for Memory Consistency Property

























34 f = 1;
35 case 4
36 f = 2;
37 case 7
38 f = 3;
39 case 10
40 f = 4;
41 case 13
42 f = 5;
43 case 16
44 f = 6;
45 case 19
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46 f = 7;
47 case 22
48 f = 8;
49 case 25
50 f = 9;
51 case 28





















































103 disp('Correctness Property 1: Memory Consistency is Done!')
Listing E.2: MATLAB Code for Cache Coherence Property





















123 f = 1;
124 case 4
125 f = 2;
126 case 7
127 f = 3;
128 case 10
129 f = 4;
130 case 13
131 f = 5;
132 case 16
133 f = 6;
134 case 19
135 f = 7;
136 case 22
137 f = 8;
138 case 25
139 f = 9;
140 case 28




145 set(gcf, 'Position', [100, 100, 900, 700])
146 subplot(3,1,1);
147 C = [0 0 0];
148 if MSIP0 == 1
149 C = [1 0 0];
150 elseif MSIP0 == 2
151 C = [0 0 1];
152 else
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158 set(gca, 'XTick', 0:7)





164 if MSIP0 == 1
165 legend('Modified');





171 title("Coherence State of Cache Blocks of Processor "+Pid0+" at State "+State)
172
173 subplot(3,1,2);
174 C = [0 0 0];
175 if MSIP1 == 1
176 C = [1 0 0];
177 elseif MSIP1 == 2
178 C = [0 0 1];
179 else





185 set(gca, 'XTick', 0:7)





191 if MSIP1 == 1
192 legend('Modified');
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197 end
198 title("Coherence State of Cache Blocks of Processor "+Pid1+" at State "+State)
199
200 subplot(3,1,3);
201 C = [0 0 0];
202 if MSIP2 == 1
203 C = [1 0 0];
204 elseif MSIP2 == 2
205 C = [0 0 1];
206 else





212 set(gca, 'XTick', 0:7)





218 if MSIP2 == 1
219 legend('Modified');









229 disp('Correctness Property 2: Cache Coherence is Done!')
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